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Introduction
I pull in resolution, and begin
To doubt the equivocation of the fiend
That lies like truth: ’Fear not, till Birnam wood
Do come to Dunsinane:’ and now a wood
Comes toward Dunsinane.
Macbeth in Macbeth (Act V, Scene V)
William Shakespeare
Enter Wim Duisenberg. On 1 July 1998, the former President of the Central Bank
of the Netherlands was appointed as the first President of the European Central Bank.
As Shakespeare’s Macbeth - initially Thane of Glamis and then Thane of Cawdor - kills
Duncan, King of Scotland, only to replace him on the throne, by 31 December 1998 the
European Central Bank had ”killed” and replaced all national central banks of euro-
adopting countries. In the analogy, Wim Duisenberg is a character that merely represent
the typical supporter of economic, financial and monetary integration in the European
Union, once European Economic Community, from at least the 1980s onwards. At the
press conference following the ECOFIN meeting on 31 December 1998, which irrevocably
fixed conversion rates for the euro, he stated:
I can assure you that we shall do our utmost to make the euro a currency
in which European citizens will be able to place their trust. The euro has
to become a currency which will keep its value over time and contribute to a
stable, prosperous and peaceful Europe.
With hindsight, he could have been seen as simultaneously playing the parts of Macbeth
and of the three Witches. At that time, his prophecy could not but sound irrefutable. Still
in 2008, the European Central Bank - in the Monthly Bulletin that celebrated the 10th
anniversary of the European Monetary Union (EMU) - triumphantly asserted: ”These
ten years have also shown that the foundations of EMU were sound and that a high
degree of economic convergence had been achieved by those countries that adopted the
euro”. Eight years later however, the impossible prophecy that economic integration
among European countries would turn into unsustainable divergences and disaggregating
tendencies has now become a real possibility. And now a wood comes toward Dunsinane.
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Figure 1: Yves Thibault de Silguy, European commissioner in charge of Economic and financial affairs
and monetary matters, on the left, and Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, unveiling
the table with euro parities at the end of the ECOFIN meeting on 31 December 1998.
This dissertation presents and critically discusses two alternative interpretations over
the origin of the economic crisis in the euro area. They are, to all intents and pur-
poses, mutually exclusive. Hence, whichever results to be the correct one will carry
clear and distinct political, not just policy, consequences. The ’Consensus View’ on the
Eurozone crisis, resumed in chapter 1, agrees on a common narrative over its origins:
current account imbalances, resulting from divergences in competitiveness among Euro-
zone countries, triggered a ’sudden stop’ of capital flows towards peripheral countries. In
the following chapters, instead, it is argued that the mainstream interpretation is ridden
with misconceptions. An ’Alternative View’ is therefore presented, one that sees in the
excess of gross financial flows, favoured by the liberalisation of capital movements and
the elimination of the exchange-rate risk made possible by the establishment of the mone-
tary union, the ultimate cause of trade imbalances that emerged in the period 1999-2007.
Domestic demand in peripheral countries has been inflated by an unsustainable dynamic
of private credit and asset prices, to which cross-border flows coming from big banks
in core countries has contributed substantially. This dissertation therefore attempts to
give theoretical and empirical support to the alternative hypothesis, by concentrating
in particular on a comparison between Germany and Spain. In the conclusions it will
be explained why, starting from this different perspective, the Eurozone crisis should be
conceived mainly as a financial crisis with structural causes linked to its institutional
configuration and to the nature of its integration process.
Chapter 1
The ’Consensus View’ on the
Eurozone crisis
Neither a borrower nor a lender be;
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.
This above all: to thine ownself be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
Hamlet in Hamlet (Act I, Scene III)
William Shakespeare
The Eurozone crisis is undoubtedly a complex event that cannot be summarised
into few straightforward propositions. Elaborating a narrative on such an intricate phe-
nomenon has the great merit of capturing its socio-economic and political aspects, not
simply in abstract terms, but with an historically and empirically sounded analysis. That
has largely been the attempt of a group of notable economists1 (Baldwin and Giavazzi
2015). This sort of consensus narrative represents a useful analytical reference, as it sum-
marises the mainstream economic view on the causes of the economic crisis in the euro
area.
In what follows, the main features of their explanation will be presented, concentrat-
ing in particular on few crucial aspects that will be critically assessed in the following
chapters: the nature of a currency union with a well-functioning payment system, the
role of private financial flows and the sources of divergent current account imbalances
in the euro area. Before doing that, it is useful to retrieve the debate in the economic
mainstream, prior to the crisis of 2007/2008, on those very issues, so as to compare it to
the new ’Consensus View’, in order to find similarities and possible discrepancies.
1Among them, the most known: Richard Baldwin, Francesco Giavazzi, Paul De Grauwe, Guido
Tabellini, Charles Wyplosz, Jeffrey Frankel and many others.
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1.1 The ’benign neglect’ of current account imbal-
ances
The renewed attention for external imbalances stands in striking contrast to the previous
conventional wisdom, which conceptualised current account divergences as being nothing
else than the natural manifestation of economic (i.e. income per capita) convergence.
In fact, two authors (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002), now belonging to the ’Consensus
View’, had previously argued that countries with lower levels of GDP per capita should
easily sustain temporary current account deficits as this represents the natural outcome
of financial and economic integration between economies with different initial levels of
capital intensity, defined in terms of their capital-labour ratio (K/L). This is in fact
the essence of Modern Growth Theory: ’conditional convergence’ occurs when countries
with a lower ratio - therefore with higher marginal productivity of capital - increase their
domestic investment because of higher expected returns and, at the same time, lower
their domestic saving as future growth will allow for the repayment of today’s liabilities.
This catching-up phase requires inflows of foreign capital to finance over-investment, in
an inter-temporal exercise of efficient resource allocation. In fact, it is essential in this
process that richer countries compensate such imbalances, by providing the necessary
capital through their oversaving, reflected in current account surpluses. It follows that
economic and financial integration in the European Monetary Union facilitates this course
of action by reducing the cost of borrowing due to interest rates’ convergence and by
increasing the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. In other
words, in the first decade of its existence, it looked as if the ’Lucas Paradox’2 (Lucas
1990) could not materialise in the EMU. For these theoretical reasons the authors label
as ’benign’ the indifference that the European authorities have expressed towards current
account divergences.
The idea that there exists a long-term tendency for external imbalances to be brought
into equilibrium has noble roots into the seminal essay of Ingram (1973), who described
how the equilibrating mechanism would work for deficit countries (p.18):
The rise in productive capacity will tend to increase exports (or decrease
imports) and thus restore current-account balance. Consequently, the need
for a government to borrow in Community capital markets will decline and
may eventually come to an end. [...] The great diversity in circumstances of
member nations and constantly changing conditions over time make it likely
that certain member nations may be chronic borrowers in Community capital
markets. However, this is no cause for alarm if the funds are being wisely
used.
2The ’Lucas Paradox’ describes the contradiction between the theoretical argument for capital -
intended as real resources - to flow from developed to developing countries, due to their lower levels of
K/L, and the observation that this does not actually occur in reality.
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Furthermore, this fundamental belief finds its consecration into one of the most im-
portant documents that sought to assess the feasibility of a monetary union, delineating
in which terms it should have been implemented. The report is titled One market, one
money. An evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of forming an economic and mon-
etary union (Commission of the European Communities 1990), the theoretical argument
is recurrent (p.39):
The necessary degree of convergence in terms of external current account
imbalances is also difficult to assess. Since the current account is identically
equal to the difference between overall savings and investment, it is clear that
a balanced current account is not always a desirable result. As discussed in
Chapter 6, economies with a low capital/labour ratio and therefore with a
relatively large potential for investment would actually gain from being able
to partially finance investment through foreign savings, thus running current
account deficits. This implies that current account imbalances should not
be a cause for concern if they reflect patterns of this type and are financed
automatically through private capital flows, which is in principle the case in
a well functioning EMU with a single currency.
Indeed, the disappearance of what they call the ’external current account constraint’ is
listed among the benefits of better adjusting to economic shocks.
Eventually, such theoretical indifference towards current account dynamics has been
well codified into the Treaties. Concerns about external imbalances among member states
are discussed only in passing in Title VIII ’ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY’,
Chapter 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Interestingly,
they are confined to the chapter on ’Transitional Provisions’, that is those that apply to
countries that have not adopted the euro yet.
1.2 Main features of the ’Consensus View’
Contrary to several official statements from the European Commission3, the current main-
stream interpretation recognises that the economic crisis in the Eurozone has not to be
seen, as least in the first place, as a crisis of public finance. The ’Consensus View’ now
agrees that the focus should be shifted to the increasing divergences in current accounts
that has been built in the years preceding the crisis, to which the large intra-Eurozone
capital flows are first of all a by-product and only later a reinforcing cause.
3From the website of the European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Af-
fairs (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/the_financial_and_economic_crisis/
why_did_the_crisis_happen/index_en.htm): ”Governments that had grown accustomed to borrowing
large amounts each year to finance their budgets and that had accumulated massive debts in the process,
suddenly found markets less willing to keep lending to them.”
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1.2.1 The role of capital flows in the ’Consensus View’
Large intra-country capital flows emerged in the Eurozone from 1999 onwards, as the
theory predicted, once the real cost of borrowing converged to similar levels, and risk
premia disappeared thanks to monetary and financial integration (figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Intra-euro convergence of interest rates on 10-year bonds. Source: Santos and Velasco
(2015)
The extent to which private capital flows had increased during the first decade of the
EMU is immediately clear from figure 1.2, rising from less than 15 per cent of euro area
GDP in 2001, to over 40 per cent in 2007, right before the eruption of the global financial
crisis. It is a central argument of the ’Consensus View’ the idea that this explosion of
intra-country capital flows was nothing but the result of excess saving in the ’core’ directly
being channelled towards the ’periphery’. In the words of Pasimeni (2014, p.184):
This unprecedented boom of capital flows acted as a system of transfers from
economies with growing current account surpluses to others with growing
current account deficits. The long-advocated common fiscal capacity was
actually substituted by an enormous system of intra-EMU transfers in the
private financial sector, instead than by public finances.
When the financial crisis of 2007/2008 occurred, private capital flows froze, generating
a sort of ’sudden stop’ that is usually considered the initial stage of a balance-of-payments
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Figure 1.2: Euro area capital flows as a percentage of GDP (1993-2001). Source: Lane (2013)
crisis. Of course, the typical mechanism of pressure on the exchange rate could not take
place, given the existence of a single currency; it manifested instead into rising risk
premia for liabilities of banks and governments. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) have
thus identified few ’sudden stops’, the most important one right after the global financial
crisis.
1.2.2 Current accounts as the main sources of imbalances
The ’Consensus View’ assigns great importance to the role of current account imbalances,
and their corresponding net lending or borrowing positions. In their view ”a nation’s
current account is its net borrowing from abroad”, something that is recovered by the
standard national account identities:
CAB = Y − C − I = ∆(B)
S = Y − C
therefore
CAB = S − I = ∆(B)
where CAB is current account balance, Y national income, C domestic consumption,
I domestic investment, S domestic saving and ∆(B) the increase (or decrease) of net
borrowing. It follows that a surplus country, say Germany, had been saving in excess
of its investment while a deficit country, say Spain, had systematically over-invested for
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many years after the introduction of the euro4.
Figure 1.3: Current account over GDP in ’peripheral’ and ’core’ countries over 1999-2007. Source:
Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015)
Ireland Spain Portugal Greece Germany The Netherlands
-19.2% -59% -90.7% -85.1% +31.5% +53.7%
Table 1.1: Cumulated current accounts (1999-2008) as a percentage of GDP. Source: Pasimeni (2014)
Therefore, this divergent dynamics of saving and investment between the euro area
’core’5 and the ’periphery’6 was nothing but the other and correspondent side of capital
flows between the two groups of countries.
Nevertheless, as initially discussed in Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010), a considerable
part of these capital flows were directed towards non-tradable sectors, mainly construction
and even private consumption. The authors therefore attempt to reconcile the inter-
temporal equilibrating mechanism described above with the evidence that capital flows
kept increasing, as current-account divergences widened further. This eventually ended
up in a ’sudden stop’ moment that triggered instability in the banking and government
sector of many debtor countries. In fact, they note that despite GDP per capita growth
had been sustained in the first decade of EMU, labour productivity and Total Factor
Productivity in many peripheral countries stagnated, thus making the persistence of
foreign capital inflows more and more incompatible with the underlying dynamics of
their economies. They introduce the distinction between ’productive’ and ’unproductive’
purpose of foreign borrowing (pp.6-7):
4By 2007, Germany’s net lending was about 250 billion euros, whereas Spain’s net borrowing was
about 150 billion.
5Germany, The Netherlands and Austria are generally assigned to the core, with the partial inclusion
of France.
6The periphery is usually composed by Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Italy to some extent.
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That distinction, and the requirement that national wealth and external debt
grow together, can be translated into the condition that the borrowing coun-
try must respect an intertemporal solvency constraint requiring that today’s
liabilities must be matched by future (discounted) current surpluses. This is
only possible if foreign borrowing is used to increase the country’s productive
capacity of exportable goods and services. [...] As soon as we allow for the
existence of non-traded goods and for the possibility that investment can be
devoted to the production of either type of goods, that condition becomes
more stringent and therefore the current account position may come to mat-
ter.
In particular they underline how in countries such as Ireland and Spain, the share
of construction in total Value Added and investment in construction as a share of to-
tal investment rose significantly during that decade (more on that in chapter 3 and 4).
Households gross debt over disposable income increased, while saving over gross dispos-
able income declined. Portugal experienced a decrease in both saving and investment
over gross disposable income, but again an increase in households gross debt. Greece
instead was characterised by a ratio of private consumption over GDP much higher than
the EU average. In each of these cases, the authors argue that the extent and the nature
of capital inflows and current account dynamics became increasingly incompatible with
the inter-temporal budget constraint.
The ’Consensus View’ takes this explanation as valid and acknowledges that the confi-
dence in the inter-temporal mechanism of resources allocation between countries, favoured
by discrepancies of investment and saving that generated large financial flows, had been
mistakenly considered as a natural process of convergence and not as a ’bug’ in the system
itself. With reference to capital flows, they argue (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015, p.19):
A major slice of these were invested in non-traded sectors – housing and
government services/consumption. This meant assets were not being created
to help pay off in the investment. It also tended to drive up wages and costs
in a way that harmed the competitiveness of the receivers’ export earnings,
thus encouraging further worsening of their current accounts.
Germany Greece Portugal Spain Ireland
Non-tradable sector
(2000− 2007) 25.0% 7.6% 6.7% 11.4% 40.3%
Tradable sector
(2000− 2007) 11.8% 37.3% 14.8% 34.4% 42.8%
Table 1.2: Cumulative growth rates in tradable and non-tradable sectors. Source: Pasimeni (2014)
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1.2.3 The issue of competitiveness
The ability of capital inflows to generate productive capacity, that should supposedly
repay the initial investment, raises the issue of competitiveness. After all, the current
account balance in the balance-of-payments statistics is composed by:
CAB = BoT +NIT +NCT
where CAB stands for current account balance, BoT is the balance of trade in goods
and services, NIT are net income transfers and NCT are net current transfers. In
the current account balance, the most conspicuous component in quantitative terms is
generally represented by the trade balance. Therefore, a country’s competitiveness is
usually associated to its success in the export markets. As the ECB’s President Mario
Draghi (2012) put it:
A convenient way to identify competitiveness differentials is simply to look at
the current account balances of each country. [...]
Current account imbalances could be justified for any country, including those
participating in a monetary union, and they do not necessarily reflect a loss
of competitiveness. But increasingly, larger current account deficits have re-
sulted from significant losses of national competitiveness, signalling domestic
macroeconomic imbalances and deeper structural problems.
This set of considerations has prompted some authors, Hans-Werner Sinn (2014) above
all, to assert that current account imbalances can be largely attributed to structural de-
velopments in cost and price competitiveness between Eurozone’s member states. In
his view, capital inflows have merely contributed to already existent divergences in the
evolution of costs - wage costs in particular - and productivity in many Eurozone coun-
tries. Progressive losses of competitiveness in peripheral countries, by aggravating the
trade balance, required more capital inflows to cover external deficits, in a vicious self-
reinforcing mechanism. The single currency did play a decisive role in this process, not
only by favouring the convergence of interest rates with the consequence of spurring a
bout of cheap credit in the periphery, but also by fixing irrevocably the exchange-rate of
previous national currencies.
The mechanism through which increases in (wage) costs translate into losses of com-
petitiveness and therefore trade deficits is quite linear. Wages (W ) are a significant
component of total production costs (CTot). In general, firms set the prices for their final
products by imposing a mark up (µ) over total costs per unit of product (CTot
q
) as follows:
P = (1 + µ)CTot
q
Then, following Felipe and Kumar (2011), total costs per unit of output can be decom-
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posed into the sum of unit labour costs (ULC):
UCL =
W
pi
or UCL =
W
q
L
and unit capital costs (UKC), the ratio of the nominal profit rate to capital productivity,
which is assumed to be fixed. In the ULC expression, pi stands for labour productivity,
which is nothing but the ratio between q, the output of the firm and L, the number of
workers employed or the total working hours. The pricing equation becomes:
P = (1 + µ)(UKC + ULC)
that is
P = (1 + µ)
(
UKC +
W
pi
)
From the last equation one can derive that the pricing behaviour of firms is influenced
by the following variables: the markup (µ) and the unit capital costs (UKC), which
are assumed to be constant; the dynamic of unit labour cost (ULC) which is directly
proportional to the level of nominal wages (W ) and inversely proportional to the level
of labour productivity (pi). This approach, inspired by the Post-Keynesian theory on
mark-up pricing (Sylos Labini 1957; Kalecki 1971) in an oligopolistic environment, helps
to explain why an increase in the general level of wages will be detrimental for the current
account balance. Wages (W ) growing faster than labour productivity will result in higher
rates of growth of unit labour costs (ULC) that will translate into higher rates of inflation
(P˙ ). High rates of inflation relative to other partners in a fixed exchange-rate system or
in a monetary union such as the euro, will produce a real appreciation of the exchange
rate (REER). Relatively more expensive prices for exported goods will make them less
palatable in the international market, thus the balance of trade (BoT ) will deteriorate
and with it the current account balance (CAB) of that country.
↑ (W )⇒↑ (ULC)⇒↑ (P˙ )⇒↑ (REER)⇒↓ (BoT )⇒↓ (CAB)
This explains how a loss in cost competitiveness may become detrimental for the trade
balance of a countries that have foregone the capacity to adjust their nominal exchange
rate. For the sake of clarity, imagine a fictional world in which there are only two
countries, A and B, trading with each other and with equal domestic rates of growth7, it
may happen that those countries experience different rates of growth in unit labour costs.
Suppose that, in country A, ULC from one year to another have increased by 6% and
that is perfectly translated into a 6% inflation rate for that year8. In country B instead,
7This is a crucial assumption that is often omitted from the analysis of external imbalances. For sure
domestic and foreign demand growth has a significant impact on net exports, as it will be showed in
chapter 4.
8Assuming as before that µ and ULC are constant.
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both variables have risen by just 2%. This means that in one single year, country B has
lost almost four percentage points in terms of price competitiveness, relative to country
A. If both countries’ commercial relations were in balance at the beginning of the period,
at the end of the year country B will run a trade surplus, the exact matching of country
A’s deficit.
Following this simplified theoretical framework, the authors of the ’Consensus View’
characterise the emergence of current account imbalances among Eurozone countries as
the byproduct of outstanding divergences in ULC before the crisis (figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4: Unit labour costs in the eurozone 1999-2013 (index 100 = 1999). Source: AMECO
Database
The argument is the following: peripheral countries have seen their ULC increasing
steadily over the decade 1999-2009, thus contributing to their negative current account
positions. On the contrary, Germany managed to keep its ULC almost constant, much
below the EMU average, enabling the spectacular year-by-year accumulation of trade
surpluses.
The responsibility for these imbalances is mainly attributed to the deficit countries,
liable of maintaining too rigid labour markets and too high wages compared to the level of
productivity of their workers. Sinn (2014) argues that ”What Europe needs is austerity
in the south and inflationary growth in the north”, while a little dose of reflation in
the core, namely Germany, would contribute to restoring intra-euro competitiveness, a
substantial wage reduction is nonetheless necessary in peripheral countries. He estimates
that, in order to obtain a realignment in the real exchange rate over the next ten years,
Germany should reflate by 20% against the Eurozone average (i.e. 4.1% annual inflation
rate), while Spain should deflate by 30% against the Eurozone average (i.e. −1.3% annual
inflation rate).
On the other side, many Keynesian and left-leaning economists (Bofinger 2015; Flass-
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beck and Lapavitsas 2015), while fundamentally disagreeing over the remedies9 of these
imbalances, they substantially adhere to the ’competitiveness myth’ (Flassbeck and La-
pavitsas 2015):
[d]ealing with existing and future current account balances and guiding mem-
ber states towards more balanced trade [...] a currency union requires, above
all, coordination of price and wage evolution.
Or as in Bofinger (2015):
For the ideal functioning of the EZ, unit labour costs of each member state
should increase in line with the inflation target of the ECB.
Nevertheless, compared to the approach of many exponents of the ’Consensus View’
and of the European Commission, those critical authors believe that the necessary ad-
justment measures should be carried out by the surplus countries (especially Germany
and The Netherlands), which should boost their internal demand by allowing wages to
grow in excess of productivity increases. Policies of ’internal devaluation’, meaning a
reduction in the level of wages, though advocated as an essential part of the adjustment
process, are doomed to fail. In fact, it is true that wages represent a cost for the single
enterprise, but at the aggregate level they are the most important source of domestic de-
mand (Stockhammer and Onaran 2013). Thus, containing wage growth will more likely
cut down aggregate demand and damage the overall production capacity of the economy,
rather than contribute to its external competitiveness.
After all, the necessity for a fixed exchange-rate system, let alone a currency union, to
have a symmetric adjustment mechanism for their external imbalances, in which surplus
countries are compelled to inject further demand in the system by reflating their domestic
economy, was clearly identified also by John Maynard Keynes (1943). In his Proposal for
an International Currency Union, a document which reflects the position of the British
delegation at the international conference of Bretton Woods in 1944, he put forward the
principle that surplus countries should be compelled to play their necessary part in the
adjusment process:
A member State whose credit balance has exceeded a half of its quota on
the average of at least a year shall discuss with the Governing Board (but
shall retain the ultimate decision in its own hands) what measures would be
appropriate to restore the equilibrium of its international balances, including
—
(a) Measures for the expansion of domestic credit and domestic demand.
9In the case of Flassbeck and Lapavitsas, they essentially argue for the dismantling of the EMU and
call for the return of a reformed European Monetary System (EMS). Bofinger, Wren-Lewis and other
Keynesians instead insist that the internal rebalancing should be primarily carried out by Germany and
other surplus countries, through increases in the level of wages and by reflating domestic demand.
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(b) The appreciation of its local currency in terms of bancor, or, alternatively,
the encouragement of an increase in money rates of earnings;
(c) The reduction of tariffs and other discouragements against imports.
(d) International development loans.
1.3 The three pillars of the ’Consensus View’
The narrative delineated by the ’Consensus View’ comprises three fundamental theoret-
ical propositions. It is worthwhile to lists and briefly summarise all of them, as they will
be questioned in the following chapters, where an ’Alternative View’ on the Eurozone
crisis will be presented.
1. The Eurozone crisis is a balance-of-payment crisis caused by current ac-
count imbalances. In remarkable contrast with what had been previously thought
on current account’s neutral, if not positive, role in the convergence process of finan-
cially and economically integrated economies, nowadays there appears to be a general
unanimity over their responsibility for the emergence of the crisis. By requiring huge
external financing they rendered peripheral countries (defined as those being in deficit)
extremely dependent on foreign capital inflows. The global financial crisis represented
the ’sudden stop’ moment in which private capital ceased to flow, diverting itself towards
’safer heavens’. However, what typically happens in a balance-of-payment crisis in emerg-
ing economies, namely speculation over the value of the currency and its exchange rate,
could not materialise in a currency union such as the EMU. Instead, when the global
financial crisis hit the European economies, capital flowed away from deficit countries,
contributing initially to the economic downturn, and then bringing into sufferance banks
and governments’ balance sheets, by increasing risk premia on their liabilities. To sum
up: current accounts, far from being the necessary and productive sign of the convergence
process between areas with different levels of development, should regain a central focus
of attention. Current account imbalances have generated a balance-of-payments crisis
that has threatened the stability and maintenance of the monetary union.
2. Current account imbalances have been fuelled by capital flows, moving from
surplus countries towards deficit countries in the periphery. The divergence
in current accounts among Eurozone countries is seen as the primary trigger of intra-
country capital flows from surplus to deficit countries (i.e. from ’core’ to ’peripheral’
countries). From national accounting identities, a current account surplus is simply the
result of excess saving over investment, and the other way round for a current account
deficit. By seeing capital flows as surpluses directly channelled into deficit countries,
the importance of current accounts - crucially its dimension - is reaffirmed. In turns,
such flows contributed to making current account deficits even bigger and ultimately
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unsustainable, as domestic banks directed foreign credit to low-productive activities such
as residential construction and even private consumption. This argument can be defined
as the ’excess saving view’. Saving in excess of investment results in current account
imbalances and borrowing/lending positions between countries. Foreign net flows simply
mirror current account divergences and the firsts can eventually be curtailed by real
adjustments between saving and investment within countries.
3. Current account imbalances are merely the consequence of divergences in
cost and price competitiveness among EMU countries. The progressive devi-
ation in competitiveness among Eurozone countries, measured in terms of relative unit
labour costs, is thought as been the structural cause behind increasingly divergent cur-
rent accounts. Cost competitiveness translated automatically into price competitiveness
and core countries, that have seen their real exchange rate progressively depreciating
with respect to peripheral countries, have gained export market shares at their expenses.
This in turns favoured the accumulation of massive trade surpluses in the core, matched
by deficits in peripheral countries, both in absolute terms and relative to GDP. As the
balance of trade in goods and services is the main component of current accounts for
most developed countries, this explains how developments in labour productivity and
labour costs have driven the Eurozone into unsustainable ’real’ imbalances. The solu-
tion for reducing and possibly reversing these ’structural’ divergences in competitiveness
is twofold: the core should reflate by letting wages grow more than productivity, while
the periphery should modestly do the opposite. Some authors, more sceptical about the
virtues of internal devaluation for deficit countries, argue that the process should be more
asymmetric, with core countries performing the great bulk of the adjustment.
Figure 1.5: The ’Consensus View’ explanation over the emergence of the Eurozone crisis. (author’s
graphical elaboration)
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Chapter 2
A balance-of-payments crisis in the
Eurozone?
This kindness will I show.
Go with me to a notary, seal me there
Your single bond; and in a merry sport,
If you repay me not on such a day,
In such a place, such sum or sums as are
Express’d in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for an equal pound
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken
In what part of your body pleaseth me.
Shylock in The Merchant of Venice (Act I, Scene III)
William Shakespeare
The widespread recognition that the persistence of current account imbalances has had
a determinant role in the Eurozone crisis, conceptualised as a balance-of-payments crisis,
has even prompted the European Commission to address the issue with the so-called
’Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’ (MIP). The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
(MIP), introduced in 2011, is:
[a] surveillance mechanism to detect and address economic trends that may
adversely affect the proper functioning of a Member State, the euro area, or
the EU. It aims to identify potential risks early on, prevent the emergence
of harmful macroeconomic imbalances and correct the imbalances that are
already in place.
The instrument with which the European Commission has started to diagnose potentially
dangerous imbalances is the Alert Mechanism Report, an annually released document
containing a detailed analysis of 14 headline indicators, with respective alert thresholds,
covering major macroeconomic imbalances and adjustment issues.
Among them the first ones are particularly related to the argument so far discussed:
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• 3-year backward moving average of the current account balance as per-
cent of GDP, with thresholds of +6% and -4% ;
• net international investment position as percent of GDP, with a threshold
of -35%;
• 5-year percentage change of export market shares measured in values,
with a threshold of -6%;
• 3-year percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of
+9% for euroarea countries and +12% for non-euroarea countries;
• 3-year percentage change of the real effective exchange rates based on
HICP/CPI deflators, relative to 41 other industrial countries, with thresh-
olds of -/+5% for euro area countries and -/+11% for non-euro area
countries;
The fourth and fifth indicators and the economic implications that go with them,
relevant as they are, will be discussed in chapter 4. With regard to the first three points
instead, it can be said that the European Commission has been devoting an ever more
increasing interest to the external performances of EU member states in recent years.
There is a striking linearity in the assessment that the European authorities propose:
variations in export market shares may turn into different and diverging current account
imbalances that can end up, if persisting, into unsustainable net international investment
positions (NIIP), the ultimate symptom before ’sudden stops’ and balance-of-payments
crisis manifest.
The problem with this theoretical framework is that the Eurozone is conceptualised
as a fixed exchange-rate regime1, or better as a currency board2 in which international in-
vestors incur in a ’country risk’ that is ultimately a ’currency risk’, related to the difficulty
for the monetary authorities of a given country to sustain the parity of its currency, fol-
1The IMF defines a fixed exchange-rate regime, or Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangement, as one
in which ”the country (formally or de facto) pegs its currency at a fixed rate to another currency or
a basket of currencies [...] The monetary authority stands ready to maintain the fixed parity through
direct intervention (i.e., via sale/purchase of foreign exchange in the market) or indirect intervention (e.g.,
via aggressive use of interest rate policy, imposition of foreign exchange regulations, exercise of moral
suasion that constrains foreign exchange activity, or through intervention by other public institutions).
Flexibility of monetary policy, though limited, is greater than in the case of exchange arrangements
with no separate legal tender and currency boards because traditional central banking functions are
still possible, and the monetary authority can adjust the level of the exchange rate, although relatively
infrequently.”
2The IMF defines a currency board as: ”A monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commit-
ment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined
with restrictions on the issuing authority to ensure the fulfilment of its legal obligation. This implies
that domestic currency will be issued only against foreign exchange and that it remains fully backed
by foreign assets, eliminating traditional central bank functions, such as monetary control and lender-
of-last-resort, and leaving little scope for discretionary monetary policy. Some flexibility may still be
afforded, depending on how strict the banking rules of the currency board arrangement are.”
Both definitions are retrieved from ’Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy
Frameworks’: https://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2004/eng/0604.htm
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lowing increasing pressures to devalue that could appear as a result of persistent negative
NIIP.
Nevertheless, the European Monetary Union, as the name tells it, has a different
institutional configuration with respect to other exchange-rate arrangements. Its proper
functioning requires a common payment system, Target2 in the case of EMU, which
fundamentally changes the nature of current accounts and balance-of-payments statistics,
so as to make them largely irrelevant in explaining how the Eurozone crisis has developed.
2.1 The lethargy of a balance-of-payments crisis
2.1.1 How balance-of-payments crises occur in a fixed exchange-
rate regime
The textbook explanation for how a country with a pegged currency incurs into a balance-
of-payments crisis is well summarised by Krugman et al. (2012, pp.628-629):
A balance of payments crisis results because the country’s official foreign
exchange reserves may be the only ready means it has to pay off foreign
short-term debts. By running down its official reserves, the government can
cushion aggregate demand by reducing the size of the current account surplus
needed to meet creditors’ demands for repayment. But the loss of its reserves
leaves the government unable to peg the exchange rate any longer. At the
same time, the banks get in trouble as domestic and foreign depositors, fearing
currency depreciation and the consequences of default, withdraw funds and
purchase foreign reserves in the hope of repaying foreign-currency debts or
sending wealth safely abroad. Since the banks are often weak to begin with,
the large-scale withdrawals quickly push them to the brink of failure. [...]
The immediate origin of such a pervasive economic collapse can be in the
financial account (as in a sudden stop), in the foreign exchange market, or in
the banking system, depending on the situation of the particular country.
It is therefore useful to briefly dig into balance-of-payments statistics, to get a better
understanding of its components and their role.
The balance of payments
The structure of balance-of-payments accounts, as they are classified in the Balance of
payments and international investment position manual (2009, 6th edition) compiled by
the IMF can be summarised into:
CAB +KAB + FAB + Errors = 0
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where CAB is the current account balance, KAB is the capital account balance and FAB
is the financial account balance. Balance-of-payments accounts are useful for purposes of
recording the net sum of payments for goods, services and financial assets that are traded
between one country and the rest of the world.
Figure 2.1: Example of balance-of-payments accounts from IMF (2009, p.14)
Payments received (credit) and payments realised (debit) for goods and services are
recorded in the current account, together with various flows of income. Transfers of
capital are recorded in the capital account, while financial account reports changes in
financial assets and liabilities. Moreover, the financial account can be written as:
FAB = FABRoE + FABCB
where FABRoE is the financial account part of the rest of the economy and FABCB is
the financial account part of the central bank, corresponding to the net change in foreign
financial assets (i.e. foreign reserves).
In a scenario in which a country has pegged its currency to a fixed value with another
currency, a necessary condition for maintaining the exchange-rate parity is to keep the
balance of payments equal or close to zero year by year. In fact, whenever the current
account balance exceeds the sum of the capital and the financial account balances, there
will be either an excess demand for foreign currency (if the sum is negative) or an excess
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supply of foreign currency (if the sum is positive). Excess demand for foreign currency,
relative to the domestic one, would put downward pressure on the exchange rate and the
monetary authorities could then be forced to devalue the currency.
Looking again at the expanded balance-of-payments identity helps to clarify how each
account interacts with one another.
CAB +KAB + FABRoE + FABCB + Errors = 0
The fact that most international payments are performed using an internationally ac-
cepted currency (i.e. the US Dollar) implies that current and capital3 account deficits
must be financed via foreign currency, which can be obtained through either foreign
investments and loans or by running down previously accumulated foreign assets (i.e. re-
serves) held by the central bank. In each case the country increases its external debt, as
certified by the international investment position. If foreign reserves need to be left invari-
ant, a current account deficit will therefore imply net private financial inflows, meaning
that foreigners are on net acquiring claims on the domestic economy. In any case, the
financial account balance is seen as mirroring the current account balance. On net, this
holds true even in today’s world of liberalised capital movements, which is constituted by
a de facto dissociation between autonomous cross-border flows of capital and the strict
financing of current account transactions. This issue will be further discussed in the
following chapter.
Balance-of-payments crisis
It may happen that foreign investors grow reluctant to finance persistent current account
deficits, as the accumulation of excessive external debt might be judged unsustainable
up to the point where the country defaults on its foreign obligations. In the first phases
of a balance-of-payment crisis as such, the central bank might have sufficient resources
to intervene, by selling foreign currency and buying domestic currency in the foreign
exchange market.
Assets Liabilities
Foreign assets ↓ Currency in circulation ↓
Domestic assets (loans to domestic banks) Commercial bank deposits
Table 2.1: Simplified central bank’s balance sheet.
If confidence in the value of the currency is re-established, then private inflows might
recover and the crisis is temporarily postponed. In the quote reported above, the authors
further presuppose that the central bank does not ’sterilise’ its intervention in the foreign
3In quantitative terms the current account balance is much larger than the capital account balance,
which nonetheless contributes to the net indebtedness of a country.
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exchange market by increasing its holding of domestic assets correspondingly. There-
fore, when it sells foreign assets, it reduces domestic liabilities (i.e. money base) by a
correspondent amount. As the authors believe that the supply of money (MS) in a do-
mestic economy is exogenously determined by the central bank, reducing the money base
will lower the level of economic activity, as the interest rate (r) is expected to increase.
Therefore, as lower domestic demand implies a reduction in the volume of imported goods,
this will contain, if not reverse, the current account deficit, further contributing to the
sustainability of the balance of payments.
↓MS ⇒↑ r ⇒↓ GDP ⇒↓ CADeficit
Moreover, a decline in GDP is supposed to ameliorate the current account balance also
through gains in competitiveness, by increasing unemployment (U), therefore putting
downward pressure on wages (W ) and thus increasing external cost competitiveness:
↓ GDP ⇒↑ U ⇒↓ W ⇒↑ CompetitivenessCost ⇒↓ CADeficit
However, as the monetary authorities run out of reserves, the previously sustained out-
flows of capital may become sudden and lethal for the central bank determined to preserve
the parity of its currency. That country will be forced to devalue, a move which represents
a generalised ’haircut’ in the value of each domestic asset relative to foreign ones. There-
fore, balance-of-payments statistics and the net international investment position (NIIP)
of a country have a crucial relevance in a system of pegged currencies. Ultimately they
give an objective indication to international investors on the specific ’country risk’ that
they might incur, which becomes a ’currency risk’ of punitive devaluation at the end of
the day. Nevertheless, this remains strictly true for a country which is engaged in a fixed
exchange-rate regime and converts its own currency with foreign ones for many different
purposes, either trade or financial. The probability of defaulting on external payment
obligations is aggravated by the country’s dependence on the level of foreign reserves,
which are exchanged with domestic assets at a fixed price. In such a context, preserving
current account balances to acceptable levels is crucial for the maintenance of the fixed
parity because, if a ’sudden stop’ of capital inflows occurs for whatever reason, the central
bank may not have sufficient reserves to defend the external value of the currency. In a
currency union instead, as it will discussed right below, the reliance on current account
and balance-of-payments statistics can be problematic, if not misleading, in assessing
macroeconomic imbalances as the European Commission attempts to do. For the same
reason, it is incorrect to interpret the Eurozone crisis as a standard balance-of-payment
crisis that takes place in a fixed exchange-rate regime.
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2.1.2 The irrelevance of the balance of payments in a currency
union
Contrary to what happens between countries pegged to a fixed exchange rate, economic
actors that trade and exchange financial instruments within a currency union use the same
common currency for settling their payments. Therefore, transactions within a currency
union are relieved by the need of deploying foreign reserves. As Collignon (2013, pp.70-71)
puts it:
[a] currency area is the territory where credit contracts can be enforced and
extinguished by transferring the legally defined and generally accepted cur-
rency.
Furthermore, such currency is issued by a common central bank, or more precisely, it is
generated when commercial banks extend new loans to the private sector without any
technical limit imposed by the central bank4 (Bank of England 2014). In fact, the only
requirement for private banks in any member state of the monetary union is to have an
equal and unlimited access to central bank’s reserve for as long as they are solvent. The
unrestricted access to liquidity for commercial banks changes dramatically the nature
of the economic area, which becomes a domestic economy in monetary terms. This
generates a crucial distinction: monetary unions such as EMU are to be considered as
payment unions and not fixed exchange-rate arrangements.
Transaction between actors operating in countries with their own currencies
Suppose that a commercial bank in the United Kingdom sells its financial services to
a Spanish enterprise that operates in foreign markets. In their respective balances of
payments, Spain records a debit and the UK a credit in their current accounts. The
payment for the financial advice to the Spanish enterprise can only be settled in sterling
currency, which is ultimately needed to pay the British bank for its service. This could
happen through a loan extended by another commercial bank, an obligation which will
have to be repaid through time by converting euro deposits into sterling deposits in the
exchange-rate market. That loan appears in the financial account of the UK balance of
payments as an acquisition of financial assets, while representing a liability for Spain’s
financial account. In itself, it constitutes an aggravating condition for the stability of the
balance of payments, as a ’currency risk’ of asset devaluation is embedded in the excess
demand for foreign currency that the aforementioned transaction generates.
4As the Bank of England explains in a recent Quarterly Bulletin where it exposes how money is
’endogenously’ created: ”the higher stock of deposits may mean that banks want, or are required, to
hold more central bank money in order to meet withdrawals by the public or make payments to other
banks. And reserves are, in normal times, supplied ’on demand’ by the Bank of England to commercial
banks in exchange for other assets on their balance sheets. In no way does the aggregate quantity of
reserves directly constrain the amount of bank lending or deposit creation.” Of course, here the reference
is to domestic reserves that can be unlimitedly expanded by the central bank.
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Transactions between actors operating within a currency union Suppose that
a Spanish entrepreneur in Andalusia needs to pay for an electronic machine imported
from Germany. The operation may occur through the respective Spanish and German
commercial banks, which settle the payment directly in euros: a transfer is made from the
bank deposit of the Spanish importer to the corresponding one of the German producer.
The same mechanism would apply, were the Andalusian entrepreneur buying the machine
from a compatriot in Catalonia. The transaction between the Spanish importer and the
German exporter is officially registered in the current account of Spain as a debit, and in
that of Germany as a credit, but with different consequences for their balances of pay-
ments than it would be in case the two countries had still their own separate currencies.
More precisely, it does not make any difference whether that import payment is financed
through a German intermediary or any other in Spain, as the settlement is carried out
in euros, which is the domestic currency of both countries. As such it does not drag on
foreign reserves, which are in fact retained by the common central bank and have to be
considered only for relations between the currency area and the rest of the world.
The combination of local payments within the same state, cross-border payments between
members of the currency union, and external payments in foreign currency makes the as-
sessment of external imbalances through current account developments rather blurred.
As Cesaratto (2013, p.363) puts it ”the need to finance a current account deficit with
foreign currencies seems to disappear in a currency union”.
This different characterisation of a currency union has several implications. As men-
tioned earlier, when the payments within that area are settled using the same currency,
the ’exchange-rate risk’ disappears for transactions arising between members of the union.
The ’currency risk’ vanishes together with the ’country risk’ of buying an asset from a
foreign country, when an hypothetical devaluation would undermine the nominal value
of the original transaction. Therefore, what remains in a currency union is only the in-
dividual ’credit risk’, whereby single borrowers (i.e. households, firm, public authorities)
may become insolvent and unable to repay their obligations. In fact, even if a country
experiences an excess in investment over saving (I > S) which generates a current ac-
count deficit, individual agents in that economy could simply finance their expenditure
in excess through the domestic banking system, provided that a refinancing mechanism
is put in place by the common central bank for every solvent commercial bank in the
currency area. Member states’ current account imbalances with the rest of the world are
therefore significant in so far as they are considered as an aggregate for that area.
Incidentally, the suppression of the ’currency risk’ and the correspondent ’country
bias’ has the important consequence of ditching the distinction between tradable goods
as potential sources of foreign earnings, and non-tradable activities as dragging down
the balance of goods and services. As presented in the previous chapter, many authors
of the ’Consensus View’ have attributed the worsening of peripheral countries’ current
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accounts to their excessive specialisation in non-tradable sectors relative to the tradable
one. Whether this is the case or not, it should not be a case for concern as foreign
obligations with other members of the monetary union do not need to be financed with
foreign currency but merely through income generated by the economic activity in itself.
Therefore, even the non-tradable sector could contribute to the creation of value added
that can be used to repay foreign obligations, without the necessity of future current
account surpluses (Collignon 2012).
In conclusion, as long as there exists a smoothly operating payment system among
national central banks and private banks have access to the refinancing operations of
the common central bank, the existence of current account imbalances should not be
considered as troublesome. A policy that aimed at reducing those excessive imbalances, as
the one argued for by the European Commission for the Eurozone, would be unnecessary
if not dangerous.
2.2 Target2 rules out balance-of-payments crises
The Eurozone is officially a monetary union endowed with a payment system, namely
Target2, and a refinancing mechanism for its commercial banks. This by itself should
rule out the possibility of a balance-of-payments crisis happening in the euro area. It is
worth turning on its practical functioning to better understand why this is the case.
2.2.1 Target2 before and after the crisis: a theoretical example
Target2 is a payment system owned and operated by the European Central Bank. It
represents the European platform for processing large-value payments and is used by both
central banks and commercial banks to treat payments in euro in real time. The name
stands for ’Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer’
system.
To understand the crucial role of Target2 in the building up and unfolding of the
Eurozone crisis, it is necessary to look at the way in which it operates through a simple
example. Following Cesaratto (2013) and Febrero and Uxo´ (2013), the illustrative case
will be based on transactions between private actors in Spain and Germany. It is easier
to start by showing the extremely simplified balance sheets of a commercial bank, in
this case Santander, and its correspondent national central bank, the Banco de Espan˜a
(table 2.2). On the assets side of the first, we find the value of loans granted to a
domestic creditworthy borrower, which by itself automatically creates a deposit. We
have also a certain amount of reserves, registered in central bank money and deposited
in the national central bank of the country in which the private bank has its location,
where they in fact appear on the liabilities side. Finally the refinancing resources, Main
Refinancing Operations (MRO) of the ECB in this case, appear in the assets side of the
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national central bank and as a liability for the commercial bank.
Banco de Espan˜a
Assets Liabilities
10 MRO 10 Reserves
Santander
Assets Liabilities
100 Credit 100 Deposit
10 Reserve 10 MRO
Table 2.2: Balance sheets of the Spanish central bank and of a Spanish commercial bank.
Suppose as in the previous case that an Andalusian entrepreneur wishes to purchase a
manufacturing product from Germany. She has to go to its commercial bank and ask it to
transfer a certain amount of her deposits to the supplier’s bank in Germany. The reserve
account of Santander is debited by the Banco de Espan˜a, which credits the Bundesbank
account by the corresponding amount. In turns, the Bundesbank transfers that amount
to Deutsche Bank, which turns into an excess reserve for the German commercial bank. In
balance-of-payments terms, the transaction is registered as a debit in the current account
of Spain, as a credit in that of Germany.
As the two national central banks’ debts have to be netted out at the end of the day,
the Eurosystem intervenes generating the needed amount of Target2 liabilities vis-a`-vis
the Bundesank and claims against the Banco de Espan˜a.
Eurosystem
Assets Liabilities
+ 10 T2 Claim against Banco de Espan˜a + 10 T2 Liability against Bundesbank
Banco de Espan˜a Bundesbank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
10 MRO 10 Reserve 10 MRO 10 Reserve
-10 Reserve +10 Reserve
+10 T2 Liability +10 T2 Claim
Santander Deutsche Bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
100 Credit 100 Deposit 100 Credit 100 Deposit
10 Reserve 10 MRO 10 Reserve 10 MRO
- 10 Reserve - 10 Deposit +10 Reserve + 10 Deposit
Table 2.3: Balance sheets of the Eurosystem, the German and the Spanish central banks and two
commercial banks in Germany and Spain after a transaction occurs between a Spanish costumer and a
German seller.
From the description above, illustrated in table 2.3, it emerges that Target2 imbalances
materialise whenever a cross-border transaction involves the transfer of deposit from a
commercial bank to another one located in a different jurisdiction.
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Pre-crisis scenario (1999-2007): imports are financed through the interbank
lending market. As it would happen in any domestic system, the payment from San-
tander to Deutsche Bank generates a loss in reserves for the first and a corresponding
acquisition for the latter. In the decade before the crisis, a bank with excess reserves
would have lent them, either domestically or abroad, at a rate corresponding to the Main
refinancing operations5 (MRO). As the latter stands between the rate of the Marginal
lending facility6 and that of Deposit facility7, this interbank lending and borrowing of
excess reserves would have been convenient for both banking institutions.
Suppose than, for simplicity, that Deutsche Bank lends its excess reserves to Santander
against collateral, usually treasury bonds or mortgage-backed securities. This interbank
loan, channelled through Target2, offsets previous claims and liabilities between the two
national central banks. In the balance-of-payments accounts it would appear as a positive
entry in the financial account of Spain and as a negative entry in the financial account of
Germany.
Eurosystem
Assets Liabilities
10 T2 Claim against Banco de Espan˜a 10 T2 Liability against Bundesbank
- 10 T2 Claim against Banco de Espan˜a - 10 T2 Liability against Bundesbank
Banco de Espan˜a Bundesbank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
10 MRO 10 MRO 20 Reserve
10 T2 Liability 10 T2 Claim
-10 T2 Liability -10 T2 Claim
+10 Reserve -10 Reserve
Santander Deutsche Bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
100 Credit 90 Deposit 100 Credit 110 Deposit
10 MRO 20 Reserve 10 MRO
+10 Reserve -10 Reserve
+10 Loan from Deutsche Bank +10 Loan to Santander
Table 2.4: Balance sheet operations after a transaction between private commercial banks is financed
in the interbank lending market.
As long as the interbank lending market was operative, current account imbalances
5Main refinancing operations are open market operations executed by the Eurosystem in order to
provide the banking system with the appropriate amount of liquidity. Main refinancing operations are
conducted through weekly standard tenders (in which banks can bid for liquidity) and have a maturity
of one week. Currently (March 2016) the MRO rate stands at 0.00%.
6The Marginal lending facility corresponds to the rate at which commercial banks obtain overnight
liquidity from the central bank, against the presentation of sufficient eligible assets. The current rate
(March 2016) is 0.25 %
7The Deposit facility is that rate that defines the interest commercial banks receive for depositing
money with the central bank overnight. Currently (March 2016) the rate is -0.40%, meaning that banks
progressively lose reserves when deposited at the ECB.
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were matched by opposite financial imbalances that cleared almost completely Target2
balance sheet.
After the crisis scenario (2007-): the interbank lending market freezes, capital
flows from the periphery and Target2 imbalances appears. When the effects
of the US financial crisis appeared on the European continent, the interbank market
collapsed: financial flows to peripheral banks diminished and reverted as credits were not
rolled over. In our example, Santander has lost the possibility of obtaining the required
reserved through interbank loans.
As Febrero and Uxo´ (2013) describe, Deutsche Bank has several ways of using the
excess reserves, apart from lending them in the interbank lending market, or depositing
them at the ECB. It can also purchase financial assets or cancel out some debt with the
Bundesbank. When it starts to do so, Santander has only two options for obtaining central
bank reserves: either it borrows them from the Banco de Espan˜a through the marginal
lending facility, obviously at a higher cost; or the Spanish central bank itself provides
liquidity through the ECB’s open market operations, the main refinancing operations
(MRO) and the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO).
In fact, from 2008 onwards and especially after 2011, the void of liquidity has been
filled by the Eurosystem through these open market operations or by the direct purchase
of eligible assets. There seems to be no limit to the amount of resources that the system
can accommodate, as long as the receiving institution provides the necessary collateral.
Eurosystem
Assets Liabilities
10 T2 Claim against Banco de Espan˜a 10 T2 Liability against Bundesbank
Banco de Espan˜a Bundesbank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
10 MRO 10 MRO 20 Reserve
10 T2 Liability 10 T2 Claim
+10 MRO -10 MRO
+10 Reserve -10 Reserve
Santander Deutsche Bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
100 Credit 90 Deposit 100 Credit 110 Deposit
10 MRO 20 Reserve 10 MRO
+10 Reserve +10 MRO -10 Reserve -10 MRO
Table 2.5: Balance sheet operations after a transaction between private commercial banks is financed
through the Eurosystem.
In conclusion, as one can see from table 2.5, the combination of capital outflows
(reserve and deposit moving out of commercial banks in the peripheral countries) and the
refinancing operations of the Eurosystem to replenish private banks in need for obligatory
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reserves, gives rise to Target2 imbalances. The very fact that Target2 claims and liabilities
emerged after financial flows suddenly dried up is an indication of the role that a payment
system plays in a monetary union in order to avoid balance-of-payments crisis that could
affect the banking system and ultimately the real economy. Indeed, here lies the difference
with a fixed exchange-rate regime, previously presented in theoretical terms. This is
clearly explained by the European Commission (2015, p.9) in a recent Quarterly Report
on the Euro Area:
An analogy can be made with the role of the central bank reserves in a fixed
exchange rate regime. If private capital flows have no counterpart in the cur-
rent account i.e., if, in aggregate terms, private inflows are not used to finance
imports, then the central bank has to adjust its reserves in order to maintain
the exchange rate. A similar mechanism is at play for euro area transactions,
with TARGET2 balances being the equivalent of foreign currency reserves.
In balance-of-payment terms, Target2 liabilities are registered in the financial account,
and for the EMU we can write:
CAB +KAB + FABRoE + FABT2 + Errors = 0
where Target2 balances become the correspondent of foreign reserves in a fixed-exchange
rate system, with the difference that the firsts are theoretically unlimited.
Inflows Outflows
Current Account (- sign) (+ sign)
Trade balance Import of goods and services Export of goods and services
Income Income paid Income received
Transfers Transfers executed Transfers received
Capital Account (- sign) (+ sign)
Financial Account (+ sign) (-sign)
Direct investment
Portfolio investment ↑ Foreign capital invested domestically ↓ Foreign capital invested domestically
Monetary authority (Target2) ↓ Domestic capital invested abroad ↑ Domestic capital invested abroad
Other investment
Errors and omissions
Table 2.6: Simplified balance of payments for any given Eurozone country.
2.2.2 Target2 before and after the crisis: some empirical evi-
dence
The mechanism behind the payment system, described theoretically above, finds empir-
ical confirmation in the Target2 balances of the two selected countries, as in figure 6.
Starting from 2007, but increasingly so after 2011, net claims of Spain became progres-
sively negative while the contrary occurred to Germany.
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Figure 2.2: Total claims minus total liabilities related to Target2 in millions of euros (Spain and
Germany 2001-2016). Source: author’s elaboration on ECB data
It seems that the appearance of Target2 imbalances can be ascribed to the dynamic
of financial outflows following a crisis in the private interbank lending market. This
is indeed the interpretation that has been given by a prominent economist from the
European Central Bank (Cour-Thimann 2013, p.23):
With the financial and sovereign debt crisis, private foreign investors were
no longer willing to roll over the financing of the cumulated current account
deficits. Foreign and domestic residents also tended to withdraw their invest-
ments and deposits from those countries [...] The emergence of Target bal-
ances within the euro area countries’ balances of payments can be interpreted
as the monetary authority having largely substituted for private money flows
in the financing of the cumulated current account deficits of certain countries
or beyond, when financial inflows reversed direction
Banco de Espan˜a’s quarterly data on the Spanish balance of payments testify the
remarkable outflow of financial assets, that has taken place in Spain from mid-2011 until
the end of 2012. Figure 2.3 represents the financial account entry ’other investment’
(by financial and monetary institutions, central bank excluded), which is particularly
significant as it is largely composed by ’deposit and cash’. Moreover, in a Bank of
Italy study on the determinants of Target2 imbalances, Cecioni and Ferrero (2012) show
even more clearly how the building up of Target2 claims in Spain, starting from the
mid of 2011, has almost perfectly matched the pattern of capital outflows, be them
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portfolio investments, deposits or cash (figure 2.4). This example is hugely important to
understand the crucial role that Target2 has played in the euro area. In a fixed-exchange
rate regime, a similar outflow of private financial flows would have either burned an
extraordinary amount of foreign reserves or it would have forced the country to devalue
its currency. In the Eurozone instead, the payment system was there to automatically
generate public reserves that compensated for the private outflow. The financial pressure
was shifted from the currency, towards government’s bonds, until July 2012, when the
European Central Bank declared its intention to assume the role of lender of last resort,
in order to avoid further speculations over the survival of the euro as a single currency.
Figure 2.3: ’Other investments’ (MFIs, central bank excluded) entry in Spain’s financial account
(millions of euros, 2006-2013). Source: author’s elaboration on data by Banco de Espan˜a
Figure 2.4: Spain’s balance of payments from July 2011 to May 2012 (cumulated monthly net flows,
billion of euros). Source: Cecioni and Ferrero (2012)
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2.3 The search for the ’Original sin’ in the Eurozone
crisis
What has been argued so far is that to think of the Eurozone crisis as a typical balance-of-
payments crisis triggered by current account imbalances, as the ’Consensus View’ main-
tains, is rather imprecise if not utterly inexact. First of all, the typical pressure on the
exchange rate cannot technically appear in a currency union. Secondly, a smoothly func-
tioning payment system such as Target2, is able to supplement private financial flows in
times of uncertainty, thus avoiding ’sudden stops’ that appear as a typical consequence
of persistent and unsustainable current account deficits in fixed exchange-rate systems.
Nevertheless, this does not explain why the economic crisis has been so particularly severe
in countries that ran higher current account deficits in the period leading up to the 2007
crisis.
One possible answer might be that despite the existence of a well functioning payment
system that could tame negative developments in the banking sector, it was the sustain-
ability of public debts that became more of an issue, as the crisis deepened. The dynamic
of capital outflows in peripheral countries have obviously affected in negative terms the
burden of their sovereign debts. The combination of a lower economic activity, and the
rising interest rate caused by the absence of a lender of last resort that guarantees the
solvency of a sovereign country, meant that a ’country risk’ reappeared in the form of
’default risk’ on government bonds (De Grauwe 2011). The mechanism through which a
previously existing ’exchange-rate risk’ becomes a ’sovereign risk’ is well summarised in
Frenkel (2012, p.9):
The role of the default risk premium in the sustainability of public debts in
the Euro Zone is similar to the role it plays in the sustainability of foreign
currency debts (public and private) in emerging market economies. As in
the emerging markets cases, a large proportion of the financing needs of the
GIPSI governments must necessarily be covered with funds from the mar-
ket, even after adjustments have been made in the public accounts. In the
Euro Zone economies’ crises, absent the influence of the exchange risk and
the international liquidity risk in the portfolio decisions, the main source of
negative feedback effects in the second phase of the cycle is the evolution of
public debt ratios and sovereign risk premiums, throughout their effects on
the portfolio decisions of the private sector. These effects would not occur if
the Euro Zone governments had a credible lender of last resort.
However, as in July 2012 the ECB President Mario Draghi announced that the ECB
would do ”Whatever it takes” to save the euro, and the details of the Outright Monetary
Transaction (OMT) Programme came into lights late in the Summer of that year, the
financial storm over European public debts was mitigated, with spreads between countries
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progressively narrowing. Afterwards, with the launching of the Quantitative Easing (QE)
Programme in January 2015, the issue of public debt sustainability has essentially faded
away, with nominal interest rates on state bonds falling below zero. Furthermore, as it
describes a particular phase and connotation of the Eurozone crisis, the ’sovereign debt
crisis’ narrative fells short of explaining the building up period of the crisis (1999-2008)
and why some countries were particularly affected (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy) and
not some others (Germany, The Netherlands), despite levels of public debt and deficit
not dramatically different. After all, it has become the conventional wisdom even among
the exponents of the ’Consensus View’ the idea that the crisis of peripheral public debts
has to be seen as a simple by-product and not as the prime cause of the Eurozone crisis.
An alternative interpretation of the crisis in the euro area, one that will be put
forward below in greater details, reclaims the importance of the institutional setting of
the European Monetary Union and the role of intra-Eurozone private financial flows.
With respect to the first issue, it has been shown how Target2 worked as a stabilisation
mechanism for the Eurosystem: if it is operating as it should, a payment mechanism
in a currency union contributes to eliminating the ’country risk’ of asset devaluation or
re-denomination. Nonetheless, it does not by itself extinguish the ’individual solvency
risk’ of any economic unit involved in cross-borders activities (be it a household or a
firm). On the contrary it can be argued that a currency union with a properly functioning
payment system and the free movement of cross-border capital might favour and stimulate
the emergence of excessive and unproductive capital flows, which could contribute to
creating unsustainable economic booms and financial distress. For these reasons, when
Keynes elaborated its proposal for an International Currency Union, he insisted that
all the international transactions should have been obliged to pass through a payment
system, in order to facilitate the imposition of capital controls that could domesticate
currency speculation and distinguish between different different types of short- and long-
term investment. In his words:
This does not mean that the era of international investment should be brought
to an end. On the contrary, the system contemplated should greatly facilitate
the restoration of international credit for loan purposes in ways to be discussed
below. The object, and it is a vital object, is to have a means of distinguishing-
(a) Between movements of floating funds and genuine new investment for
developing the world’s resources; and
(b) Between movements, which will help to maintain equilibrium, from surplus
countries to deficiency countries and speculative movements or flights out of
deficiency countries or from one surplus country to another [...]
It is evident that the existence of an International Clearing Union would make
such control easier.
In Keynes’s view, the role of the International Clearing Union was to facilitate ’produc-
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tive’ transactions of commercial and financial nature - as in the example above between
Germany and Spain - but at the same time he conceived that institution as a controlling
and enforcing agency against ’speculative’ financial flows among countries.
In conclusion, there is no currency union cum payment system that can guarantee,
through its normal functioning, the solvency of any private actor within that area. In
other words, Target2 does indeed prevent a typical balance-of-payments crisis to appear in
the Eurozone, but cannot deal with the solvency of households and firms. The reliability
of each debtor in terms of its capacity to repay its obligations, especially foreign ones,
remains a feature of the European Monetary Union. In fact, as far as Target2 facilitates
and encourages financial transactions of all sorts across the currency area, the likelihood
that unsustainable financial booms generate economic crises is highly increased. The
previously existing ’currency risk’ had in fact acted as a measure of protection against
undesirable capital inflows. Yet, as it has been shown above, the combination of the euro
plus Target2 have de facto eradicated such risk. In addition, the operating principle of free
movement of capital across member states of the European Union, does not allow national
monetary authorities to distinguish between ’productive’ and ’speculative’ financial flows,
let alone to direct them towards selective and beneficial purposes.
This leads to the second issue mentioned above: the role of private capital flows in
the Eurozone. It is essential to understand which function they played in the building up
phase of the crisis, if they were simply current account surpluses in the core channelled
towards deficit countries in the periphery and whether the institutional setting of the
European Monetary Union mattered. The next chapter will explore these arguments in
greater depth.
Chapter 3
Current accounts ”are not what they
seem”
Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago:
In following him, I follow but myself;
Heaven is my judge, not I for love and duty,
But seeming so, for my peculiar end:
For when my outward action doth demonstrate
The native act and figure of my heart
In compliment extern, ’tis not long after
But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve
For daws to peck at: I am not what I am.
Iago in Othello (Act I, Scene I)
William Shakespeare
3.1 From ’excess saving’ to ’excess financial elastic-
ity’
3.1.1 The obstinate focus on current accounts
In a NBER paper of 2012 Maurice Obstfeld, the current Chief Economist of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, posed a crucial question for today’s international economics:
”Does the Current Account Still Matter?”. Its relevance for the discussion on the nature
of the Eurozone crisis cannot be left aside. In fact, one of the major tenets of the ’Con-
sensus View’ is the idea that cross-border net capital flows have to be held responsible
for the unfolding of the Eurozone crisis. They are conceived as both the by-product and
a further cause of the increasing divergence in current account positions among euro area
countries. This is particularly evident in the four years preceding the crisis of 2007/2008.
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If one compares figure 3.1 below with figure 1.2 in chapter 1, a visible correlation be-
tween intra-euro current account dispersion and capital flows will appear, especially after
2003, when both indicators increased exponentially. However, correlation does not imply
causation and, more importantly, the role of current account imbalances in generating
and directing capital flows is indeed questionable.
Figure 3.1: Current account dispersion in the euro area (standard deviation of current account balances
over GDP). Source: Lane (2013)
This approach, that can be labelled the ’excess saving’ view, relies on the notion that
a net resource deficit in the current account is matched by its identical external financ-
ing. It basically postulates the equivalence between saving and financing, a linear relation
between current account and capital flows that has a long-standing tradition. It dates
back to David Hume’s price–specie flow mechanism exposed in Of the Balance of Trade,
written in 1742, goes through Keynes’s essays (1929) on the problems of inter-war repa-
rations and persists in today’s ’saving glut’ argument put forward by Bernanke (2005),
with reference to the role played by the current account surpluses of some Asian countries
before the financial crisis of 2007. In all those variants, current accounts come to identify
origins and destinations of cross-border financial flows, as well as the vulnerability of each
country to ’sudden stops’ in external financing. To put it bluntly: current accounts are
seen as indicators of foreign borrowing and lending in a world where goods are exchanged
for goods - determining the great bulk of the current account balance - and net inflows
(outflows) represent liabilities (claims) on future goods.
What this common vision represents is an application at the international level (i.e.
between countries) of the loanable funds theory1, with an intertemporal approach of
1The loanable funds doctrine is an extension of the classical theory on the determination of the rate
of interest. While the classical authors postulated that the rate of interest in a given economy was at
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lending and borrowing as a way of relaxing the saving constraint of each State at a
certain point in time. Countries that have a current account surplus are considered to
be direct net creditors to those that register a current account deficit. Correspondingly,
deficit countries, whose net international investment positions worsen year by year, are
seen as potentially vulnerable to sudden reversals of net financial flows. The causal
link goes from current accounts to financial accounts: when domestic spending exceeds
domestic production, that corresponding gap is financed by saving from surplus countries
and it is registered in the financial account. Finally, capital flows are unidirectional and
considered mostly in net terms, meaning that there are no particular implications for the
balance-sheet structures of the lender/borrower.
− Current Account ⇒ (net) Capital inflows
+ Current Account ⇒ (net) Capital outflows
Borio and Disyatat (2015, p.4) efficiently summarised it:
Through this lens, current accounts are seen as both a gauge of how much
financing an economy obtains from abroad and of the direction of that financ-
ing, with surplus countries lending to deficit ones.
Consequently, if one applies that framework to the Eurozone case the logical sequence
goes as follows: Germany and other core countries saved in excess of their investment
needs, therefore they registered current account surpluses which were channelled towards
those peripheral countries that needed to finance their current account deficits. Thus,
capital flows from the centre towards the periphery materialised as excess saving being
lent to cover the financing gap of deficit countries.
Finally, the logical policy implication of the ’excess saving view’ is that, in order to
reduce to a minimum potentially disruptive and unproductive financial flows, current
accounts should be brought and kept close to balance.
3.1.2 The appropriate focus on financial imbalances
This section will criticise the excessive attention that has been given to current account
imbalances as indicators of upcoming financial crises, let alone the Eurozone crisis. In-
deed, not only is their role technically downplayed by the existence of a single currency
and a smoothly functioning payment system, they are also misleading in what they theo-
retically represents. Current account imbalances are often considered as triggers of (net)
financial flows that could become unsustainable or generate instability and crises. In fact,
any time determined by an equilibrium resulting between the demand for investment and the availability
of saving, the pioneers of the loanable funds approach, notably Dennis Robertson (1934) and Bertil
Ohlin (1937), admitted that the extension (retreat) of banking credit can decrease (increase) the market
interest rate below (above) its ’natural’ level.
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their role is grossly misconceived. As the owls in David Lynch’s Twin Peaks mask the
reality of supra-natural events that are unfolding in the TV series, current accounts are
not what they seem.
The theoretical framework concerning capital flows and current accounts that will be
adopted here, and in the following empirical examination, is the one that has been put
forward by the Bank for International Settlements. Two of its most prominent economists
Borio and Disyatat (2011, 2015) have recently elaborated their critique of the standard
view on current accounts, with a general application to the US case. Their work will
constitute the central reference for analysing the Eurozone crisis with a different and
more effective set of lens.
One has to start from a simple but fundamental distinction between saving and fi-
nancing. Saving is merely a national-account concept, it refers to income not consumed
in a given period within some territory. But investment and expenditure in excess require
(external) financing, a cash-flow concept that implies access to purchasing power in the
form of an accepted settlement medium (i.e. money). By its nature, financing is a gross
notion, and it concerns single economic units (i.e. banks, households, firms, governments
and so on) and not geographical entities as a whole. The crucial distinction between the
(real) resources constraint and the (monetary) financial constraint is grounded on the fact
that goods are exchanged for claims on them (credit), not for other goods as in a barter
system. The focus on national current accounts envisages the existence of some sort of
national ’representative agent’ that borrows and lends on behalf of the whole country.
Yet, cross-border lending and borrowing is not performed by states, but mainly by banks
and other financial institutions. For this reason it is utterly deceiving to consider cur-
rent accounts - which simply represent the gap between domestic spending and saving -
as indicating the lending/borrowing position of a given country. The idea that surplus
countries are ’creditors’ and exposed to credit risk of ’deficit countries’ which they finance
’on net ’, does not hold. Instead, from current account statistics one cannot derive who is
financing whom. This does not mean that the balance-of-payments identities are useless.
In fact, it is absolutely true that ’on net ’ countries registering current account surpluses
are accumulating net claims over those in deficit. The net international investment posi-
tion is therefore improving in the first group and worsening in the latter. However, the
nature and direction of those claims is tied to gross financing, that is dependent on the
location of those who are financing the expenditure in excess. Current accounts capture
net resource transfers, but does not reflect gross financial flows. As such they tell nothing
about what, from whom and how much domestic investment is financed from abroad. As
Borio and Disyatat (2015, p.3) put it:
current accounts have been asked to tell us more than they can about several
key macroeconomic magnitudes – about the volume and direction of capital
flows; about how economic activity is financed; about the role countries play
in financial intermediation, lending and borrowing; and about the risks of
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financial instability and the mechanisms involved.
Yet the standard approach to current accounts leaves out the crucial distinction be-
tween net and gross flows. The immediate implication is that cross-border lending does
not represent a flow of saving between jurisdictions, instead it results in the provision of
endogenously created purchasing power (i.e. finance) in the form of gross flows, mostly
unrelated to current account balances.
In the current world of free movement of capital, the underlying dynamics of gross
flows and their contribution to existing stocks - transaction in financial assets included -
constitute the great majority of cross-border financial transactions. They differ substan-
tially, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from net capital flows captured by current
accounts. In the words of Borio and Disyatat (2011, p.1):
As such, current accounts tell us little about the role a country plays in inter-
national borrowing, lending and financial intermediation, about the degree to
which its real investments are financed from abroad, and about the impact of
cross-border capital flows on domestic financial conditions.
For instance, over the past twenty years, on average, the magnitude of gross capital
flows has been around tenfold compared to net imbalances resulting from current accounts
divergences (figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Gross capital flows and current account imbalances as a percentage of world GDP. Source:
Borio and Disyatat (2015)
Moreover, it is not necessary for bilateral financial flows to match bilateral trade flows.
Indeed, the required financing can be provided by a third country that is not involved in
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the bilateral current account transaction between the two original countries (figure 3.3).
Indeed, that is exactly the case of Ireland prior to the crisis, which had most of its trade
deficit with the UK even though it received the great bulk of its financing from German
intermediaries. Finally, for each country pair there is no automatic correspondence in
terms of gross and net external financial positions. The case of the euro area is particularly
telling: in 2007, countries with which the Eurozone engaged mostly in gross financial
transactions, namely the US and the UK, were far less important than other European
countries, Japan and Switzerland in net terms (Borio and Disyatat 2015).
Therefore, a country’s main financial trading partner in gross terms needs not nec-
essarily be the one with which it holds the largest net claims/liabilities. It is clear from
how they are composed that total gross flows bear no obvious relation to net flows.
Net flows = Gross inflows − Gross outflows
Gross outflows = purchases of foreign assets by residents−
sales of foreign assets by residents
Gross inflows = purchases of domestic assets by foreigners−
sales of domestic assets by foreigners
Figure 3.3: Any financial intermediary in a third country can finance the current account deficit of a
country with which there is no current account involvement (author’s graphical elaboration).
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Moreover, ’gross-gross’ flows, the underlying components of gross outflows and inflows
summed up, are many times higher that the net result of sales and purchases. Borio
and Disyatat (2011) notes that those ’gross-gross flows’ in the US in 2010 amounted to
435% of US GDP, some 60 times the gross flows measure. From their decomposition
it is clear that a balanced current account does not imply that domestic saving equals
domestic investment, but only that domestic production equals domestic spending. There
is always the possibility that the great majority of one country’s investment is financed
from abroad.
The fundamental distinction between saving and financing has important analytical
and policy implications: the focus of analysis should be shifted from current account
imbalances to financial imbalances. Indeed, this is in line with the conclusion reached
by Obstfeld (2012): analysing current accounts is important as they might constitute a
measure of a country’s external competitiveness, yet this must be complemented with
an examination of gross flows and stocks, since they better indicate financial stability
risks. Seen from this other perspective, ’sudden stops’ are less likely to be triggered
by the immediate realisation that net international investment positions have become
unsustainable. They most probably arise out of a sudden inability to meet gross financial
obligations. As a matter of fact, foreign investors do not interrupt their financing of the
current account, they cease to finance debt or start selling previously acquired assets.
Disruptions in the flows of financing appear from problems with balance sheets exposures
and not because of what happens to the net flows of real resources. Current account
reversals are of little use in these circumstances, as they do not address by any means
the specific financing gap that can be ultimately eliminated either by new financing or
after some sort of debt restructuring.
3.1.3 Excess financial elasticity and credit booms
Once the focus of enquiry is shifted from current accounts towards financial accounts,
gross capital flows and stocks assume a major importance in assessing the likelihood of a
financial crisis. Indeed, there is an alternative and honourable tradition in international
economics (De Cecco 1974; Kindleberger 1965) which assigns to financial booms, often in
the form of excessive credit growth, asset and property prices booms a central role in the
development of financial crises. Again, current accounts are of little relevance: both Jorda`
et al. (2011) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) have found that the correlation between
current account imbalances and either episodes of credit booms or banking crises is rather
tenuous, while credit growth over GDP correlates well with experiences of financial crises.
In fact, credit booms - often triggered by external sources - have resulted in financial
distress and banking crises also in countries that at that time were registering current
account surpluses: the cases of the US in the 1920s and of Japan at the end of the 1980s
are just the most notable.
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It goes without saying that the likelihood of incurring in a credit-driven financial cri-
sis is increased by the openness of each country’s capital account. In fact, in a world of
tight capital controls the link between current accounts and gross financial flows would
be much stronger, as cross-border financial flows would mostly reflect cross-border cur-
rent account transactions. However, capital controls have been progressively dismantled
over the past 40 years (Goodman and Pauly 1993), leading to a deeper capital market
integration worldwide that is testified also by various indicators and indices. Firstly, the
Figure 3.4: Measures of financial integration. On the left: the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as
a percentage of GDP. On the right: the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness. Source: Borio and
Disyatat (2015)
ratio Foreign Assets+ Foreign Liabilites
GDP
has risen exponentially from 70% in the 70s and 80s
to more than 450% in recent years for advanced economies (figure 3.4). The Chinn-Ito
index on capital account openness shows a progressive tendency for capital accounts to
be liberalised, both in advanced and emerging economies. As suggested before, capital
account liberalisation tends to increase the amount of cross-border gross financial flows,
thus contributing to the potentially disruptive expansion in domestic credit (Avdjiev et
al. 2012). In particular, as noted by Borio et al. (2011), cross-border credit normally
grows faster than overall credit in many countries experiencing credit booms.
For those reasons, the BIS authors prefer to assess the sustainability of the interna-
tional monetary and financial system using the concept of ’financial system elasticity’,
which they define as (Borio and Disyatat 2015, p.28):
the degree to which the monetary and financial regimes constrain the credit
creation process and the availability of funding more generally.
Through these lens, the occurrence of major financial crises comes to be seen as the
consequent result of excess financial elasticity, which Borio (2014) considers to be the
real ’Achilles heel’ of the international monetary and financial system.
Financial crises are far from being totally unpredictable events or ’black swans’ (Taleb
2007). They build on a series of visible developments in financial or housing markets that
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may last for several years. The idea that there is a climax of events and stages behind
major financial crises is masterly described by Minsky (1986) and reduced to a happy
metaphor by Borio and al. (2014). They suggest that financial crises are not accidental
meteorite strikes, instead they look more like volcanic eruptions that reflect pre-existing
pressures that have been built up over time. Perhaps it is even more appropriate to think
of them as landslides, as human intervention can increase the hydrogeological instability
as much as it can do with financial crises, through policies and different institutional
arrangements. Before addressing them, it is appropriate to explore a bit more the ’excess
financial elasticity hypothesis’ and which are the main signals of an upcoming financial
crisis.
As described in Borio (2013) there are several, and most of the time regular, features
linked to the unfolding of financial cycles. They are usually characterised by an upsurge
in private sector credit and property prices (see figure 3.5 with reference to the financial
crisis of 2007) that turn into banking crises, as the balance sheet positions of domestic
banks deteriorates. Meanwhile, economic recessions are triggered by the sudden freeze in
bank financing towards households and enterprises.
Figure 3.5: Credit gaps and property prices. On the left: the credit-to-GDP gap is the deviation from
the credit-to-GDP ratio from a one-sided long-term trend. On the right: seasonally adjusted, quarterly
averages, CPI deflated residential property price indices. Source: Borio (2014)
Interestingly, as the phase of credit expansion proceeds, the cross-border component
of total financing tends to outgrow the domestic one (Avdjiev et al. 2012). This regularity
is evident also at the global level, as figure 3.6 indicates.
It is therefore logical to assume that ’financial’ and ’monetary’ regimes do contribute
to making the international monetary and financial system more or less ’elastic’, depend-
ing on the policy regimes and arrangements. Financial regimes are important because
the free mobility of capital across borders increases the availability of finance through ex-
ternal channels, thus contributing to the creation of unsustainable credit booms. On the
other hand, monetary regimes are functional in transmitting easy monetary conditions,
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Figure 3.6: Global bank credit aggregates at constant end-Q4 2013 exchange rates. Aggregate for a
sample of 56 reporting countries. Source: Borio (2014)
especially in the case of currency unions. Consequently, financial elasticity becomes even
more ’excessive’ when liberalised financial systems coexist with monetary regimes that
give absolute priority to the issue of price stability over financial stability. The assump-
tion that liberalised financial systems, by weakening financial constraints, leave room for
more frequent and intense credit and asset price booms has been repeatedly attested
(Borio et al. 2001). At the same time, monetary regimes that focus almost exclusively
on price stability - often defined as keeping the inflation rate below, but close to, 2% -
have less regards for issues of financial imbalances and systemic risks, as long as inflation
remains low and stable.
As a matter of fact, by its very nature, the Eurozone cannot but be classified as an
institutional and policy arrangement that structurally creates the conditions for excess
financial elasticity. In this case, freedom of movement for cross-border capital had been
established as a fundamental principle, if not a necessary premise, even before the in-
troduction of the single currency. At the same time, price stability remains by far the
prime concern of the European Central Bank2. Moreover, as it was shown in the previous
chapter, the elimination of the currency risk for cross-border transactions, provided by
the single currency and Target2, contributes to making the euro area one of the most
financially ’elastic’ worldwide, hence more prone to unsustainable credit booms (possibly
2The Eurosystem has encoded in its statute the principle of price stability as its primary objective.
Art. 2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank says:
”In accordance with Article 127(1) and Article 282(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability”.
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externally fuelled) and financial crises. The origins of the Eurozone’s ’Achilles heel’ might
therefore be found in its very integration process.
3.2 The ’Achilles heel’ of the European Monetary
Union
Once the theoretical validity of the ’excess financial elasticity hypothesis’ has been estab-
lished, it remains to be tested if that could apply also to the case of the Eurozone crisis.
Several contributions and empirical data will be used to this purpose.
3.2.1 A centre-periphery dynamic of bank leverage
The Argentinian economist Arturo O’Connell (2015) has adopted the analytical perspec-
tive of the BIS to analyse the Eurozone crisis, supplementing it with a ’centre-periphery’
dimension typical of the Latin American school of economic development. He argues,
following an established literature (Calvo et al. 1993), that cross-border capital flows
are cyclical and determined by so-called ’push factors’: developments in the banking and
financial sectors of ’core’ countries, in particular their leverage cycle. In line with Andrew
Haldane’s (2011) ’Big Fish Small Pond’ problem, the notion of ’sudden stop’ is criticised
on the grounds that the seeds of many financial crises are sown in the upswing phase
by the initiative of the creditors. The ’Big Fish’ capital exporting institutions in the
’core’ have ventured into the ’Small Ponds’ of relatively scant financial markets in the
’periphery’.
The leverage ratio in the banking sector is a measure of how much the financial
institution is engaging in risky investments, depending on the share of external out of
total capital that it is deploying. It is defined as:
Leverage Ratio =
Tier 1 Capital
Adjusted assets
where:
Equity + Reserves − Intangible assets = Tier 1 Capital
Total assets − Intangible assets = Adjusted assets
Therefore the leverage ratio is often thought as increasing whenever equity is substituted
for debt, as it is shown in the left hand side of the figure 3.7 below. If this ratio goes
up, then banks should be discouraged to take on a progressively greater amount of debt
liabilities. However, Shin (2012) has argued that this only a minor part of the leverage
cycle of the banking sector, one that ignores how the leverage ratios is mostly driven by
the fluctuations of the total volume of balance sheet, with equity remaining fixed at a
pre-determinate level. Indeed this happens to be the most frequent and decisive dynamic
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of the leverage cycles, as represented on the right hand side of figure 3.7.
Therefore, the leverage ratio can be reduced even though the lending activity is pro-
gressively extended. As explained by Shin (2012, p.7) himself:
Banks and other financial intermediaries lending depends on their “balance
sheet capacity”. Balance sheet capacity, in turn, depends on two things —
the amount of bank capital and the degree of “permitted leverage” as implied
by the credit risk of the bank’s portfolio and the amount of capital that the
bank keeps to meet that credit risk.
Figure 3.7: Two ways of leveraging upwards. Source: Shin (2012)
As the leverage ratio diminishes, lending activities are caught in a self-sustaining
process of lowering risk and further lending facilitated by positive market conditions. The
idea that the banking system tends to expand when financial (or monetary) constraints
are released resonates well with the concept of ’excess financial elasticity’ of Borio and
Disyatat (2011). In the case of the Eurozone (figure 3.8), the median leverage ratio
of core euro area banks - therefore the inverse of banks’ leverage - moved downwards
from over 4% in 2002 to close to 2% in 2008. Over those years, banks in core Eurozone
countries have been expanding their cross-border lending activities, incurring in higher
debt exposure, facilitated by a diminished leverage ratio.
The most important and striking example is represented by Germany (figure 3.9).
Data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank illustrate how cross-border lending activities
by German banks have increased threefold in absolute terms between 1999 and 2008,
while progressively decreasing ever since. The figure shows values in billions of euros
simply because they are released monthly, while GDP data only quarterly. However,
Germany’s GDP has grown cumulatively by 24% over the same period. The exponential
increase in foreign lending by German banks would therefore appear even relative to
GDP, from about 36% at the beginning of 1999 to 87% at its peak in 20083.
3Author’s calculation summing total lending by German banks to foreign banks over total lending
by German banks to foreign non-banks in January 1999 and October 2008, and dividing by Germany’s
GDP at the end of 1998 and 2008.
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Figure 3.8: Leverage ratio of core euro-area banks Source: adaptation from Hale and Obstfeld (2014)
Figure 3.9: Total lending from Germany’s banks to foreign banks (MFIs) and foreign non-banks
(billions of euros, 1999-2013). Source: author’s elaboration on Deutsche Bundesbank data
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3.2.2 Gross financial flows flood the periphery
Interestingly but not surprisingly, the progressive lowering of the leverage ratio in the
centre’s banks coincided with the increase of cross-border lending within the Eurozone
(figure 3.10). Two revealing facts emerge from the analysis of Eurozone gross financial
flows. Firstly, there has been a substantial increase of financial transactions from 2001 on-
wards but especially after 2004, both in absolute and in relative terms to GDP. Secondly,
there seems to be a ’euro bias’ in the world-wide phenomenon of financial globalisation.
The volume of cross-border transaction has increased much more in the Eurozone (or the
European Union as a whole) than in other geographical areas.
Figure 3.10: a) Gross financial flows aggregated by partner; b) Intra-Eurozone and Intra-EU assets
plus liabilities over GDP. Sources: a) Hobza and Zeugner (2014); b) Waysand et al. (2010)
For instance, by simply looking at the figure 3.11 on euro area cross-border bank
assets, it turns out that the great bulk of the surge in those flows is accounted for
by financial transactions within the euro area itself and with the United Kingdom. In
line with what has been previously suggested, Lane (2013) affirms that the abolition
of capital controls in the 1980s and 1990s, the harmonisation of financial regulation at
the EU level and the introduction of the single currency have contributed decisively
to inflating the volume of financial flows in the euro area, relative to other parts of
the world. Shin (2012) gives a similar interpretation to the gradual expansion of cross-
border banking activities in the Eurozone: a regulatory environment that enthusiastically
adopted Basel II regulations and the advent of the euro. Crucially, these policy and
institutional changes had contributed to reducing transaction costs and to increasing the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign assets.
Explaining the composition, the geographical origins and destinations of these cross-
border gross flows is fundamental in order to understand the role they played a role in
building up intra-Eurozone imbalances. First of all, it is evident from figure 3.12 that
the great majority of cross-border gross flows in the Eurozone is represented by debt
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Figure 3.11: Euro Area Cross-Border Bank Assets (percent of GDP). Source: Lane (2013)
instruments rather than equity or foreign direct investment. As Lane (2013) reasonably
claims, the creation of the single currency had an higher positive impact on debt-type
flows than equity-type flows due to the commodity nature of debt instruments and the
suddenly perceived high substitutability of bonds denominated in euro. Debt flows (i.e.
portfolio and other investment) in the euro area have been, and continue to be, twice or
three times larger in quantitative terms relative to equity flows (i.e. portfolio equity and
foreign direct investment).
Figure 3.12: Gross debt and equity flows within the euro area. Source: Hobza and Zeugner (2014)
Moreover, this is even more evident if one looks at the average annual inflows for each
member state in the crucial period 2003-2007 (table 3.1).
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Capital inflows over GDP (2003-2007)
Portfolio and other debt Portfolio equity Foreign direct investment
Germany 8.9 1.0 1.4
The Netherlands 3.4 0.6 5.8
Greece 14.7 2.4 0.9
Spain 18.7 -0.2 2.9
Portugal 12.2 3.0 2.8
Table 3.1: Average annual inflows over GDP. Source: Lane (2013)
Debt instruments dominated cross-border financial flows and most of them were either
short-term inter-bank transactions, or investment of banks and other financial institutions
into sovereign debt of peripheral countries. A composition of gross flows biased in favour
of debt assets and liabilities has the consequence of augmenting the vulnerability of
peripheral countries, as lower future income growth and inflation rates might imperil the
sustainability of the debt burden.
With respect to the origin of gross financial flows, it is interesting to note that they
are almost never matched by bilateral trade flows. As a confirmation of what is claimed
by the BIS authors, there is a substantial decoupling between bilateral trade (or current
account) balances and gross financial flows, which have an autonomous nature. In the
case of the Eurozone before the 2007 financial crisis, surplus countries have financed the
periphery by more than their trade balances required, often intermediating flows coming
from outside (mainly from the UK).
Data from Waysand et al. (2010) relative to 2008 are extremely revealing on the
mismatch between trade and net credit relations (table 3.2). More importantly though,
they underline the absolute decoupling between gross financial transactions and trade
or current account balances (table 3.3). The case of Ireland is particularly striking:
its biggest bilateral trade deficit was with the UK but its largest net contributor was
Germany. Nonetheless the UK was the biggest financial intermediary to Ireland in gross
terms, with whom it registered financial relations that are 2.5 times Ireland’s GDP.
Spain instead, despite having Germany as its main source of trade deficit and of net
financing, entertained a greater amount of financial relations with UK and French actors
and institutions with whom they were much more indebted in gross terms. Greece’s
biggest net creditors were France and Germany but the UK was by far its largest financial
intermediary in gross terms4
In addition, much of each country’s exposure towards those peripheral countries was
represented by ”too-big-to-fail” banks in core countries, German, British and French in
particular as figure 3.13 illustrates. In fact, as Lane (2013) maintains, the cross-border
expansion of balance-sheet positions may have favoured the geographical diversification
of bank portfolios, but it has increased the associated risk in several ways. Geographical
4Greece’s total liabilities with the UK were twice those with Germany, its second biggest net creditor.
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Net IIP Creditors Trade deficit
USD Billions Percent of GDP USD Billions
Greece
France -67 -19 Germany -47
Germany -47 -14 Italy -47
The Netherlands -25 -7 Russia -27
Italy -24 -7 France -26
Belgium -20 -6 The Netherlands -24
Luxembourg -9 -3 China -19
Austria -9 -2 South Korea -18
Ireland
Germany -223 -84 United Kingdom -43
Belgium -98 -37 Taiwan -14
The Netherlands -75 -28 China -7
France -61 -23 Singapore -6
Rest of the World -61 -23 Norway -5
Luxembourg -56 -21 Denmark -2
Other Offshore Centres -39 -15 Thailand -1
Portugal
France -64 -25 Spain -77
Germany -35 -14 Germany -24
Ireland -26 -10 Italy -20
Spain -23 -9 The Netherlands -13
United Kingdom -19 -7 Brazil -8
Canada -16 -6 Japan -7
Belgium -14 -5 France -7
Spain
Germany -287 -18 Germany -197
France -239 -15 China -93
United Kingdom -217 -14 The Netherlands -65
United States -105 -7 Italy -63
Netherlands -93 -6 France -41
Luxembourg -75 -5 Belgium -40
Ireland -72 -4 Russia -38
Table 3.2: Top net financial positions and trade deficits in 2008. Source: Waysand et al. (2010)
diversification has little positive effect if there is no sectoral diversification5, especially
on the assets side of the balance sheet. The expansion of already ”too-big-to-fail” banks’
balance sheets goes together with excessive credit growth, with dangerous financial con-
sequences in case of a systemic crisis. Moreover, the short-term nature of cross-border
transactions, in particular of liabilities, increases the vulnerability of the domestic bank-
ing system to sudden reversals of capital flows.
5In the case of Ireland, its banks were heavily exposed to the domestic property sector and also
extended loans secured against foreign property investments. This made them enormously vulnerable to
any fall in housing prices.
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Total Assets Total Liabilities
USD Billions Percent of GDP USD Billions Percent of GDP
Greece
United Kingdom 101 29 United Kingdom 108 31
Cyprus 41 12 France 72 20
Luxembourg 28 8 Germany 56 16
Bulgaria and Romania 22 6 Luxembourg 37 11
United States 16 5 The Netherlands 31 9
Rest of the World 9 3 Italy 26 7
The Netherlands 6 2 Cyprus 24 7
Ireland
United Kingdom 672 254 United Kingdom 668 252
United States 526 198 Germany 379 143
Italy 197 74 United States 177 67
Germany 156 59 France 174 66
France 113 42 The Netherlands 157 59
The Netherlands 82 31 Belgium 137 52
Luxembourg 61 23 Luxembourg 116 44
Portugal
Spain 48 19 France 87 34
Ireland 39 16 Spain 71 28
The Netherlands 30 12 Ireland 65 26
Germany 27 11 Germany 62 25
United Kingdom 27 11 United Kingdom 45 18
France 23 9 The Netherlands 26 10
Luxembourg 18 7 Luxembourg 24 9
Spain
United Kingdom 212 13 United Kingdom 429 27
France 157 10 France 397 25
The Netherlands 143 9 Germany 375 23
Italy 137 9 The Netherlands 236 15
United States 118 7 United States 223 14
Germany 88 5 Luxembourg 160 10
Portugal 86 5 Italy 121 8
Table 3.3: Top gross financial partners in 2008. Source: Waysand et al. (2010)
Figure 3.13: Banks’ exposure to euro area periphery in 2010. Source: Deutsche Bank (2010)
3.2. THE ’ACHILLES HEEL’ OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 63
3.2.3 The symptoms of excess financial elasticity in the Euro-
zone
As hinted before by the BIS authors, gross flows are not neutral for the financial and
macroeconomic stability of an economy. If they favour and reinforce a process of ex-
cessive domestic credit growth and assets price booms, this might turn into negative
consequences. Indeed, two of the countries which were most subject to substantial cross-
border gross flows, namely Ireland and Spain, experienced an exponential surge in both
total (and banking) credit to the private sector and in housing prices.
The relevance of direct cross-border bank lending is largely testified in BIS statistics
(Borio et al. 2011). Figure 3.14 indicates how the scale of cross-border operations per-
formed by banks with respect to Spain and Ireland had been growing dramatically from
1999 to 2007, especially after 2003. The ratio of consolidated foreign claims6 to GDP
went from 29% in 1999 to 80% in 2007 in Spain and from 122% to 373% in Ireland, in
the same years.
Figure 3.14: Consolidated foreign claims of BIS-reporting banks to GDP for Spain and Ireland, and
Ireland from 1999 to 2013. Source: author’s elaboration on BIS data
Spanish and Irish banks became progressively engaged in cross-border financial trans-
actions in the years preceding the crisis of 2007. They operated as effective intermediaries
for their respective economies with regard to the rest of the world (mainly British, German
and French banks, as reported in table 3.3), with several consequences for the domestic
financial and credit conditions of the two countries.
As figure 3.15 testifies, total credit to the private non-financial sector relative to
6Foreign claims are defined as the sum of cross-border claims plus foreign offices’ local claims in all
currencies.
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Figure 3.15: Total credit to private non-financial sector relative to GDP, in Spain, Ireland, Greece,
Portugal and Germany from 1995 to 2015, adjusted for breaks. Source: author’s elaboration on BIS data
GDP in Spain started to increase exponentially after 1999, when it stood at 107%, and
more than doubled in less than ten years. The peak of 218% over GDP was reached in
the second quarter of 2010, than it flattened and finally started to diminish from 2012
onwards. The increasing indebtedness of the private sector in Spain was particularly
driven by developments in the construction and real estate sectors, whose indebtedness
relative to GDP grew more than threefold in ten years, from 29% in 1997 to 104% in
2007. The crucial role of the Spanish construction sector in the pre-crisis period will
be analysed in further details in chapter 4. Financial institutions became even more
extremely indebted: their liabilities increased by more than tenfold, not least because
they operated as an intermediary for foreign financial flows coming into Spain. This
partly explains why total debt held by the rest of the world has increased almost threefold
in those years, from 58% to 161% (table 3.4, adapted from Febrero and Bermejo 2013).
In the case of Ireland, the increase in total credit to private non-financial sector became
staggering after 2004. It reached its peak in the first half of 2010, when it recorded a level
(329% over GDP) that was almost three times higher that the one it had in 1999 (110%
over GDP). Similar patterns of credit growth were registered also in other ’peripheral
countries’: Portugal’s ratio went from around 120% in 1999 to 190% in 2007; in Greece
it more then doubled in the same period, from 43% at the beginning of 1999 to about
100% in 2007. Furthermore, in all these cases the indicator masks the astonishing growth
of total credit in absolute terms, given that the denominator in the ratio (i.e. GDP) had
been growing steadily from 1999 to 2007. Finally, the comparison with what happened in
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Indebtedness over GDP in Spain
1997 2007
Households 35.37% 84.54%
Non-financial corporations 47.22% 133.92%
(Construction and real estate) 29.42% 104.20%
Total private debt (non-financial) 82.59% 218.46%
Government 60.41% 33.74%
Financial institutions 8.47% 97.79%
Total external debt 57.59% 160.91%
Table 3.4: Indebtedness over GDP in Spain (1997-2007). Source: adapted from Febrero and Bermejo
(2013)
Germany is truly remarkable: total credit to private non-financial sector remained stable
over the first years after the establishment of the monetary union, in fact it even started
to decrease in 2003 when it stood at 131%, reaching a comparatively modest 120% in
2007 at the onset of the crisis. Thus, while credit growth has been modest in Germany
in the period 2003-2007, at that very same time its banks and other financial institutions
increasingly engaged in lending operations abroad, as figure 3.9 showed.
The relation that incurs between capital flows and domestic credit growth has largely
been established in several empirical works. For instance, Lane and McQuade (2014)
perform a detailed analysis of credit growth in a sample of 30 European countries7,
in the crucial years 2003 to 2008. They observe and emphasise throughout the study
that domestic credit growth in those countries is strongly related to net debt inflows.
Interestingly enough, they dismiss the importance of gross debt asset and liability flows,
despite their relation with domestic credit growth being highly significant and stronger
compared to the net debt flows variable. Gross debt liability flows appear to have positive
effects on domestic credit growth and vice versa with reference to gross debt asset flows.
More importantly, the authors find that current account balances do not reflect the
evolution of either international capital flows, or domestic credit growth.
Apart from growth in private sector credit, the other indicator that the BIS authors
consider essential for detecting the building up of a banking or financial crisis with po-
tential macroeconomic consequences is the trend in asset prices, in particular property
prices (Borio and Drehmann 2009). Data on Spain and Ireland are particularly telling,
as they indicate the extent to which the market in the residential sector was inflated in
the years preceding the financial crisis of 2007. As figure 3.16 shows, real property prices
more than doubled in Spain from 2000 to 2007, whereas they increased by 75% in Ireland
over the same period.
In conclusion, to use the conceptual apparatus of the BIS authors: the European mon-
etary and financial system has displayed an excess of ’financial elasticity’. The symptoms
7The sample used by the authors consists of the 27 member countries of the EU, plus Iceland, Norway,
and Switzerland.
66 CHAPTER 3. CURRENT ACCOUNTS ”ARE NOT WHAT THEY SEEM”
Figure 3.16: House-price index in real terms for Spain and Portugal (index Q1 2000=100). Source:
author’s elaboration on The Economist house-price index
of it has been manifested by crisis-stricken countries in the form of unsustainable booms
in credit and housing prices, both fuelled by the inflows of gross capital, mostly in the
form of debt, with little if no relation whatsoever to their current account positions.
3.2.4 Capital reversal
The fate of private gross capital flows in the Eurozone, after the financial crisis of 2007 and
the sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2012, represents the ultimate confirmation that bilateral
current account balances and net flows played an irrelevant role in the build up phase,
but also in the aftermath, of the Eurozone crisis.
So far it has been exposed how, and in what terms, financial linkages among Eurozone
countries has been strengthened in the first decade of the euro. In fact, bilateral net trade
flows perform very poorly as indicators of net, let alone gross, bilateral financial flows.
It emerges that financial institutions from surplus countries have flooded the periphery’s
private sectors with capital well in excess of their respective bilateral current account
balances. For this reason, focusing on gross financial flows becomes essential for capturing
the structure and developments of intra-Eurozone external imbalances. Gross financial
flows have surged globally but in the case of the euro area they received a supplementary
incentive from the establishment of the single currency: the ’euro bias’ in the cross-border
holding and trading of different financial assets, mostly in the form of debt. Within
this framework, German banks became the main lenders towards the construction sector
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in Spain. At the same time, French financial institutions intermediated international
financial flows coming from outside the Eurozone to the peripheral economies of southern
Europe.
Figure 3.17, adapted from Hobza and Zeugner (2014), represents the annual average
gross financial flows8 between groups of countries for the period 2004-2006. The group
of EA surplus countries comprises Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Austria and Finland; the EA deficit group is composed by Italy, Spain, Greece and
Portugal; the group called Rest of the EU (RoEU) includes the UK, Denmark, Sweden,
Ireland9, and member states that joined the EU after the 2004 enlargement; finally France
is considered separately, due to its role as an important intermediary of financial flows
to the periphery and because, over the past 15 years, it has been alternatively a surplus
and deficit country in net terms.
Figure 3.17: Gross financial flows in billions of euros (annual average 2004-06). Source: adapted from
Hobza and Zeugner (2014)
In the years preceding the crisis, EA Surplus countries had been the main financial
partners of deficits countries, both in gross and net terms. The most important bilateral
financial relationship among Eurozone countries was that between Germany and Spain:
the first financed the latter by an average of e41 billion from 2004 to 2006. Germany was
also the largest provider of finance in the Eurozone (e321 billion, compared to France’s
8Financial flows stand for the sum of direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment.
9Ireland has been inserted into the group of non euro countries for its important role in offshore
transactions with the UK and several surplus countries.
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e319 billion and second in the EU only to the United Kingdom with e322 billion). It
is also of particular interest the case of France, whose financial institutions received net
inflows from outside the euro area and even the EU, which they eventually channelled to
the deficit countries. France’s net contribution to the peripheral countries corresponded,
on average, to little less than e40 billion per year.
The crisis of 2007 had a radical impact on the intensity and direction of bilateral
financial flows. The euro area, with its highly integrated financial markets and banking
systems, suffered more than other economic regions the repercussions of the global col-
lapse in cross-border financial flows. Net financial flows from surplus to deficit countries
did not present substantial variations in size and direction, what changed nonetheless
was their geographical composition, due to reconfiguration of underlying gross flows. In
the period from 2007 to 2009, France became the largest provider of finance to deficit
countries, as German investors swiftly reduced their exposure to the European periphery
(figure 3.18). Compared to German financial institutions, more linked to the US subprime
market, French banks were much more exposed to deficit countries, thus forced somewhat
to roll-over existing debts in order to prevent the collapse of receiving institutions, and
ultimately their own losses, due to the insolvency of private banks in the periphery.
Figure 3.18: Gross financial flows in billions of euros (annual average 2007-09). Source: adapted from
Hobza and Zeugner (2014)
Nevertheless, when the financial crisis eventually turned into a sovereign debt crisis,
heavily exposed French financial institutions ceased to finance their peripheral counter-
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parts (figure 3.1910). At the same time, the withdrawal of gross private financing further
accelerated in surplus countries. By 2012, the periphery became fundamentally reliant
on the ECB liquidity provided through Target2 (see chapter 2) as well as on official as-
sistance from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and from the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) later in 2012.
Figure 3.19: Gross financial flows in billions of euros (annual average 2010-12). Source: Adapted from
Hobza and Zeugner (2014)
Table 3.5 from O’Connell (2015) gives a final aggregate overview of the reversal in
capital flows that has been taking place among intra-Eurozone countries after the financial
crisis of 2007. From that it emerges how the exposure of private banks from the rest of
the euro area to the periphery has fallen, in absolute terms, by 39% in less than three
years from December 2009 to September 2012. As a share of euro area GDP, it went down
from 24% to 13.4%. At the same time the financing needs of banks and other financial
institutions in peripheral countries were covered by the assistance coming either from
the ECB (Target 2 and Security Market Programme) or from official EU funds for crisis
resolutions (European Financial Stability Facility, now European Stability Mechanism).
In conclusion, the financial crisis of 2007 did not immediately and substantially change
the geographical pattern of trade among Eurozone members. What mutated instead
were the bilateral financial relations. Peripheral countries have been running progres-
sively smaller current account deficits, while their banks and other financial institutions
10Negative gross investment flows indicate a reduction in outstanding aggregate position. This could
simply reflect the sale or the non-rollover of foreign assets.
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continued to receive considerable external financing, yet from different institutions and
geographical sources. This represents a final evidence against the trivial notion that
current account imbalances generate capital flows across countries. Once again, gross
financial flows have a nature of their own. They surged in the euro area before 2007,
generating massive exposures towards peripheral countries that are still being financed,
in part by Target2 (especially in 2011 and 2012) and partly by the stability funds estab-
lished by the European Union. Thus, by no means is the recent closing of current account
deficits in peripheral countries related to the matrix of private gross capital flows across
the euro area.
December 2009 September 2012
Borrowing from private banks 1391 852
EFSF 0 301
SMP 0 209
ECB Liquidity 275 859
Total 1666 2221
Borrowing from private Banks over EA GDP 24% 13.4%
Table 3.5: Rest of Euro Area exposure to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (billions of euros).
Source: adapted from O’Connell (2015)
3.2.5 From Achilles’ Iliad to a different Odyssey
The moral of this chapter is that one should shy away from a linear explanation of the
Eurozone crisis that sees developments in the real economy (i.e. losses of competitiveness)
triggering financial disturbances (i.e. net capital flows as counterpart of current account
imbalances). The chain of variables already presented in the first chapter, that resumes
the ’Consensus View’ on the issue, has to be amended if not reversed. There, losses in
competitiveness, namely above average increases in unit labour costs, translated directly
into current account deficits and mechanically into net capital inflows. Each country’s
financial flows are supposed to be determined by its current account position with other
countries.
However, this chapter has sought to demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically,
that capital flows have a nature of their own, independent on current accounts. In fact,
the origin in the sequence of events linked to the Eurozone crisis has to be traced to
the autonomous and detrimental nature of cross-border gross financial flows, as the first
’poisonous arrow’ that struck the Achilles’ heel of the euro area. This way, current
accounts, far from being the original sin of the economic crisis, appear to be the by-
product of credit and asset prices booms, triggered by cross-border financial flows, that
in turn inflated domestic and import demand in peripheral countries. Gross capital flows
should be considered as the prime causes of the imbalances, not the result of it. This
process became unsustainable and affected most peripheral countries in the Eurozone,
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not because current account imbalances had assumed unbearable dimensions, but as a
result of financial imbalances evolving into banking and financial crises. At the end of
the day, the Eurozone crisis is a financial crisis, not a balance-of-payments crisis.
In conclusion, current accounts are not indicative of financial flows, their amount,
directions and scope. They do not represent good indicators for the likelihood of a
financial crisis. In a policy perspective, insisting on their rebalancing, as the EU Com-
mission recommends with its Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), misses the
point of tackling the ’excess financial elasticity’ that is enshrined in the European Mon-
etary Union and that should instead be blamed for the intensity and the persistence of
the economic crisis. Current accounts could therefore be treated at most as a measure
of competitiveness, but in fact they simply indicate whether domestic demand in a geo-
graphical unit has been lower (i.e. surplus), equal (i.e. balance) or greater (i.e. deficit)
than domestic production over a certain period of time. Hence, what remains to be done
is to tear down the last pillar of the ’Consensus View’: the ’competitiveness myth’. The
idea that, especially in a monetary monetary union, current account imbalances are ex-
clusively driven by divergences in wage growth, reflected in losses and gains in cost and
price competitiveness.
Figure 3.20: The sequence of events that explains the relation between gross financial flows and current
account deficits in peripheral countries in the Eurozone. (author’s graphical elaboration
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Chapter 4
Competitiveness and Oscar Wilde’s
economics
LORD DARLINGTON: What cynics you fellows are!
CECIL GRAHAM: What is a cynic?
LORD DARLINGTON: A man who knows the price of
everything and the value of nothing.
Lady Windermere’s Fan (Third Act)
Oscar Wilde
If Oscar Wilde had witnessed the recent debate concerning the Eurozone economic cri-
sis, perhaps he would have picked his definition of a cynic person to describe an economist.
The pervasive role of relative prices as the prime cause of trade imbalances has become
a widely shared consensus among economists and commentators of various orientations
(Draghi 2012; Sinn 2014; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015). Divergences in unit labour
costs and resulting inflation differentials, in their views, have determined huge competi-
tive gaps between surplus and deficit countries, disparities that a monetary devaluation
or depreciation cannot address, given the existence of a single currency. Therefore, cur-
rent account imbalances are supposed to have risen from those developments in external
competitiveness.
Nevertheless, leaving aside the dominant role played by private-sector financial flows
in inflating the economies of peripheral countries and financing their current account
deficits, the conceptualisation of the Eurozone trade imbalances as a matter of price
competitiveness appears to be rather simplistic if not implausible. For this to be valid, one
should postulate a rather ubiquitous but unrealistic homogeneity in the production and
export structures, as well as identical technological specialisations among EU countries,
whereby almost perfect substitute goods are readily sensible to changes in relative prices.
This vision nonetheless harks back to a utopian pre-Schumpeterian world, which appears
to have little attachment to reality (Schumpeter 1942, p.84):
Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in which price competition
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was all they saw. [...] But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its
textbook picture, it is not that kind of competition which counts but the
competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source
of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit of control for
instance) - competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage
and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.
In what follows it will be argued that income variations, not changes in relative prices of
exports, has been the major determinant of trade, therefore current account imbalances
in the euro area. Structural-technological characteristics of national productive systems
usually prevail over cost dynamics in determining a country’s external competitiveness
and the Eurozone, far from being an exception, can be seen a supreme confirmation of it.
This has important analytical implications and dramatic policy consequences when the
Eurozone crisis is re-examined under those new lens.
4.1 Rival theories of international trade
4.1.1 Theoretical flaws in the ’Consensus View’ approach
The main fallacy in the typically neoclassical1 interpretation of current account imbal-
ances held by the ’Consensus View’ is to ignore the effects - and crucially the responsive-
ness - of domestic and foreign demand on imports and exports. Borrowing the words of
Schumpeter: price competition is all they see. The import and export equations take the
following functional forms:
EX = f(RER)
with
∂EX
∂RER
< 0
and
IM = f(RER)
with
∂IM
∂RER
> 0
A positive variation in the real exchange rate (i.e. appreciation) has a negative effect on
exports and a positive one on imports. Vice versa, if the real exchange rate depreciate,
exports will increase and imports fall.
One could see the argument from a quantity theory of money perspective, as the
price-specie mechanism of David Hume, where the influx of gold into surplus countries
1Although the interpretation that looks as trade imbalances from a cost- or price-competitiveness
standpoint is shared by many Post-Keynesian authors such as Stockhammer and Onaram (2013), Bofinger
(2015) or Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2015).
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had the immediate effect of raising the level of domestic prices, therefore making their
products less palatable to the external markets. Conversely, countries with a negative
trade balance experienced an outflow of gold which produced a generalised deflation that
would bring their trade positions into balance, as their products became cheaper. The
argument suits even a more realistic ’Keynesian’ approach to the determination of prices,
one that is based on unit production costs, which determine, together with a margin
of profits on top of them, the price level and the rate of inflation in a time-dynamic
perspective. Of course, wage costs, or better unit labour costs, constitute an important
component of total costs for a firm and for the economy as a whole. The relation with
the trade balance is negative in various ways: if the prices of tradable goods and services
increase relative to other countries (i.e. there is a real exchange-rate appreciation), there
will be an internal substitution effect of relatively more expensive domestic goods for
relatively cheaper foreign goods; at the same time domestic goods have become less
attractive abroad. Thus, an increase in domestic costs, reflected in higher export prices,
has a positive substitution effect on imports and a negative substitution effect on exports:
overall the trade balance should deteriorate.
Nevertheless, a theory of international trade that focuses exclusively on relative prices
of tradable goods and services is bound to encounter several theoretical and empirical
obstacles. For instance, Kaldor (1970) elegantly argued that the dynamic of export
prices may have a predominant role in determining the trade balance of countries with a
relatively simple and technological homogeneous - therefore nowhere existing - economic
structure, as in a hypothetical agricultural economy. In such case (ibid., p.485):
Where the goods produced by the different regions are fairly close substi-
tutes to one another, a relatively modest change in price – in the ‘terms of
trade’ – will be sufficient to offset the effects of changes in either supply or
demand schedules as may result from crop failures, the uneven incidence of
technological improvements, or any other ’exogenous’ cause.
However, in any other economic system that better resembles the complex configuration
of modern capitalism, the pattern of trade among countries is mainly determined by the
income variable (i.e. different rates of growth in domestic demand). In this case (ibid.,
p.485):
If the goods produced by the different regions are complements rather than
substitutes to each other, the adjustment process may involve far greater
changes in the terms of trade of the two areas, and would thus operate mainly
through the ’income effects’.
Indeed, as noted by Dosi et al. (1988), the mechanism of quantity adjustment through
changes in relative prices is made ineffective by the nature of technology and the global
demand for products. Productive systems in modern capitalist economies are centred
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around the application of technological and scientific knowledge to the production process.
As technical change and innovation entail a high degree of procedural and substantive
uncertainty (Dosi and Egidi 1991), knowledge and path-dependency, technological and
productive capabilities are not freely accessible to everyone and therefore they are not
evenly distributed on the global scale (Cimoli et al. 2009). The Ivory Coast (a leading
country in the export of cocoa) will not start producing and exporting sophisticated
industrial machines just because Germany’s KUKA robots have suddenly become too
expensive, due to increased unit labour costs and real exchange-rate appreciation. If
the ’Schumpeterian efficiency ’2 of each country’s specialisation represents a major factor
behind its export and economic success, the relevance of demand patterns, the ’Keynesian
efficiency ’3 of sectors and productive activities, has not to be underscored (Dosi et al.
1990). In fact, many trade relations are linked to complex and global supply chains, in
which final products are merely assembled out of single components that are produced
and supplied elsewhere, no matter what their price is.
Kaldor again had the great merit of being among the firsts to empirically dismiss the
idea that export performance is negatively correlated with unit labour costs and export
prices. In his essay The Effects of Devaluations on Trade in Manufactures (1978), he com-
pared the trends in relative unit labour costs and relative export prices of twelve OECD
countries with their trade success measured in export shares in manufacturing over the
period 1963-1975. The results that he obtained came to be known as the ’Kaldor Para-
dox’: with the exception of the Netherlands, Switzerland and only marginally Canada,
countries that had experienced a substantial fall in relative unit labour costs and in rel-
ative export prices, namely the UK and the US, had been losing market shares to a
significant extent. Instead, countries such as West Germany, that saw their relative unit
labour costs or relative export prices increasing over that period, had nonetheless been
gaining shares in the export market of manufacturing products. He than concluded that
(p.106 and p.111):
What these figures reveal is that the customary statistical measures of ”com-
petitiveness”, whether they be unit labour costs or export prices, are arbitrary
and not an adequate indicator of a country’s true competitive position. [...]
The general picture which emerges from a study of the trade record of the last
five or six years is that the comparative export performance of the main in-
dustrialised countries remained remarkably impervious to very large changes
in effective exchange rates.
Ten years later, Fagerberg (1988) gave another empirical confirmation to the theoret-
ical intuition of Kaldor, with a refined econometric model of simultaneous equations. He
2Activities or sectors are defined to possess ’Schumpeterian efficiency’ if they are able to create more
technological externalities, have higher technological opportunities and exhibit higher rates of innovation.
3’Keynesian efficiency’ pertains to those activities and sectors in which demand (internal and external)
for products grows at higher rates compared to the average, therefore further stimulating production and
investment.
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revisited the ’Kaldor Paradox’ working on a longer time period and focusing on 15 OECD
countries. The results he obtained are similar to Kaldor’s: relative unit labour costs are
of little use in determining the international competitiveness of a country. In his view
what drove international competitiveness and growth across countries was technological
competitiveness and the ability to compete on delivery of products.
However, one important variable that is partially underplayed by neo-Schumpeterian
authors is that of demand, domestic in the case of imports, foreign in the case of export.
This is simply the consequence of looking at export market shares instead of analysing,
year by year, the trade balance of a given country, in particular its export and import
component in total values. The crucial role of demand in driving the destiny of the trade
balance is instead something that the already mentioned Keynesian tradition4 (Kaldor
1981; McCombie and Thirlwall 1994) and the Latin American Structuralist school have
always upheld (Prebisch 1949; Cimoli et al. 2010; Cimoli and Porcile 2013). In fact,
as Kaldor (1981, p.339) emphasised ”Variation of real income, not relative prices and
exchange rates provide the more powerful force, tending to adjust imports to exports”.
Building on Harrod’s theory of the foreign trade multiplier, Kaldor concludes that: varia-
tions in imports are mainly determined by variations in real income rather than in prices
whereas it is foreign demand growth that drives exports.
4.1.2 An alternative Keynesian-Schumpeterian approach to in-
ternational trade
Based on such criticism to the purely neoclassical theory of international trade, the
’Keynesian-Kaldorian’5 specification of the export function becomes:
EX = f(RER, Y ∗)
4Kaldor has written extensively on the determinants of international trade, not just criticising the
excessive importance attributed to cost and price variables, but also addressing the issues of demand
responsiveness, technical progress and economic growth as in The Role of Increasing Returns, Technical
Progress and Cumulative Causation in the Theory of International Trade and Economic Growth (1981).
Another telling example from a very different historical context, is the essay New Plans for Interna-
tional Trade (1943) by Kalecki and Schumacher, in which the authors criticised the American but also
the British (i.e. Keynes’s) plan for the post-war international monetary system on the grounds that
they did not pose enough attention to the role of domestic demand, in particular investment, in the
economic development and reconstruction of less developed countries. As necessary as it was deemed,
over-investment would have been potentially in conflict with the trade balance, therefore with the sta-
bility of the exchange rate. What they argued for was the institution of an International Investment
Board to supply additional purchasing power to deficit countries in need, coupled with a system that
would have granted developmental loans conditional upon the purchasing of foreign products from other
deficit countries, thus without any necessary reduction in world-wide demand from the deficit countries
themselves.
5In fairness, some neo-Keynesian authors do consider the income variable as relevant the import and
export functions. Krugman and Obstfeld’s (2012) textbook is an exemplary case. However, relative
changes in the real exchange rate are always deemed more important than relative variation in income,
mainly because they assume that one of the two countries at least is at full capacity utilisation.
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with
∂EX
∂RER
< 0 and
∂EX
∂Y ∗
> 0
The import function instead takes the following form:
IM = f(RER, Y )
with
∂IM
∂RER
> 0 and
∂IM
∂Y
> 0
With the domestic (Y ) and foreign (Y ∗) income variables dominating the price variable
(RER)6 in quantitative terms.
Once the main determinants of exports and imports have been established, it is more
practical to examine them in dynamic terms. Building on the theory of the balance-of-
payments constraint suggested by Thirlwall (1979) and systematised by McCombie and
Thirlwall (1994), the export and import functions are expressed into workable equations.
The quantity of exports demanded can be formulated in the following multiplicative
function:
X = (Er)
η(Z)ε
where X is the volume of exports, Er the real exchange rate, Z the level of world income
(i.e. demand). Looking at the parameters instead, η is the price elasticity of demand for
exports, it captures the responsiveness of exports to a variation in the real exchange rate
in percentage terms. Following the established relation between export prices and export
volumes, the parameter has a negative sign (η < 0). Finally, ε is the income elasticity of
demand for exports, capturing by how much exports increase following a rise in the level
of foreign income: it has a positive sign (ε > 0). By taking logarithms and differentiating
through time one obtains an expression for the rate of growth of exports:
x = η(er) + ε(z)
which is found to be dependent on the rates of change7 of the real exchange rate er and
6There is an important clarification that needs to be made here. In the above formalisation we are
dealing just with volumes and not values. In fact, in case we wanted to compute the trade balance we
would express it in the following form NX = EX − IM
RER
, where
IM
RER
represents the value of imports
in terms of domestic goods. Therefore an increase in the real exchange rate has certainly a positive effect
on the volume of imports, but a negative and counterbalancing one on their unit value. Therefore, it
becomes difficult to ascertain with precision whether the impact of a variation in the real exchange rate
on the total value of imports is positive or negative. Here we make the somewhat reasonable assumption
that the ’volume effect’ prevails over the ’value effect’, thus confirming the positive relation between the
two variables.
7Variables expressed in capital letters represent absolute values, while lower-case letters stem for rates
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of external income (i.e. demand) z. However, their effect on export growth can be either
neutralised or enhanced by the values that the two elasticities assume. For instance,
a high income elasticity of exports will contribute positively to the growth of exports,
whereas a low price elasticity of exports may reduce to little the effect of a variation in
the real exchange rate on export growth.
The same applies for the volume of imports:
M = (Er)
Ψ(Y )pi
where M is the volume of imports, Er is again the real exchange rate and Y the level
of domestic income (i.e. demand). This time the parameter Ψ represents the price
elasticity of demand for imports, registering the responsiveness of imports to a variation
of the real exchange rate in percentage terms. As previously specified in note 6, here we
are simply dealing with the volume of imports: as the unit value effect of an increase (or
decrease) in the value of products is left out, the parameter takes the usual positive sign
(Ψ > 0). Lastly, pi represents the income elasticity of demand for imports. It measures the
sensitiveness of imports in percentage terms, following a variation of domestic demand,
and has a positive sign (pi > 0). Taking logarithms and differentiating again through
time, in order to obtain the rate of growth of imports, we obtain:
m = Ψ(er) + pi(y)
which happens to be dependent on the rates of change of the real exchange rate er and
of domestic income (i.e. demand) y. Once more, their effect on import growth depends
on the values of the elasticities of price and income. If a country has a high elasticity of
imports, domestic demand growth will generate an high rate of import growth and vice
versa. Instead, if the price elasticity of imports is low, fluctuations of the real exchange
rate will have very little effect on import growth.
Now, if one considers the trade balance measured in value terms (i.e. considering the
price of imports and exports), it can be resumed as:
TB = EPxX − PmM
where E is the nominal exchange rate and Px and Pm respectively the price of exports
and the price of imports. After differentiating through time the expression for the trade
balance one gets:
tb = e+ px + x− pm −m
and since the expression (e + px − pm) corresponds to the rate of change of the real
of change of those variables. Greek-style characters instead are just absolute parameters.
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exchange rate er, the rate of change of the trade balance can be written as:
tb = er + x−m
Then, after substituting x and m into the previous equation, and rearranging, one gets
the following expression:
tb = (η −Ψ + 1)(er) + ε(z)− pi(y)
that encapsulates the so-called Marshall-Lerner conditions: ceteris paribus, the trade
balance ameliorates after a devaluation (or depreciation) depending on the magnitude
of the elasticities of price for imports and exports. More formally: the sum of the two
elasticities in absolute value terms must be greater than unity (|η + Ψ| > 1).
The result obtained is crucial and needs to be discussed in greater details as it repre-
sents the theoretical departure point for confronting the issues of trade imbalances and
current account divergences in the euro area. It is an established conventional wisdom to
consider the dynamic of the trade balance as a measure of international competitiveness:
countries with a persistently worsening trade balance8 are regarded as being uncompet-
itive. Indeed, that has been the case of almost all peripheral countries in the decade
preceding the crisis. It has been recalled in chapter 1, that the very same countries have
been suffering from deteriorations in their relative unit labour costs (figure 1.4), which
the authors of the ’Consensus View’ upholds as a faithful indicator of external compet-
itiveness. The unit labour cost variable presents severe limitations9 when it comes to
measuring a country’s competitiveness. Nonetheless, if one looks at the evolution of the
estimated real exchange rate of those countries, the picture does not appear to change
substantially: there has been a generalised appreciation of the real exchange rate in the
decade 1999-2009 (figure 4.1).
The ’Consensus View’ therefore attributes a great deal of importance to the evolution
of real exchange rates: as they appreciate the countries involved see their trade balances
worsening as symptoms of losses in price competitiveness. They basically maintain that
peripheral countries (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015, p.191):
suffered a considerable loss in price competitiveness during the debt-financed
booms, due to major wage increases and high inflation. Consequently, domes-
tic export companies were put at a competitive disadvantage and lost trade
shares.
Unexpectedly however, the allegedly dominant role of price competitiveness in explaining
8Here trade balance and current account balance, the focus of our analysis, are taken as synonyms.
For many relatively big economies (e.g. Germany, Spain, Italy, France) the trade balance is by far the
most important component of the current account balance in quantitative terms.
9The reasons for the inadequacy of unit labour costs as a measure of international competitiveness
has been hinted above but will further discussed in the following section, with reference to the Eurozone
case.
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Figure 4.1: Annual Real Effective Exchange Rates (HICP Deflator) of selected peripheral countries
relative to a group of 42 industrialised countries. Source: author’s elaboration on European Commission
data
current account imbalances in the Eurozone has been assumed also by some left-leaning
Keynesian authors (Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015):
The only current account imbalances that are clearly unsustainable are those
originating from a loss of competitiveness for the economy as a whole, which
would be reflected in an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Nevertheless, as the expression for the rate of change of the trade balance suggested,
a worsening in the trade performance due to the appreciation of the real exchange rate is
conditional upon the values of the two import and export elasticities of price. Therefore,
even excluding any role for demand and relative elasticities, it appears extremely naive
to claim that an increase in the value of the real exchange rate in peripheral countries
represents a sign of declining competitiveness, thus the main responsible for their trade
and current account deficits. In fact, the responsiveness of the price elasticities might be
quite low and their sum in absolute value terms reasonably close to unit. In that case,
imports and exports would appear to be largely insensitive to variations in the real terms
of trade.
At the end of the day, any analysis of trade developments that ignores the effects of
domestic and foreign income growth, and their relative elasticities, is bound to be utterly
imprecise. To understand the logical implications of ignoring the role of those variables,
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it is useful to imagine what would happen to the trade balance in a situation in which
internal and external demands grew at different rates even when the variation of the real
exchange rate had a positive effect. Suppose that imports and exports were initially on
balance and that during the current year the real exchange rate has depreciated by 5%.
With modest but sufficiently high price elasticities that sum up to 1.2%, the total effect
of price competitiveness on the trade balance should be positive and around 1%10. Now,
suppose that the two income elasticities for imports and exports were equal, for instance at
1% (i.e. growth in income is perfectly matched by an equal growth in imports or exports),
but during that year domestic income has grown by 4%, compared to 2% of world income.
This means that the income effect on the trade balance would be negative and around
2%. Therefore the gain in price competitiveness would not be sufficient to cover the trade
deficit induced by the excess of domestic over foreign demand11. The trade balance would
deteriorate by 1% over that year, despite the country’s price competitiveness having
improved! In this case trade and current account deficits cannot sensibly be taken as
symptoms of losing competitiveness, they are merely the result of the different rates
of growth between domestic and foreign demand. Here, one can recall the Keynesian
meaning of ’balance-of-payments constraint’ put forward by Thirlwall (1979), in which the
rate of domestic income growth compatible with the stability of the balance-of-payments
is constrained by the values of the two income elasticities and the rate of growth of external
demand. In the last case, assume that the variation in the real exchange rate and its
elasticity were the same, so that the positive effect on the trade balance in percentage
terms is still 1%. This time, domestic and foreign demand grew at the same pace, say
3% each. However, the two income elasticities differed in the following way: the import
elasticity is around 1.5%, while the export elasticity takes the value of 0.5%. Again, the
result would be a negative one for the trade balance: -2%12. This means that, even when
the price competitiveness of a country improves, relative demand patterns and income
elasticities can contribute negatively to its trade balance and current account if they
overplay quantitatively the effect of a depreciating real exchange rate. This illustrates
the ever increasing relevance of non-price factors in international trade.
There is a final comment that needs to be made concerning the determinants of the
trade balance. The latter is composed by price and demand variables, that have their
own autonomous nature, and by elasticity parameters that instead reflect supply-side
factors. Indeed, one great merit of the income elasticities of imports and exports is that
they capture non-price elements of a country’s competitiveness. If a country is specialised
in productive activities that show ’Keynesian’ and ’Schumpeterian’ efficiency it will tend
10With price competitiveness being resumed by (η − Ψ + 1)(er), in this case we have (−1.2% +
1%)(−5%) = +1%.
11The income effect on the trade balance is given by ε(z)−pi(y) and in this numerical case is 1%(2%)−
1%(4%) = −2%. The total effect on the rate of change of the trade balance is tb = +1%− 2% = −1%.
12The total effect on the rate of change of the trade balance is computed as such: tb = +1% + 1.5%−
4.5% = −2%.
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to show a higher value of elasticity for its exports. At the same time, if its productive
structure is sufficiently diversified and technological advanced, the import elasticity will
be relatively low. This implies that what determines the final aggregate value of income -
but also price - elasticities is the technological level of a country’s productive activities, as
well as its structural composition. As Kaldor (1981) suggested, aggregate elasticities are
made of different ones that correspond to specific sectors and economic activities. Gen-
erally speaking, the more a product (or a sector) is technologically complex, the less its
trading in the international markets depends on its price. It is well-established that more
’traditional’ sectors (e.g. textile) are more sensitive to price competitiveness, because
of their low technological and innovative content. On the contrary, other more techno-
logically advanced sectors (e.g. nanotechnology) are barely influenced by the pattern of
the real exchange rates. Due to their highly sophisticated nature they display higher
income elasticities. There are some products - especially those investment goods that
are essential for the the production process of various firms - that only certain firms in
particularly advanced economies are able to manufacture. They will be more sensitive to
external demand growth compared to the average, meaning that their export elasticities
will be higher.
In conclusion, once the issue of trade and current account imbalances in the Eurozone is
observed through Keynesian-Schumpeterian lens, the omnipotent relevance of unit labour
costs and price differentials can be seriously challenged. The fact that peripheral countries
have incurred into current account deficits and core countries have run current account
surpluses may have different valid explanations. Once again, the ’Consensus View’ insists
on a narrative that gives a prominent role to the divergence in unit labour costs and real
exchange rates. On the contrary, the Keynesian analysis of trade imbalances assigns a
great deal of importance to the relative rates of growth of domestic and foreign demand as
well as to the responsiveness of imports and exports to variations of the real exchange rate
and of internal and external income. In the Eurozone case, substantial differences in do-
mestic demand growth may have contributed more to the emergence of trade imbalances
than the divergence in relative export prices. This demand-driven process might also be
reinforced by the structural divergence in terms of productive structure between core and
peripheral countries, with respect to their overall technological levels and specialisation
patterns. In other words, different responsiveness to imports and exports (i.e. different
values for import and export elasticities) may have further facilitated the emergence of
external imbalances in the Eurozone. In what follows, some empirical validation to the
alternative ’Keynesian-Schumpeterian view’ will be presented, by focusing in particular
to two extreme but comparable cases: Germany and Spain.
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4.2 The Eurozone competitiveness dilemma
As hinted at the end of the previous chapter, the emergence of current account diver-
gences in the Eurozone might be mostly unrelated to the divergent dynamics of cost and
price competitiveness that greatly concern the authors of the ’Consensus View’ and the
European Commission itself. Instead, current account patterns should be understood not
as measures of competitiveness but as the by-product of domestic credit booms spurred
by ever increasing financial flows. In the remainder of this chapter, some empirical ev-
idence will be presented with the aim to underplay the relationship between cost/price
variables and the emergence of current account imbalances in the Eurozone.
4.2.1 Trickle-down competitiveness: ’cost’ does not imply ’price’
A first major fallacy in the linear explanations that goes from average labour compensa-
tion growing more than average labour productivity (i.e. increasing unit labour costs) to
the explosion of current account asymmetries is the following: variations in cost compet-
itiveness perfectly translate into correspondent changes in export price competitiveness.
In fact, as anticipated in the first chapter, in any modern oligopolistic economy much
of the price behaviour of the single firm can be resumed by the expression:
P = (1 + µ)(UKC + ULC)
Assuming that the margin remains approximately constant, a generalised increase in unit
labour costs will induce a rise in the price level, especially harmful for those goods that
are produced by exporting firms, particularly exposed to competition in the international
market. In other words, a loss in cost competitiveness translates into a correspondent loss
in price competitiveness, as higher inflation rates through time bring about real exchange
rate appreciations.
However, as Gaulier and Vicard (2012) have revealed, there appears to be basically
no correlation between export growth and either unit labour cost variation (-0.05) or
current account variation (0.05) in the ten years preceding the 2007 crisis (figure 4.2).
What drives the spurious correlation between unit labour costs and current accounts
is merely the growth of imports. In fact, as previously mentioned, import growth is
dependent not just on relative prices but, perhaps even more importantly, on domestic
demand growth. The two economists from the Banque de France observe that not only
does import growth correlates negatively and considerably (-0.58) with current account
variations, but also that variation in domestic demand correlates positively (0.71) with
changes in unit labour cost and negatively (-0.69) with variations in current accounts.
This should be no surprise, as wages represent a major component and driver of demand,
especially for medium- and large-size economies (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). The
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Figure 4.2: Changes in current account, unit labour costs, exports (1999-2007). Source: Gaulier and
Vicard (2012)
logical sequence is the following:
↑ (W ) ⇒↑ (ULC) & ↑ (Domestic demand) ⇒↑ (IM)
A generalised increase in wages (W ) has two consequences and effects: one is to increase
unit labour costs (ULC) if productivity is lagging behind, the other is to encourage do-
mestic demand growth. In theory, both effects should in turn increase import growth
(IM) but the demand channel is both direct and quantitatively more relevant. Instead,
the effect of an increase in unit labour costs on the dynamic of exports remains more
dubious. The intuition that deteriorating unit labour costs necessary turn into an appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate and a negative trend for exports is evidently dependent
on the magnitude of this cost component over total production costs and on the dynamic
of the profit margin (µ). However, this does not seem to be the case of the Eurozone
deficit countries: Storm and Naastepad (2014) have estimated those values (average val-
ues for the 2000s) for the manufacturing sector and their results fail to provide support
for the cost-price competitiveness nexus.
Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Intermediate input costs per unit of output (UKC) 0.68 0.74 0.73 0.73
Unit labour costs (ULC) 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16
Mark-up rate (µ) 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.12
Gross output price (1 + µ)(CUnit) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Implied ’pass-through’ elasticity 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
Table 4.1: Unit labour costs and gross output prices, southern Europe (mid-2000s). Source: adapted
from Storm and Naastepad (2014)
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Assuming that what matters in international competition is only the ’gross output
price’ of a product - which includes labour and intermediate input costs as well as a profit
margin - table 4.1 reports the composition of the gross output price for the manufacturing
sectors of the peripheral countries (around mid-2000s). It appears that unit labour costs
(ULC) constitute only about 16% of the total manufacturing gross output prices. This
means that even assuming a complete ’pass-through’ from labour costs onto prices13, a
1% increase in unit labour costs corresponds to a 0.18% rise in gross output prices.
Another way to underplay the role of unit labour costs in driving real exchange rate
variations is to decompose it as Felipe and Kumar (2011) propose. They take the aggre-
gate value of unit labour cost for the whole economy:
ULC =
Wn
ALP
where Wn is nominal compensation per employee and ALP is average labour productivity.
It can be re-written as:
ULC =
Wn
V Ar
L
or ULC =
Wn
V An
LP
where V A stands for value added (in nominal or real terms depending on the subscripts
n and r), L is the number of workers and P is a price deflator. The whole expression can
be reformulated as:
ULC =
WnL
V An
P
where
WnL
V An
is nothing but total labour compensation over the economy’s nominal value
added, i.e. the economy’s labour share θL. Thus, the unit labour cost expression becomes:
ULC = θLP
The authors’ estimations based on OECD data for 12 countries show that, except for
Greece, the labour share has not increased substantially between 1980 and 2007. What
instead has risen, in line with the trend of unit labour costs, is the price index used to
calculate labour productivity.
As for the possible explanations of this, the authors put forward two plaudible argu-
ments:
One is that the nontradable sector of the economy, which probably applies
a higher mark-up on unit labor costs, is gaining weight in the economy. A
second reason is an increasing markup in the nontradable sector together with
a declining markup in the tradable sector.
13Storm and Naastepad (2014) argues that a realistic value for the ’pass-through’ could be around
50%.
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Figure 4.3: Unit labour costs decomposed in peripheral countries (1980-2007). Source: adapted from
Felipe and Kumar (2011)
A final reason for debunking the myth that sees unit labour costs as a good indicator of
a country’s competitiveness, is the performance of some of the new members of the EU.
Hanzl-Weiss and Landesmann (2016) note that the group of countries that they label
’CEE-5’, composed by Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia has been
undergoing a sort of ’Kaldor paradox’ in the years 2001-2008. Despite deteriorating unit
labour costs, those countries have managed to expand their global export market shares
year by year.
Something is rotten in the stats of Spain It would have been sufficient to look at
Spanish data on unit labour costs and real exchange rate, to affirm that cost competi-
tiveness do not automatically translate into price competitiveness.
First of all, the deterioration of the real exchange rate in the decade 1999-2009 is
much less severe compared to unit labour costs. Secondly and even more remarkably,
the value of the real exchange rate has only modestly returned to pre-crisis levels after
2009, whereas unit labour costs have dramatically fallen back to their 2002 level. Indeed,
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Figure 4.4: Patterns of unit labour costs for the total economy (ULC) and real exchange rate price
deflator for exports of goods and services (REER) in Spain (1999-2015, index 2005=100). Source:
author’s elaboration on European Commission data
as calculated by Uxo´ et al. (2014), despite falling unit labour cost (-8,5% from peak in
2009 to 2014), the GDP price deflator has increased by 0.7%. As a matter of fact, cost
reduction has not been passed on to prices. This is confirmed when decomposing the
GDP deflator, as they do in the following way:
P˙ = ˙ULC + ˙(1 +m) + ˙(1 + t)
where P˙ is the growth rate of the price deflator, ˙ULC the growth rate of unit labour
costs, ˙(1 +m) the growth rate of profit margins and ˙(1 + t) the growth rate of indirect
taxes. The results are shown in table 4.2: from peak in 2009 to the end of 2013, unit
labour costs have been falling by 2.0% on average, but they were more then compensated
by an average growth of 1.7% in profit margins and 0.5% in indirect taxes.
Unit labour costs Profit margins Indirect taxes GDP deflator
Spain -2.0% +1.7% +0.7% +0.1%
Table 4.2: Contributions to the average growth rate of the GDP deflator (2009Q4-2013Q4). Source:
adapted from Uxo´ et al. (2014)
What comes out from these figures is the ultimate argument against using unit labour
costs as a measure of competitiveness14. The reason is blatantly simple: growth in unit
14This result is of crucial importance in policy terms, as measures that seek to reduce labour costs
4.2. THE EUROZONE COMPETITIVENESS DILEMMA 89
labour costs is not the only determinant of the overall rate of inflation, other production
costs and especially the pattern of profit margins may have a different and counterbal-
ancing dynamic. Figure 4.5 from Uxo´ et al. (2016) represents the contributions to the
growth rate of the GDP deflator of its various components from 2001 to 2014.
Figure 4.5: Contributions to the growth rate of the GDP deflator in Spain (2001Q1–2014Q3). Source:
Uxo´ et al. (2016)
It emerges that since 2009 unit labour costs have ceased to make a progressively
decreasing contribution (which became negative since 2010) to the GDP deflator but it
has been more than compensated by rising indirect taxes and profit margins. Incidentally,
as the authors note (Uxo´ et al. 2014), the same development has occurred in other
peripheral countries, namely Greece and Portugal.
Finally, despite relative price movements within the Eurozone, that have contributed
to the relative appreciation of the real exchange rate of peripheral countries, the great
bulk of the variation in those countries’ real exchange rates is accounted for by the changes
in nominal terms of the euro vis-a`-vis other currencies. As the indices compiled by the
European Commission show (figure 4.6 plots the values for Spain), the nominal and real
exchange rates compared to a group of 37 industrialised countries follow similar trends,
both in the pre-crisis period of appreciation (1999-2009) and after the crisis, when it
depreciates slightly.
In conclusion, the idea that cost variables constitute not just good measures for a
country’s international competitiveness but also the explanatory factor behind current
account imbalances in the euro area is utterly inaccurate. There are many ways in which
costs do not convert into prices, and this happened precisely and most strikingly after
through internal devaluation do not guarantee any automatic improvement of a country’s international
competitiveness.
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Figure 4.6: Nominal exchange rates (NEER) and real exchange rates (REER), price deflator of exports
(Spain 2000-2015, index 2005=100). Source: author’s elaboration on European Commission data.
2009 in the Eurozone case. Even though unit labour costs are related to developments
in the current account balances, the correlation appears spurious. In fact, unit labour
costs do not relate at all to export growth, as the mainstream theory would suggest. The
logical conclusion on the ambiguous role of cost variables should be to look exclusively
at the real exchange rate as a better indicator of external competitiveness. Nevertheless,
the recent economic history of the euro area seems to challenge the idea that divergences
in current accounts are merely the result of disparities in external competitiveness. In the
remaining part of this chapter, variations in income, rather than in relative prices, will be
examined in details, as they performed a more decisive role in determining intra-Eurozone
current account imbalances.
4.2.2 There are some things money can’t buy: the real nature
of Eurozone trade imbalances
In the narrative put forward by the ’Consensus View’ Eurozone current account imbal-
ances are simply the result of emerging divergences in price competitiveness. However, as
hinted above, there is no space in their explanation for demand growth differentials and
structural-technological elements in the productive systems of different countries. In fact,
the relative appreciation or depreciation of the real exchange rate, due to different do-
mestic rates of inflation, may have played a relatively little role in the emergence of trade
deficits or surplus. This suggestion represents the core idea of the chapter: Eurozone
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trade imbalance are mostly explained by different rates of demand growth, commercial
relations and structural factors related to each national system of innovation and pro-
duction.
The hypothesis that current account imbalances are mostly determined by an asym-
metrical ’demand shock’, rather than by a ’competitiveness shock’, is based on the dy-
namic trend of imports and exports before and after the crisis. Indeed, it is important to
adopt a comparative approach by confronting the pre-crisis pattern with the post-2009
situations. Once again, a greater attention will be given to the Spanish case, and a much
more detailed comparison with the German one will be presented below.
Figure 4.7: Current account imbalances for selected countries (1999-2015). Source: author’s elabora-
tion on Eurostat data.
Figure 4.7 represents the current account trends of Germany and of the three mostly
affected peripheral countries. As previously discussed in chapter 1, Greece, Spain and
Portugal have seen their current account balances progressively deteriorating in the period
1999-2008, while Germany has constantly increased its surplus. After 2008 however, a
different pattern has taken place: current account deficits in the periphery have been
drastically reduced and have now turned into modest surpluses. Germany has nonetheless
managed to register a huge surplus, which has increased above 6%15. As the current
account balance is largely determined by the underlying trade balance, it is useful to look
at the import and export patterns of those selected countries in order to have a clearer
idea on whether current account balances have been driven by a spectacular or meagre
15The 6% threshold is the upper limit that the European Commission has foreseen in its Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure (MIP), the lower being an asymmetric -4%. Germany have run a current account
surplus well in excess of the 6% parameter ever since 2011.
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export performance or if the growth of imports has had a greater relevance. To put it
more succinctly: is the surge in imports the main culprit behind the current account
deficits registered by the peripheral countries? And more importantly: can we attribute
the adjustment in the trade balances to the collapse in imports, due to the fall in domestic
demand in the southern periphery after 2008?
For instance, by looking at the two most indicative countries, namely Germany and
Spain, it appears that imports in Spain underwent a sudden decrease and did not recover
their pre-crisis level, while in Germany they seem to be back on the pre-2008 trend (figure
4.8). Incidentally, imports in Spain accelerated quite dramatically between 2003 and 2007,
at the same time as the externally fuelled credit boom started to manifest its effects on
residential and other asset prices. On the contrary, both countries experienced a certain
regularity in their export trends, with exports growing strongly in the years preceding the
crisis. In fact, Spain does not appear to be enjoying a significant spur of exports in these
last years of supposedly regained competitiveness (i.e. depreciation of its real exchange
rate), rather it looks as if the Spanish trade balance might have been ameliorated simply
by a considerable stagnation of imports, that could be mainly attributed to the policy of
wage devaluation pursued after 2010. Moreover, if one compares the export and import
trends of the four countries mentioned above, since the introduction of the euro in 1999,
the picture looks even more clear.
Figure 4.8: Exports and imports of Germany and Spain in billions of euros (1999-2014). Source:
author’s elaboration on OECD data.
From these simple descriptive figures one cannot derive the conclusion that the ex-
port performance of Germany has been extraordinarily superior to that of countries in
the southern periphery (figure 4.9). Even at this level, one should observe that Ger-
many’s increasing pre-crisis competitiveness relative to the peripheral countries did not
constitute an impediment for their export growth (with perhaps only the minor exception
of Portugal). Interestingly, after the collapse of international trade in 2008-2009, similar
export trends reappeared, despite a drastic recovery in cost competitiveness and modest
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Figure 4.9: Exports of goods and services of Germany, Spain, Portugal and Greece, indexed at 1999
(1999-2014, index 1999=100). Source: author’s elaboration on OECD data.
but meaningful improvements in price competitiveness.
What one can derive instead from comparing import trends is that only German
imports have continued to grow along a path that is comparable to the pre-crisis one.
In all the peripheral countries here considered, imports have been stagnating after the
collapse in 2009 and in no single case have they recovered to pre-2008 levels. Moreover,
with the exception of Portugal, import growth of Greece and Spain in the years preceding
the crisis (especially after 2003) has vastly outperformed that of Germany.
In conclusion, during the decade 1999-2008 exports grew more or less similarly in
all these countries, despite increasingly divergences in price competitiveness - testified
by the appreciation in the real exchange rate - of the peripheral countries. After the
trade collapse of 2008-2009, export growth resumed in all countries following a trend
similar to the pre-crisis one, irrespective of a partial recovery in competitiveness by the
countries in the periphery. What emerges as being clearly different, among countries and
between the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods, is the pattern of imports. They grew
substantially more in Spain and Greece relative to Germany until 2008 and remained
mostly flat ever since. The ’substitution effect’ that one should observe when a country
is gaining competitiveness relative to another one does not show up from this very first
impression. Indeed, as table 4.3 indicates - reporting the compounded annual rates of
growth of exports and imports for the selected countries (for the periods 1999-2007 and
2010-2013) - the biggest changes have taken place with respect to imports. This points
to the dominance of an ’income effect’ determined by different rates and variations of
domestic demand growth, with major consequences for the growth of imports in each
country.
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Figure 4.10: Imports of goods and services of Germany, Spain, Portugal and Greece, indexed at 1999
(1999-2014, index 1999=100). Source: author’s elaboration on OECD data
Exports Imports
1999-2007 2010-2013 ∆ 1999-2007 2010-2013 ∆
Spain +5.4% +3.1% -2.3 +6.5% +0.2% -6.3
Greece +6.8% +3.6% -3.2 +7.5% -2.0% -9.5
Portugal +5.7% +4.8% -0.9 +4.8% +0.1% -4.7
Germany +6.9% +3.1% -3.8 +5.1% +1.8% -3.3
Table 4.3: Compounded annual growth rates of exports and imports for selected countries. Author’s
calculations based on OECD data
The export columns reveal that, from the pre-crisis to the 2010-2013 period, export
growth has decelerated almost proportionally in each country under scrutiny. Instead,
what has changed dramatically after the crisis is once again the pattern of import growth
among countries: in the period from 1999 to 2007 peripheral countries (with the exception
of Portugal) show average annual rates of import growth well above Germany. After 2008-
2009 however, all countries have experienced a fall in the pace of import growth, yet with
striking quantitative differences between Germany and the peripheral countries. The
average annual rate of import growth has fallen by 6.3 percentage points in Spain, 9.5
percentage points in Greece and 4.7 percentage points in Portugal compared to a modest
fall of 3.3 percentage points in Germany. Thus, Germany has managed to register modest
but positive import growth over the period 2010-2013, while the three deficit countries
have seen little or negative import growth whatsoever. This apparent decoupling of
export and import developments seems to support the hypothesis that demand (external
but especially domestic), rather than real exchange rate variation, has played a dominant
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role in determining the trade pattern of the above mentioned Eurozone countries.
Domestic Demand External Demand
2000-2007 2010-2013 2000-2007 2010-2013
Spain 4.6 -2.8 -0.9 1.7
Greece 5.0 -8.6 -0.7 2.9
Portugal 1.5 -3.5 0.0 2.2
Germany 1.5 2.7 1 0.3
Table 4.4: Average contribution of domestic and external demand to GDP growth (in percentage
points). Sources: values for Spain, Greece and Portugal from Uxo´ et al. (2014), values for Germany
from author’s calculations based on AMECO data
As one can see from table 4.4, the average values of domestic and external demand
for the two periods (pre-crisis 2000-2007 and post-crisis 2010-2013) are essentially in line
with those on import growth and with what the theory would suggest. In the pre-crisis
period, above average domestic demand drove GDP growth in Spain and Greece at the
same time when those two countries were experiencing high rates of import growth. In
the years 2010-2013 instead, domestic demand in the same countries has been curbed
through restrictive fiscal and wage policies, so much that it has come to give a negative
contribution to GDP growth.
Figure 4.11: Contribution of exports and imports to GDP growth in Spain (2000Q1–2014Q2). Source:
Uxo´ et al. (2016)
It is no coincidence that import growth over that period has stalled, well before the
modest adjustment in real exchange rate took place. In the case of Spain for instance, the
index compiled by the European Commission tells that from the 2009 peak to 2013, the
real exchange rate has depreciated by merely 1.37% in terms of its HICP deflator and by
6.19% as of its GDP price deflator, after having appreciated by 16% and 20.30% respec-
tively in the period 1999-2009. The rapid and extraordinary adjustment in the Spanish
(but also in the Portuguese and Greek) trade balance cannot seriously be attributed to
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such modest changes in price competitiveness. On the contrary, the radical inversion in
domestic demand and import growth - with exports following similar pre-crisis trends
- do suggest that the eradication of current account deficits has more to do with the
policies of fiscal restraint and internal (i.e. wage) devaluation. Rather than ameliorating
the competitiveness of the countries that underwent such radical measures, they directly
affected the volume of imported goods demanded by each country: once more, wages are
a cost for the single enterprise but a major source of demand for the whole economy.
In the case of Spain, as explained by Uxo´ et al. (2016), real wages (deflated with the
consumer price index) have decreased by 8% between 2009 and 2014, and this has mostly
to do with nominal wages growth falling below the inflation rate. The authors also note
that wage moderation in Spain has been even stronger than what appears to be, since
job destruction has been concentrated on lower skilled workers who, on average, receive
lower wages. This dynamic of growth in wages has been the consequence of the economic
crisis that has reduced the bargaining power of workers. A series of agreements stipulated
between the main trade unions and the employers’ associations have set targets for wage
growth rates at 0.6% per year or even less. Secondly, a wage restraint has been imposed
through various labour market reforms (in 2010, 2011 and most importantly in 2012),
especially in the public sector, where civil servants’ wages were reduced in 2010 and 2012
and frozen in 2011, 2013 and 2014.
Nevertheless, as one can see from figure 4.12, from 2010 to 2013 almost all peripheral
countries experienced more or less drastic measures of wage compression that translated
into an effective reduction in average real wages. Portugal cut its average real wage by
6.5% over that period, Greece did the same by an astonishing amount of 23.6%, whereas
Germany saw an increase of 4.4%, in line with the positive and expanding contribution
of domestic demand to GDP growth.
Figure 4.12: Changes in real wages per employee in the EU in percentage terms (2010–2013). Source:
Lehndorff (2016)
4.2. THE EUROZONE COMPETITIVENESS DILEMMA 97
4.2.3 Regression analysis of imports and exports: Germany Vs
Spain
Following the presentation on the determinants of imports and exports introduced in the
first part of this chapter, a simple and standard econometric analysis seems to confirm
the irrelevance of price competitiveness in determining the trade patterns of euro area
countries. For the sake of comparability, regression analysis has been performed on the
exports and imports of Germany and Spain. These are two medium-large size economies,
the first being the surplus country par excellence and the second the biggest one among
the southern periphery16. The period chosen for the analysis goes from 1999 to 2007,
for analytical and practical reasons. First, trade elasticities of the two countries are
examined in a period of increasingly divergent current accounts. Secondly, in 1999 the
nominal exchange rate of Eurozone members is fixed irrevocably and after the crisis of
2007 the movement of income, imports and exports is highly unstable and therefore not
reliable for a quantitative analysis.
The export equation takes the following form:
Log(EXi) = α1i + α2iLog(GDPEU) + α3iLog(REEREX) + εi
where i represents the country; EX stands for exports of goods and services; GDPEU
is the gross domestic product of EU member states, it constitutes a proxy for external
demand; REEREX is the annual real effective exchange rate (price deflator for the goods
and services exported) of the given country compared to a group of 37 industrialised
economies. Data for exports and EU GDP comes from the AMECO database, the real
exchange rate index from the European Commission. As each variable is presented in log
terms, the alpha coefficients represent the income elasticity of exports (α2i) and the price
elasticity of exports (α3i), that is to say: how much exports react in percentage terms to
a percentage variation in foreign demand or in the real exchange rate.
The import equation instead is as follows:
Log(IMi) = β1i + β2iLog(GDPi) + β3iLog(REERIM) + εi
where i represents again the country; IM denotes the imports of goods and services;
GDP is gross domestic product of the given country; REERIM is the annual real ef-
fective exchange rate (HICP deflator) of the given country compared to a group of 37
industrialised economies. Data for imports and for GDP are taken from the AMECO
database and the real exchange rate from the European Commission. Once again, all
variables are logarithmically transformed so that the beta coefficients represent the in-
16Italy should be excluded from this group of deficit countries, as it registered modest trade deficits
only in the years 2005-2011, remaining in surplus in the first 6 years since the introduction of the euro
and after 2011.
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come elasticity of imports (β2i) and the price elasticity of imports (β3i), capturing how
much imports react in percentage terms to a percentage variation in GDP or in the real
exchange rate.
Exports Imports
Log(GDPEU) Log(REEREX) Log(GDP ) Log(REERIM)
Spain 1.83 -0.99 1.43 -1.37
(0.16)*** (0.37)* R2 = 0.99 (0.24)*** (0.90) R2 = 0.96
Germany 1.72 -0.66 2.71 -0.64
(0.04)*** (0.19)* R2 = 0.99 (0.34)*** (0.73) R2 = 0.89
Table 4.5: Regression results for export and import equations. Note: ”***” is 0.001 significance; ”*”
is 0.05 significance; no symbol equals no significance.
The results reported in table 4.5 are broadly in line with previous attempts to in-
vestigate the relative importance of price and demand factors in the emergence of trade
imbalances in the Eurozone (Chen et al. 2013; Uxo´ et al. 2014; Schro¨der 2016). Even in
this simplified case one can note how the coefficients for the price elasticities of imports
are not statistically significant, therefore we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are
equal to zero. With respect to price elasticities of exports, there is some significance but
the values are particularly low. The values of price elasticities of exports are close to
unit for Spain (i.e. a 1% depreciation of the real exchange rate increases export growth
by 1%, other things being equal) and estimated to be significantly lower for Germany
(0.66%). When considered with the price elasticities of imports in the Marshall-Lerner
conditions, their sum in absolute value remains close or even below unit. Therefore the
effect of a variation in the real exchange rate on the trade balance remains low, if barely
existent: it affects positively exports but has little or no effect on imports, which instead
suffer in value terms for the worsening of the terms of trade. Thus, the two regressions on
aggregate variables for Spain and Germany seem to confirm the intuition that divergences
in the real exchange rate were not directly responsible for the trade imbalances in the
euro area.
Uxo´ et al. (2016) have given a further specification to the argument, by simulating
with estimated values the trend of the Spanish trade balance in two different cases: first,
considering only the change in the real exchange rate, and secondly isolating the effect
of demand variation. As it becomes evident from figure 4.13, since the beginning of
the crisis in 2008, no adjustment in the trade balance would have occurred if Spain had
maintained the pre-crisis rate of growth in domestic demand, despite improvements in the
real exchange rate. Spain’s net trade would have actually worsened even more. Instead,
considering only the variation in domestic demand that has taken place, and keeping
the value of the real exchange rate at the pre-crisis level, the trade balance would have
adjusted in a similar way to what it actually did.
As far as income elasticities are concerned, the results are unequivocal: they are all
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Figure 4.13: Net trade of Spain (actual and simulated values). Source: Uxo´ et al. (2016)
highly significant and therefore confirm the predominance of income, rather than relative
price variations in explaining import and export trends in Germany and Spain. A little
bit more controversial is perhaps the values that those elasticities appear to have for the
two selected countries. One would have expected a higher export elasticity for Germany,
although the difference is not huge. Given that the German export performance in
those years has been slightly superior compared to that of Spain, this would point to
the hypothesis that, rather than the value of the income elasticity in itself, the relative
strength of external demand has played a greater role in determining the trade patterns
of the two countries. After all, external demand is proxied by a common value (i.e.
GDP growth of EU countries), which obviously cannot capture the share of commercial
relations that each country entertains with other countries, with their different rates of
growth of external demand. Later in the chapter, it will be shown how Germany has
enjoyed better trade relations with Asian emerging economies, especially China, which
were displaying above average rates of growth. Not only did those countries grow more
than many European and other OECD economies over the 2000s, they also imported
much more of those kind of high-tech capital goods in which the German productive
system is specialised.
Finally, income elasticities of imports are equally significant but their values differ for
Spain and Germany in an unexpected way. Germany’s income elasticity of imports is
higher (2.71%) than that of Spain (1.43%). This means that, in case of similar rates of
domestic demand growth, the German economy is much more prone to importing goods
and services, relative to the Spanish one. First of all, it has been reported how domestic
demand in those years was almost stagnant in Germany, while it was prospering in Spain,
thanks to the credit and housing prices booms described in the previous chapter. Indeed,
excessive internal demand growth remains the most important explanatory factor for the
appearance of trade deficits in the peripheral economies of the Eurozone. Nonetheless,
to see Spain as being less ’reliant’ than Germany on imported products appears to be
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contradictory, but only on the surface. The puzzle is explained by considering the nature
of imports that enter those countries: in the case of Spain they are mostly final products,
whereas Germany imports an incredibly higher share of intermediate goods that consti-
tute an essential part of their supply chain. In the past twenty years, German firms have
progressively delocalised the production of intermediate goods to neighbouring countries,
setting up a geographical matrix of production that has Germany as the assembly core,
producing final goods that are mostly sell abroad. Therefore, the higher propensity to
import of the German economy is vastly explained by the high import content of their
exports17, whose final value added greatly dominates those of all its components assem-
bled together. In this way, most of Germany’s imports are later exported as parts of
final goods, whereas Spanish imports are greatly composed by final and non-exportable
intermediate goods. It is because of this structural change in the German productive
system that Sinn (2006, p. 1162) has started to label Germany as a ’Bazaar Economy’:
Intermediate products delivered from other domestic sectors to the manufac-
turing sector have increased only a little more since 1995 than the production
value of that sector itself. The main reason why value added in manufactur-
ing fell behind manufacturing output is the enormous increase of imported
intermediate products, no less than 64 per cent over a period of nine years
in real terms. Nine-tenths of the decline in production depth of the German
manufacturing sector in the period from 1995 to 2004 has resulted from shift-
ing intermediary production abroad, and only one-tenth has resulted from
shifting it to other sectors within Germany.
Hence, only apparently is Germany’s trade balance penalised by such high propensity
to import. On the contrary, this represents a functional element in its productive and
export model that has achieved so much success over the last decades. This explains also
why the complexity of trade relations cannot be fully grasped by a very simple model
made of aggregate variables. It is therefore important to complement any econometric
estimation of trade equations with in-depth case study analysis of the single countries
under scrutiny.
The following section of this chapter will finally try to cast some further light on what
have mostly determined recent export and import developments in Germany and Spain.
4.2.4 A tale of two countries: Germany and Spain
The biggest economic problem for Europe today is how to revive the German
economy.
That is what The Economist solemnly declared in 1999, at the onset of the single currency.
At that time, the unemployment rate in Germany was 10.7% and the GDP growth rate in
17According to Sinn (2006): ”The average import share in German exports has increased from 27 per
cent in 1991 to 39 per cent in 2002”.
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the previous years had been comparatively lower than many other European countries,
France, Spain and the UK among them. Germany was therefore given the infamous
title ”The sick man of the euro”. As late as 2004, the same commentators where still
questioning the hypothesis that Germany ”could go the way of Japan or Argentina”.
In the same period, the development of the Spanish economy stood in striking contrast
with the perception that the world had for the German economic situation. As The
Economist itself recalled in a gloomy special report on Spain in 2008 (”The party’s over”),
from 1996 to 2007 the Spanish economy grew on average by 3.6%, unemployment fell from
24% to 8% (total employment went from 12 millions in 1993 to 20 millions in 2007) and
income per capita radically converged towards EU15 average, moving from a level of 68%
relative to the average, when Spain joined the European Economic Community in 1986.
In the experience of the past seven years these accounts look incredibly far from to-
day’s imagination. Nowadays, the situation seems to have radically reversed: Germany is
held as a positive model for the whole Eurozone and Spain is being labelled as an undy-
namic and uncompetitive country. The authors belonging to the ’Consensus View’ have
constantly stressed the role of external imbalances as the partially hidden phenomenon
that underpinned the emergence of the financial and sovereign debt crises in peripheral
countries. In fact, the years following the introduction of the euro in 1999 were also char-
acterised, as repeatedly stated above, by an opposite development: the building up of
huge current account imbalances. Germany has continuously run current account surplus
well above 4% over GDP ever since 2004, while Spain’s current account deficit by that
year stood at 5% over its GDP. However, we have seen in the previous chapter that such
imbalance between the two countries does not imply that Spain was directly borrowing
from Germany in order to finance its deficit. At the same time, current accounts should
not be regarded as valuable indicators for understanding the causes of the economic cri-
sis that struck Spain and other peripheral countries. Finally, previous sections of this
chapter have sought to underplay the myth that current account imbalances have been
generated by the relative losses (gains) in cost and price competitiveness among coun-
tries. Nonetheless, current accounts do testify that deficit countries did not satisfy (on
net) their domestic demand with their domestic production, and vice versa for the sur-
plus countries. How these asymmetries in the export or import performances materialised
within the Eurozone is largely explained by the different rates of domestic and external
demand growth, which are major factors behind the growth in total volume of imports
and exports in any economic unit, being it a region, a country or a regional area such
as the EU. Apart from dissimilar patterns of domestic demand growth, non-price fac-
tors such as the configuration of their trade relations, the internal specialisation and the
composition of their productive activities are all fundamental elements in explaining the
trade performance of a country. Despite attempts to reduce some of these determinants
into quantitative variables, it is manifestly impossible to give a realistic picture of each
country’s competitiveness in these terms. Comparative analysis needs to consider many
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historical and sociological dimensions, as well as economic ones, that only a descriptive
approach can include. In what remains of this chapter a tentative exposition of such
important characteristics will be presented for both countries.
Germany
The history of the German export success depends on two crucial elements (Storm and
Naastepad 2015b). First of all, Germany’s commercial relations are highly oriented to-
wards countries and economic areas which are developing at a sustained rate; secondly,
Germany possesses a strong manufacturing base in high and medium-high technological
sectors (e.g. chemicals, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles and machinery), which see their
global demand growing at an above-average rate.
A legacy of the past, Germany still typifies the model of a ’Coordinated Market
Economy’ (Hall and Soskice 2001) in which the manufacturing core is subject to con-
straints and regulations that favour process and product innovation in high value-added
sectors (Streeck 2008). Pressured from one side to follow a path of Marx-biased tech-
nical change18, from the other side manufacturing firms have always been granted the
crucial patient long-term finance, either from locally controlled Hausbank or from the
renowned public investment bank, the Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau (KfW). Investment
in R&D, in workers’ skills and in the cumulation of technological capabilities have become
distinguished features of the German productive core of medium-sized, export-oriented
enterprises: the so-called Mittelstand.
Nevertheless, the 1990s and the early 2000s have been characterised by few transfor-
mations that have partly modified the original ’Modell Deutschland ’: policies of wage
moderation in the 1990s, labour market reforms in the 2000s and a process of financial
and industrial restructuring throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Starting from the latter,
financialisation has become an important element in the German economy (Detzer and
Hein 2014): the stock exchange tax was abolished in 1991, share buy-backs were made
legal in 1998, capital gain taxes were slashed for many corporations in 2002 and hedge
funds were legalised in 2004. At the same time, many previously cautious commercial
banks started to be involved in investment banking, most often internationally, as testified
by data on cross-border lending by the German banks (chapter 3).
18It is defined as ’Marx-biased’ the process of labour-saving technological change which is forced to
the capitalists by the increasing labour costs that, without productivity-enhancing innovations, would
otherwise erode the profit margins of the firms. It is referred to Karl Marx after the following passage
from The Poverty of Philosophy (1847):
In England, strikes have regularly given rise to the invention and application of new ma-
chines. Machines were, it may be said, the weapon employed by the capitalist to quell the
revolt of specialised labour. The self-acting mule, the greatest invention of modern indus-
try, put out of action the spinners who were in revolt. If combinations and strikes had no
other effect than that of making the efforts of mechanical genius react against them, they
would still exercise an immense influence on the development of industry.
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The productive landscape and its model have also changed substantially. Storm and
Naastepad (2015b) argues that the once coordinated German economy has been partially
transformed into a more ’liberal’ one in several ways: by weakening collective bargain-
ing, partially privatising the pension system and deregulating the labour market through
the so-called Hartz IV reforms. However, rather than a totally different but homoge-
neous model, the German economy has developed a dualism between a ’coordinated’
manufacturing core and a ’liberal’ deregulated service sector. The manufacturing sector
fostered productivity growth for the whole country but contributed to making workers
increasingly redundant through reduced working hours, so that the labour-intensive ser-
vice sector absorbed the workforce expelled (or not employed in the first instance) from
the manufacturing industry.
Manufacturing Non-traded sector
GDP (billions euros) Hours (billions) GDP (billions euros) Hours (billions)
Spain +105.2 -0.3 +474.1 +11.0
Germany +112.2 -6.1 +664.1 +3.3
Table 4.6: Change in real GDP and hours worked between 1980 and 2007. Source: Storm and
Naastepad (2015b)
Table 4.6 shows in absolute terms how the expansion of the manufacturing sector
has been accompanied by a substantial fall in the number of hours worked in Germany,
whereas in Spain a similar increase in manufacturing value added had hardly any effect
on the total number of working hours. This speaks volume about the high productivity
enhancement of the German manufacturing sector compared to the Spanish one, yet at
the same time it raises the issue of labour redundancy. A loss of 3.7 million full-time
jobs have been estimated over that long period (1980-2007), barely compensated by a 2
million increase of full-time jobs in the non-traded sector, meaning that a progressively
higher number of people has taken on part-time jobs.
Labour market reforms were therefore thought to be functional to facilitating the
structural change that the German economy was experiencing. This intention became
an actual plan around 2003, with the name ’Agenda 2010’. It was characterised by the
following features (Lenhdorff 2016):
1. The reduction in quantity and duration of unemployment benefits, partially substi-
tuted with a system that forces unemployed workers to accept whatever job they
are offered.
2. Abolishment of many restrictions on temporary employment. The number of tem-
porary agency employees - they earned on average around half as much an hour
as standard employees in 2006 - surged from 300,000 in 2003 to around 900,000 in
2011.
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3. Thanks to the package of reforms named ”Hartz IV”, the so-called ”mini-jobs”
(paid 450 euros without concerns over the number of hours worked) were largely
liberalised, with the result that they increased from 4.2 million in 2000 to around
5 million by the end of that decade.
4. The pension system underwent several modifications: early retirement was basically
abolished, the retirement age increased from 65 to 67 years and further elements of
privatisation were introduced.
Figure 4.14: Changes in employment structure in Germany (numbers in thousands between 2000 and
2010). Source: Lehndorff (2016)
The importance of these reforms should not be understated. As a matter of fact,
they have given a major contribution to the process of internal devaluation in Germany
which, interestingly, took place before the crisis of 2008/2009. Either directly or indirectly,
through a drop in the coverage of workers by sectoral collective agreements19, Germany
was the only EU member state in which the average real wage per employee fell over the
period 2001-2009 (by 6.2%, see figure 4.15).
Nevertheless, the divergence between stagnating wages and soaring productivity growth,
that is responsible for the decrease of unit labour costs relative to other Eurozone part-
ners, is merely the result of aggregating together different sectors of the economy. In fact,
in the metal and chemical industries - highly exposed to international competition - av-
erage wages have risen in line with productivity growth. Where they stagnated most was
19The share of workers covered by sectoral collective agreements dropped from 65% in 1999 to 55% in
2010 in the western part of Germany and from 46% to 40% for the same years in the East (Lehndorff
2016).
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Figure 4.15: Changes in real wages per employee in the EU (2001–2009). Source: Lehndorff (2016)
in the non-traded sectors, those that were greatly expanding in the 2000s, boosted by the
deregulation of the ”Hartz IV” reforms. This helps to explain why average export prices
rose from 2003 to 2008, despite falling nominal unit labour costs. Advantages in unit
wage costs were not corresponded by lower selling prices, thus German firms managed to
increase their profit margins, helped by the fact that other European competitors raised
their export prices even more.
It has already been argued that the process of ’internal devaluation’ in Germany did
contribute to the emergence of colossal trade surpluses, primarily via the demand chan-
nel and very little through gains in price competitiveness. Wage moderation meant lower
domestic demand for consumption goods, but in a Keynesian-Kaleckian sense it also im-
plies lower domestic demand for investment goods, which have growth expectations as
its main determinant. Interestingly, the increasing amount of profits that German firms
were accumulating in the 2000s did not spill over new investment in Germany - as some
neoclassical theories would suggest - but contributed instead to the accumulation of net
foreign assets. Detzer and Hein (2014) estimate that while gross fixed capital formation
contributed on average by more than 0.4 percentage points to real GDP growth in the
1960s and 1970s, from 1992 to 2008 the average contribution was only about 0.17 percent-
age points20, with just a minor increase towards the end of that period. The combination
of financial liberalisation and increasing surpluses in the real economy therefore facilitated
the expanding cross-border operations of the German too-big-to-fail banks. This should
be deemed responsible for inflating peripheral countries with further financial leverage
during their housing and asset price bubbles (see chapter 3).
20Author’s average based on Detzer and Hein’s (2014) calculations for two distinct periods: 1993-2002
and 2003-2008.
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However, the import channel, even though the most relevant in this case, is only one
side of the balance of trade. The export capacity of the German productive system
remains an undeniable fact, so much that the country is often accused of practising neo-
Mercantilist policies. The left-leaning Keynesian authors mentioned above (Stockhammer
and Onaran 2013; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015) particularly endorse this viewpoint,
arguing that the measures of internal devaluation pursued in Germany have given the
country an outstanding competitive advantage relative to its euro partners, given that
the single currency rules out the possibility of monetary competitive devaluations. They
mention only in passing the direct effect of wage moderation over domestic demand and
in turns on the volume of total imports, assuming that trade surpluses and deficits emerge
simply out of a substitution effect between relatively less or more expensive goods. The
excessive focus on relative prices of export goods has already been refuted in the previous
section of this chapter. However, the significance of internal devaluation in explaining
the export success of Germany can be traced to the particular way in which it occurred.
It was mainly concentrated in the non-traded sectors, that are obviously not exposed
to international competition but represent a significant source of demand for the whole
economy. Instead, in the most technologically-advanced and export-oriented sectors, the
implicit subsidy that lower wages represent for the entrepreneurs did not materialise, as
wages kept the productivity pace also thanks to the ’coordinated’ nature that this part of
the economy has mostly preserved. The pressure for Marx-biased technical progress did
not disappeared for the exporting firms. What instead became increasingly less reliable
was the domestic source of demand, due to actual wage devaluation in other domestically-
oriented sectors. This forced many firms with both domestic and foreign costumers to
concentrate more aggressively on the external markets.
Indeed, a major transformation of the German productive system in the past decades
has been the re-orientation of exporting firms towards more dynamic and potentially
expanding emerging markets. As described in Simonazzi et al. (2013), most European
countries, especially after their joined the EU, have been integrated into the supply
chains of Germany and other core countries. A confirmation of this can be found in the
composition of trade, with the expansion in imports and exports of intermediate goods
prevailing over that of final goods.
The pattern of German imports and exports that emerges over the period 1999-2008
is clear (table 4.7): a shift from the southern periphery21, especially in terms of imports,
and more generally from the Eurozone, towards Eastern Europe22 and the rest of the
world outside the EU.
More specifically, each and every country in the southern periphery (France included)
21Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
22Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria
and Romania.
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German Exports to German Imports from
1999 2008 1999 2008
Southern EU 14.8 13.5 12.6 9.7
Eastern EU 8.3 12.6 8.5 13.6
Eurozone 48.9 46.2 52.4 49.5
Non-EU 30.6 31.6 29.4 30.5
Table 4.7: Germany’s exports and imports by area as a percentage of total (1999-2008). Source:
adapted from Simonazzi et al. (2013)
EX to Germany IM from Germany
over EX to Eurozone over IM from Eurozone
1999 2008 1999 2008
Greece 32.7 24.3 33.3 36.6
Italy 33.1 28.9 49.4 54
Portugal 29.1 20.6 25.2 24.9
France 31.1 29.2 53.4 54.7
Spain 21.5 19.1 33.5 38.8
Table 4.8: Share of southern EU countries (plus France) trade with Germany in their total trade with
the Eurozone (1999-2008). Source: adapted from Simonazzi et al. (2013)
has followed a similar trajectory from 1999 to 2008: they have all decreased the share of
their exports towards Germany but at the same time increased the share of imports from
that very same country (table 4.8). Despite growing demand from peripheral countries,
German firms over the 2000s sought to expand their trade relations with countries out-
side the Eurozone: Eastern European as reported above, but especially emerging Asian
economies, China above all. There is no need to state any more that the higher the rate
of growth of external demand, the higher the rate of export growth. Therefore, looking
for stable trade links with countries showing above average rates of growth, and further
potential for development, is a perfectly sensible strategy, for the single entrepreneur and
for the industrial development of the country as a whole. After performing a regression
analysis on bilateral trade relations between some Eurozone countries and other non-
member ones (e.g. eastern European, commodity exporter, emerging Asian), Chen et
al. (2013) have found that there is no significant evidence in favour of Germany having
a higher than average export demand elasticity compared to other Eurozone economies.
This seems to confirm the findings on aggregate trade elasticities reported above. Never-
theless, the export demand elasticity from China appears to be significantly higher than
the average, implying a relative advantage for the country that is most involved in trade
partnerships with the Chinese economy (i.e. Germany).
Table 4.9 gives several important intuitions on why the export success of Germany has
both a qualitative and a geographical dimension. Not only is the great bulk of its exports
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High Medium-High Medium-Low Low
1999 2008 1999 2008 1999 2008 1999 2008
Spain Total 1.2 1.2 4.6 4.2 2.5 2.6 3.4 2.8
Emerging Asia 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
CEE 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Commodity Exporters 0.1 0.08 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Germany Total 3.0 4.2 8.0 12.6 2.7 4.9 2.5 3.1
Emerging Asia 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
CEE 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.6 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3
Commodity Exporters 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Table 4.9: Bilateral exports subdivided by the OECD technological classification, as a percentage of
GDP (1999 compared to 2008). Source: adapted from Chen et al. (2013)
concentrated in the high and medium-high sectors23, this share has also increased in the
ten years from 1999 to 2008. By way of comparison, Spain had a lower share of exports
in high and medium-high technology sectors in 1999, which have remained stationary
throughout the 2000s. Moreover, over those ten years, Germany more than doubled
the share of its exports directed towards emerging Asian economies, eastern European
countries and commodity exporters countries in the high and medium-high layers, those
that are very sensitive to external demand growth. Spain instead, which had a lower
share of high and medium-high technology exports to begin with, has not seen particular
improvements, especially with respect to the Asian economies, to which exports in those
layers have radically fallen.
The ability of the export-oriented German enterprises to engage in trade partnerships
with crucial emerging economies has become a typical characteristic of Germany’s recent
growth model. As Detzer and Hein (2013) note, German exports are heavily dependent on
the rate of investment in capital goods in the rest of the world. China, with its astonishing
high rate of investment24, has therefore become an indispensable, and progressively more
important, reference and source of external demand for German products.
According to data presented in a recent Coface (2016) Report, from 2001 to 2014
Germany’s average annual export growth to China has been over 16%, raising China’s
share of German exports from 1.5% at the beginning of the period to over 6% in 2015
(figure 4.16). Germany’s exports in terms of trade volumes are particularly concentrated:
in 2015 more than 60% of them are accounted for by the automotive sector (18.8%),
mechanical engineering (14.1%), chemicals (9%), data processing, electrical and optical
parts (8.1%), electrical equipment (6%) and pharmaceutical (5.9%).
As figure 4.17 tells, the automotive, mechanical engineering, and electrical equipment
sectors are the most valuable in terms of exports to China, well above the average value.
It is no surprise that all three are very capital-intensive sectors, thus related to the
23Following the OECD classification already mentioned.
24From World Bank data, China’s average rate of gross capital formation (as a percentage of GDP)
over the period 1999-2014 has been 42.7%, and it has increased progressively.
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Figure 4.16: Export growth to China and China’s share of German exports in percentage terms
(2001-2015). Source: Coface (2016)
amount of investment performed in the Chinese economy. Once again, the importance of
the geographical source of demand for domestic products is restated. To paraphrase the
well-known say ”When the US sneezes, the world catches a cold”: when China grows,
German exports thrive. Conversely, given the exposure that German exporters now have
towards emerging economies and the Chinese one in particular, when exports to China
became negative, Germany’s overall rate of export growth slows down, as it happened
last year (2015) for the first year since 1997.
Spain
The ’failure’ story of Spain’s trade performance is not as clear-cut as it is often depicted.
Certainly, Spain has run progressively larger trade and current account deficits in the
period 1999-2007, which have been explained in several different ways. The authors of
the ’Consensus View’, once more, focus mainly on the decline in cost and price competi-
tiveness that Spain endured in the 2000s. Instead, the alternative story presented above
stresses the importance of cross-border financial flows and their role in fuelling domestic
credit booms in the peripheral countries, which in turns pushed up internal demand for
imports. As policies of internal devaluation have been put in place since 2010, current
account deficits have disappeared, thanks to the drastic fall in import demand.
It is useful then to explain in greater details the logical and actual sequence of events,
trying to provide a more articulate explanation for the surge in Spanish imports. Un-
doubtedly, Spain suffered from the evil combination of unrestrained financial flows in-
vested in non-tradable activities and overspecialisation in certain sectors: in 2007 con-
struction and real estate absorbed 18% of total employment, accommodation and catering
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Figure 4.17: Share of exports to emerging countries and to China, in aggregate and sectoral terms
(2015). Source: Coface (2016)
around 10% and wholesale and retail another 9% (Uxo´ et al. 2016).
The construction sector in Spain should be the crucial focus of analysis for what
happened up to 2007 and for how the crisis developed from 2008 onwards. Why does the
construction sector deserve such scrutiny? First, it is a part of the economy that does not
contribute to the total value of exports, instead it imports a lot of construction material
and instruments. Secondly, it is rather undynamic and with little scope for technological
and productive improvements that can bring positive spillovers for other activities. In
the terminology of Hirschman (1958) it has positive backward linkages but almost no
forward linkages. Product and process innovation is almost absent, yet it is very labour
intensive. The combination of all these characteristics brings to a logical conclusion: an
above average expansion of this sector is bound to contribute towards generating trade
deficit for the whole economy.
As a matter of fact, what happened in Spain between 1997 and 2007 is that the
construction sector grew at twice the rate of GDP, the building of 6.25 million houses was
initiated and one in five new jobs was created in construction activities. As a result, by
2007, the weight of the building industry was much larger than the EU average, mostly at
the expenses of employment in manufacturing. As table 4.10 reports, the average annual
rate of growth in gross fixed capital in the construction sector more than doubled the
rate of GDP growth in the ten years from 1997 to 2007, acting as a driver for the whole
economy. After 2008, investment in that sector nosedived, falling by 40% in just three
years.
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Annual growth rate Cumulated change Cumulated change
(1997-2007) (1997-2007) (2008-2011)
GDP +3.85% +46.97% -4.71%
Investment in construction +7.85% +107.43% -38.03%
Table 4.10: Annual and cumulated growth rates of GDP and Gross Fixed Capital in the construction
sector in Spain. Source: adapted from Febrero and Bermejo (2013)
Construction sector Spain EU
1997 2007 1997 2007
Employment (thousands) 1318 2697 11715 17915
Employment (% over total) 9.93% 13.25% 7.8% 8.21%
Spain Rest of euro area
1997 2007 1997 2007
Value added (% over total) 7.1% 11.8% 6.3% 6.5%
Table 4.11: Employment and share of value added in the construction sector of Spain, compared to
the EU and the euro area (12 countries). Source: adapted from Febrero and Bermejo (2013) and Uxo´ et
al. (2011)
Table 4.11 gives a better picture on the extraordinary expansion of such determinant
sector over those crucial years. Both in terms of share of employees and value added
out of total, the construction sector in Spain registered an increasing divergence from
the average values of other European countries. The impression that the process was
artificially fuelled and had a speculative connotation is evident from employment data
after the beginning of the crisis. From 2007 to 2014 the number of people involved in the
vertically integrated construction sector dropped by almost 1.8 million, which represented
a fall of 64.4% for the whole sector and contributed to 53.7% of total employment losses
over that period (Uxo´ et al. 2016).
In the previous chapter it has been argued that the main culprit behind the Spanish
housing bubble has been the amount of cheap credit, a great part of that coming from
abroad. Investors from Germany, in particular private German banks, were among the
greatest creditors in gross terms to Spain’s financial institutions and other private actors.
One explanation for this phenomenon has been put forward by Storm and Naastepad
(2015a), arguing that the surge in investment into the construction and real estate sectors
in Spain has been driven by ”push factors”: the fall in the rates of return on investment
in core countries (i.e. Germany) whose investors looked for a more profitable allocation of
capital abroad. Investment in the construction sector over GDP fell by about 3 percentage
points from the 1990s to the 2000s in Germany, while it increased by little less than 3
percentage points in Spain over the same periods. Meanwhile, in the very same sector,
the rate of return on capital fell by 9 percentage points in Germany and grew by 9.5
percentage points in Spain (table 4.12).
Therefore, the surge in domestic demand that dramatically deteriorated the trade and
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Rates of return on capital Germany Spain
1992-1999 2000-2007 1992-1999 2000-2007
Construction 28.8% 17.9% 23.7% 34.2%
Finance, insurance and real estate 7.7% 6.2% 6.8% 10.5%
Table 4.12: Industry-specific rates of return on capital in Germany and Spain (1992-1999 compared to
2000-2007). Source: adapted from Storm and Naastepad (2015a)
current account balance of Spain cannot be explained without considering the relative
importance of the construction sector. This sector is easily subject to speculation as
housing prices rise and fall with extreme volatility, to which freely-flowing cross border
capital may contribute. Thus, the financial nature of the externally-triggered crisis in
Spain, as well as in Ireland, becomes clearer when the developments in the construction
sector over the 2000s are taken into account.
Nevertheless, little or nothing have been said so far on the Spanish export performance
over the last 20 years, and how much it is related to structural characteristics of its
productive system. First of all, Spanish exports have been growing at more or less the
same rate as GDP from 1999 to 2007, as testified by the stability in the exports to GDP
ratio over that decade (figure 4.18). Since GDP growth of Spain over that period have
been remarkable, it is impossible to argue that Spain’s export performance has been dis-
maying. Germany’s ratio instead have sky-rocketed from 27% in 1999 to 43% in 200725.
In this case, the result is explained by a combination of booming exports and a meagre
rate of GDP growth. The sustained rate of export growth explains partly why Spain has
been able to resist losses in export market shares (-8.9% between 1999 and 2011), even
doing better than Germany (-12.2%), despite a documented loss in price competitiveness
(BBVA 2012).
Figure 4.18: Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. Source: BBVA (2012)
25World Bank data.
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This apparently contradictory evidence, that has been labelled ”Spanish Paradox”,
can be taken as an ultimate confirmation that the deterioration of the real exchange rate
has had little if no effects on the trade performance of the Spanish economy. According
to the Bank of Spain (Banco de Espan˜a 2011), between 2001 and 2011 Spanish exporting
firms represented only a small minority of the total. Only 12% of them exported goods
and 8.6% exported services. The dualism, that in truth is typical of most advanced
economies (e.g. Germany, but also Italy) between a vast majority of less productive and
technologically backward firms that rely totally on the internal markets and a small core
of competitive exporting firms that operate in the international market, is made even
more evident by the concentration of exporting firms. Over the same period, the top
1% of firms in terms of export volumes accounted for 67.4% of total exports, while the
top 10% represented almost 93% of all exports. This is partly explained by the size26 of
exporting firms, as figure 4.19 confirms with respect to manufacturing firms: more than
90% of those that have more than 200 employees are exporting abroad.
Figure 4.19: Percentage of exporters by firm size in Spain (average 1990-2010). Source: BBVA (2012)
However, size by itself means nothing in terms of export capacity. The biggest en-
terprises are generally successful in the international market, partly because they are
structurally more productive and technologically advanced. Indeed, according to the
OECD (2008), Spain is a country that presents a great dispersion in productivity levels
among different classes of firm size. Compared to the average productivity of labour in the
manufacturing sector, firms with more than 250 employees are 65.5% more productive,
while the productivity level of firms with less than 9 workers is almost half compared to
the average. Moreover, the comparison between exporters and non-exporters (table 4.13)
confirms that, in every parameter that measures productive and innovative capabilities,
exporting firms perform much better than non-exporting ones. In terms of the median of
the distribution, exporting firms’ size is statistically larger, while productivity is double
in terms of output per employee and 50% greater in terms of value added per employee.
26National offices of statistics consider the number of employees when measuring the size of a firm.
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Finally, non exporting firms have a risible (here surveyed as zero) percentage of engineers
and university graduates as employees over the total number, and spend little or nothing
on R&D and on the imports of technology services.
(median of the distribution) Exporters Non-exporters
Size 167 21
Productivity (value added per employee) 33.2 20.2
Productivity (output per employee) 104.7 48.8
Physical capital per employee 31.4 12.3
Innovation
High-skilled labour (%) 3.6 0
White collar workers (%) 28.6 21.4
R&D and technological adoption 24 0
Table 4.13: Firms’ characteristics in the Spanish manufacturing industry: exporters vs. non-exporters,
average 1990-2010. Source: adapted from BBVA (2011)
Once again, it seems that the international competitiveness of modern firms in ad-
vanced economies derives primarily from its capacity to be productive, innovative and
able to match the external demand for its products. The price variable, as stated above,
has a bigger influence in certain traditional activities, which have nonetheless a diminish-
ing quantitative importance on the total value of exports. In the case of Spain, firms that
used to operate internationally in the lower layers of production may have suffered the
competition of emerging economies, not helped by an appreciation of the real exchange
rate in the 2000s. Indeed, the single currency has a common external exchange rate that
applies to both Spain and Germany, despite opposite balances in their current accounts.
Therefore, ever since 1999 Spain has suffered a continuous overvaluation of its external
exchange rate and vice-versa. However, the effects of this disequilibrium does not ap-
pear to be huge, and Spain has managed to maintain a fairly flourishing export sector
nonetheless. For this reason, the trade performance of the Spanish economy is better
explained by analysing the import side, therefore the domestic developments, shaped by
the contribution of external financial flows and the configuration of its productive system.
4.3 We are all Wildeians now!
The ’real’ dimension of current account imbalances in the Eurozone has been the focal
point of this chapter. In this case, ’real’ means that the analysis referred to the account-
ing of its trade, primary income and secondary income balances. In practice, however,
the trade component is what mostly determines the overall current account balance in
many medium to large size advanced economies. Trade patterns and competitiveness de-
velopments have thus been demystified: the ”cynic” vision of the ’Consensus View’ that
relies on cost and price variables appears rather myopic and might have some relevance
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only for certain more traditional activities (e.g agriculture, textiles, mining and so on),
which represent only a minor part in the overall export basket of a modern European
country.
What has been argued instead is that trade imbalances in the Eurozone cannot be
explained without taking into account different rates of demand growth, specific geo-
graphical sources of demand for products, productive and trade structures, institutional
arrangements and recent historical events. They all constitute fundamental elements for
the analysis of trade developments in advanced capitalist economies. This alternative
perspective, that shifts the focus from a ”price” to a ”value” analysis of trade perfor-
mances has several practical consequences. It calls for a totally different policy paradigm
that privileges active industrial policies, capital controls and even measures of planned
trade - as Kaldor (1981) recommended - over the self-defeating war of competitive wage
devaluations among members of the single currency. However, in the context of the cur-
rent European Monetary Union, such ’Copernican Revolution’ is unquestionably hard to
be conceived.
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Conclusions
Questo e` il fin di chi fa mal;
E de’ perfidi la morte
Alla vita e` sempre ugual!
Don Giovanni (Atto Secondo, Scena ultima)
Music: Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart
Libretto: Lorenzo da Ponte
The oxymoronic title of this dissertation represents an explicit tribute to Hyman
Minksy’s intuition on financial instability in a modern capitalist economy. When he ar-
gued that (Minsky 1986, p.320) ”a capitalist economy is inherently flawed because its
investment and financing processes introduce endogenous destabilizing forces” he meant
that periods of financial stability, by encouraging risk-taking and innovative behaviour,
paradoxically27 sow the seeds of emerging instability in the economy. ”Stability is desta-
bilizing”28 beautifully summarises this concept.
Even though Minsky’s analysis is prevalently focused on the US economy and its fi-
nancial, monetary and government institutions, it is not improper to apply his theoretical
tools to the case of the European Monetary Union. In fact, in previous chapters we have
sought to demonstrate that the euro area has not experienced a balance-of-payments
crisis originated from divergent trends of competitiveness in the real economy. On the
contrary, the Eurozone crisis should be seen as a sort of Minskyan financial crisis that has
turned into a crisis in the real economy, affecting several EU member states. We shall
nonetheless leave Minsky aside for a moment, in order to further clarify the proper inter-
pretation of the Eurozone crisis, as it brings to logical conclusions that are remarkably
different to those of the standard interpretation.
∗ ∗ ∗
27In recent years, prestigious institutions such as the Bank for International Settlements have been
recognising the reinforcing feedback mechanism of risk perception diminishing as the financial system
nurtures imbalances that make it more and more vulnerable. Borio and Drehmann (2009) have referred
to this phenomenon as the ”paradox of financial instability”.
28The original quote from its John Maynard Keynes (1975, p.11) is ”Because Keynes arrived at his
views on how a capitalist economy operates by examining problems of decision-making under conditions
of intractable uncertainty, in his system, stability, even if it is the result of policy, is destabilizing”
(emphasis added).
117
118 CONCLUSIONS
The European Monetary Union is often assimilated to the gold-exchange standard in
the interwar period, or even to the pre-1914 gold standard, in so far as its members have
given up their monetary and exchange-rate policy. When in A Tract on Monetary Reform
(1923) Keynes argued against the restoration of the pre-war gold standard, it did so on
the ground that a system of exchange rates managed and controlled by central banks’
intervention would have been preferable than destabilising fluctuations in the domestic
price levels. His argument was still based on a ’classical’ mechanism of equilibrium in
the trade balance, accomplished through realignments in the terms of trade of similar
competing nations. From his words (ibid., pp.71-72):
In conditions of equilibrium the internal and external purchasing powers of
a currency must be the same, allowance being made for transport charges
and import and export taxes; for otherwise a movement of trade would occur
in order to take advantage of the inequality. [...] If, therefore, we find that
the internal and external purchasing powers of the home currency are widely
different, and, which is the same thing, that the actual exchange rates differ
widely from the purchasing power parities, then we are justified in inferring
that equilibrium is not established, and that, as time goes on, forces will come
into play to bring the actual exchange rates and the purchasing power parities
nearer together.
As in the ’Consensus View’ on today’s Eurozone crisis, excessive and unstable financial
flows were only considered the outcome of ’real’ trade imbalances, which in turns are the
result of divergences in relative costs and prices. If, in the gold-standard era, world
capital movements and their fluctuations manifested in speculation over the values of
currencies, in the Eurozone, a de facto single currency area, they appeared as rising
interest rates on government and corporate bonds of deficit countries in the periphery.
Keynes’s vision however would be refined later, culminating in his practical involvement
in the establishment of the post-war international monetary system at the conference
of Bretton Woods in 1944. His Proposal for an International Clearing Union (1943),
was indeed ambitious and envisaged the institution of a properly functioning clearing
union that should have dealt with all the international current payments, at the same
time regulating cross-border flows of capital, in order to facilitate its use for ’productive’
purposes while restraining other ’speculative’ transactions29.
Nevertheless, rather than the monetary ’orthodox’ Keynes, both the pre-1914 and the
euro area crisis are better explained by reversing the causal order of events and concen-
trating on the autonomous and predominant role of financial flows. In fact, as Rudolph
Hilferding (1910) put it, the long-lasting ”latest phase of capitalist development” is one
29Eventually, the position of the US chief negotiator Harry Dexter White prevailed over the British
’Keynes Plan’ and the international monetary institutions that resulted from the Bretton Woods agree-
ments only minimally reflected Keynes’ vision for the post-war international monetary order.
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of Finance Capital, where ”large banks increasingly acquire the power to dispose over
fictitious capital”. Hilferding’s pioneering analysis put bank capital at the centre of the
process of capitalist accumulation, which was more and more assuming the configura-
tion of a close relationship, if not dependence, between great industrial monopolies and
monopolistic financial capital. Whereas many aspects of his interpretation have been
made obsolete by the structural transformations underwent by both the industrial and
the financial component of the capitalist system (if they can be distinguished today), his
great merit was to underline the independent and crucial role that banks and other finan-
cial institutions play in conditioning each different ”regime of capital accumulation”. We
have seen in chapter 3 how the cross-border activities of euro area core banks have fuelled
unsustainable developments in capital-receiving countries in the periphery. Interestingly,
in chapter 22 of Finance Capital we find a detailed explanation of how, and for what
purposes, the export of capital takes place (p.326):
If capital export in its most advanced form is undertaken by those sectors
of capital in which concentration is most advanced, this in turn accelerates
the growth of their power and their accumulation of capital. It is the largest
banks and the largest branches of industry which succeed in obtaining for
themselves the best conditions for the valorization of their capital in foreign
markets, and acquire the rich extra profits in which lesser capitals cannot even
dream of participating.
Moreover, the consequences of these aggressive, if not ’imperialistic’ (in Hilferding’s
words), cross-border flows of capital show an extraordinarily resemblance to recent devel-
opments in the Eurozone, as they have been described above in chapters 3 and 4 (ibid.,
p.275, p.279):
There is an observable tendency for the balance of payments to deteriorate
in a country which has reached the peak of the boom and is close to a crisis.
Prices during the boom encourage imports, which rise far above their normal
level, whereas exports do not increase to the same extent since the absorptive
capacity of the domestic market remains considerable [...]
Thus England, the first country in which advanced capitalist production be-
came established, was only able to promote its exports of means of production
so vigorously by supplying them not only as commodities but as capital; that
is to say, not by selling means of production abroad but by sending them
abroad as capital investments.
It is therefore striking that the separation between ’real’ developments in the current
account balance and the autonomous nature of international financial flows, that is cur-
rently a central tenet of the alternative analysis proposed by the Bank for International
Settlements of the BIS, was as crucial for interpreting the pre-1914 gold-standard world
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as it is today for conceptualising the Eurozone crisis primarily as a financial crisis. If
one reads the critical reappraisal that Robert Triffin undertook of the gold standard be-
fore 1914, there is an astounding parallelism with the current debate, between what we
have called ’Consensus View’ and the alternative vision on the financial nature of the
Eurozone crisis that has been put forward in the previous pages. In The Evolution of the
International Monetary System: Historical Reappraisal and Future Perspectives (1964),
the Belgian economist resumed the mainstream interpretation on the mechanisms of ad-
justments between countries in the gold-standard era in the following way (pp.6-7):
The importance of international capital movements, and of their fluctuations,
is often obscured by the disproportionate emphasis often placed on compara-
tive price and cost fluctuations as the major factor in balance-of-payments dis-
equilibria and their correction. Attention is thereby centered on the current-
account items of the balance of payments, and tends to suggest that most
disturbances arose in this area and had to be corrected promptly by the
restoration of equilibrium between receipts and expenditures on current - or
even merely merchandise - account.
In fact, however, international capital movements often did cushion - and
even stimulate - vast and enduring deficits, or surpluses, on current account
without calling for any correction whatsoever.
As he further explained below (p.8), even the distant gold-standard era was char-
acterised by the predominance of international capital flows and the emergence of a
core-periphery pattern between capital exporting and capital importing countries, the
latter subject to unstable variations in their economic activities that mostly originated
from what Triffin called ”perverse fluctuations in the availability of capital imports”:
The borrowing countries, on the other hand, were far less able to control
the rate of their capital imports which tended, on the whole, to swell in
boom times and dry up in hard times, contributing further to the economic
instability associated with their frequent dependence on one or a few items
of raw material or foodstuff exports, themselves subject to wide quantity
and/or price fluctuations. All in all, therefore, the balance of payments of
the countries of the so-called ”periphery” would be assisted, over the long run
by the large capital imports available to them from the financial markets of
industrial Europe, but these countries would pay for this dependence through
perverse fluctuations in the availability of such capital and in their terms of
trade over the cycle.
The historical comparison of the Eurozone crisis with the functioning of the gold standard
before 1914 establishes an important characteristic of the international monetary system:
when movements of capital across borders are effectively permitted with little regulation,
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the role of the current account balance is vastly overplayed by the independent direction
and scope of gross financial flows. That is precisely what the BIS authors refer to when
they argue that the ’excess financial elasticity’ of domestic monetary and financial regimes
is greatly influenced by the policy and institutional regime at the international level.
Monetary regimes that concentrate mostly on price rather than financial stability are
more likely to amplify financial elasticity, as they are not compelled to adopt a restrictive
monetary policy as long as the rate of inflation remains low and stable. Moreover, the
transmission of an excessive loose monetary policy from core economies to the rest of the
world is immediate and direct when currency areas extend beyond national jurisdictions
(i.e. the case of the international role of the US dollar, or of the euro in the European
Monetary Union). As far as financial regimes are concerned, when the mobility of capital
across borders is unrestrained, external sources of finance contributes to the domestic
building up of unsustainable credit and asset prices booms. As a matter of fact, the
history of the international monetary system, from the Bretton Woods agreements to the
financial crisis in 2007, is about the progressively dismantling of capital controls, even on
short-term financial flows, as well as about a shift from financial stability and regulation
towards financial liberalisation and the obsession with price stability. In this respect,
the European Union represents a supreme and radical example of how those policies and
institutional arrangements were adopted over the past thirty years. For this reason, the
analysis of the financial and economic crisis in the Eurozone - given its systemic nature -
cannot be performed without considering the role of its institutions and rules that have
been codified in the EU Treaties.
∗ ∗ ∗
The ’rigidity’ of a monetary union and its tendency to create ’unwanted’ imbalances was
clear well before the euro - and even the European Monetary System - was introduced.
Nicholas Kaldor (1971a) was simply one amongst many to criticise the Werner Report30
because it assumed that economic and monetary union could precede the political union.
In Kaldor’s view, the latter would have been necessary to deal with external imbalances,
as if they were regional divergences within a single country that needed to be addressed
through structural fiscal transfers.
In that case, the Cambridge economist was nonetheless looking at ’real’ imbalances,
which have been shown to be less relevant than external financial imbalances in explaining
the emergence of the Eurozone crisis. This should not surprise, since he was still writing
in an expiring but still established Bretton Woods era of limited movements of capital
across nations. The restriction of short-term capital movements was a legacy of the
30The Werner Report (1970), a policy document sponsored by the then Prime Minister of Luxembourg
Pierre Werner, was intended as a blueprint for the institution of a European Monetary Union in a
three-stage process. The objective should have been achieved through the irreversible convertibility of
currencies, free movement of capital, and the permanent locking of exchange rates that would eventually
lead to a single currency.
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international conference of 1944, from which many institutions of the post-war period were
born. Among these, was the International Monetary Fund, whose Articles of Agreement,
composed and adopted at Bretton Woods, explicitly mentioned the possibility for its
members to apply capital controls and restrictions, as Article VI (Section 3) ”Controls
of capital transfers” still declaims:
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international
capital movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a manner
which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly
delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in
Article VII, Section 3(b) and in Article XIV, Section 2.
When it comes to the European Economic Community (the European Union after
1992) instead, the free circulation of capital had always represented a central theoretical
dogma for the supporters of monetary integration in Europe. Ever since Mundell’s (1961)
theory of ’Optimal Currency Area’, where mobility of labour and capital assumes a central
role, the freedom of movement of capital has invariably been considered a crucial element
for the single market to work efficiently. Even the Werner Report that Kaldor ardently
contested, despite recognising that ”speculative movements of capital have assumed enor-
mous proportions” and that they could ”make still more difficult the control of economic
development by Member States”, advocated the completion of capital liberalisation in
the European Community. When it debated the establishment of the monetary union, it
maintained that (p.9, emphasis added):
A monetary union implies inside its boundaries the total and irreversible con-
vertibility of currencies, the elimination of margins of fluctuation in exchange
rates, the irrevocable fixing of parity rates and the complete liberation of
movements of capital.
The principle of free movement of capital became part of the European acquis com-
munautaire only after the European Single Act in 1986, which was followed by the har-
monising Council Directive 88/361/EEC that imposed the liberalisation of all capital
movements between member states: by 1 July 1990 all remaining restrictions were re-
moved. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) then solemnly codified the freedom of capital
movements in Article 63 of the TFEU:
[a]ll restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and be-
tween Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. [...] all restric-
tions on payments between Member States and between Member States and
third countries shall be prohibited.
Hilferding (1910, p.311) would have probably rationalised this historical process by
claiming that ”the development towards finance capital enhance the importance of the
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size of the economic territory”. It is not surprising then that the imposition of credit
controls and limitations on the movements of capital still remains a taboo in the European
Monetary Union. In fact, last year the European Commission has launched the ’Capital
Markets Union Action Plan’, with the intention of establishing an effective single market
for capital across EU member states. Among its principles it is listed ”fostering a stronger
and more resilient financial system”, a theoretical intuition that sharply contrasts what
the Bank of International Settlements has been arguing over these years. Even the
International Monetary Fund, after the long parenthesis of the ’Washington Consensus’,
which preached fiscal discipline, privatisations and the liberalisation of capital accounts,
is currently rethinking its position on all these issues that it is now starting to consider
as ’oversold’ (Ostry et al. 2016). In fact, some sort of controls over the amount, nature
and direction of the gross financial flows between Eurozone banks would have contained
the creation of unsustainable credit and asset prices booms in many peripheral countries.
It would have, more importantly, reduced to a minimum the capital outflows that so
contributed to the speculation on the periphery’s public debts in 2011 and 2012, which
in turns justified contractionary fiscal budgets that ultimately brought many Eurozone
countries into a double-dip recession in 2012 and 2013.
The liberalisation of capital movements in the European Union represents only one
aspect - the financial one - of the institutional arrangements that enhanced the ’financial
elasticity’ of that economic area. With respect to the monetary aspect, authors such as
De Grauwe (2013) have insisted that the one-size-fits-all monetary policy of the Euro-
pean Central Bank requires all euro area countries to be in a similar phase of the business
cycle. In this respect, while the sluggish economic performance of the German economy
in the first years of the monetary union necessitated a policy of low interest rates, the
opposite was true for many peripheral countries, were credit booms were fuelled by the
combination of low nominal interest rates and higher inflation rates. Moreover, the am-
biguous institutional structure of the Eurozone happened to be detrimental also in terms
of remedial measures that a country with a lender of last resort (i.e. its central bank) can
implement in preventing a crisis of confidence in its banking sector or speculation over
the value of its government bonds. Instead, the architecture of the European Monetary
Union does not confront any of these criticisms and, as Obstfeld (2013) rightly observes,
it gives total and absolute priority to the maintenance of price stability (Article 2 of
its Statute) over financial stability in the private and public sectors. Finally, there is a
bitter irony in recent events, which testifies that central banks can do very little, if noth-
ing at all, to revamp inflation in a deflationary environment in which many Eurozone
countries are currently living. The ECB interest rate on the marginal lending facility
has been reduced to the historical minimum of 0.25 in March 2016, while the rate on
deposit facility has been turned into negative already in June 2014. Together with such
extremely loose interest rate policy, the undergoing Quantitative Easing programme of
the European Central Bank, started in March 2015 and successively extended in duration
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and scope, has spectacularly failed to reach the ECB inflation target. As of August 2016,
annual inflation in the euro area is 0.2%, quite far from its ”below, but close to, 2%”
target, with many countries, such as Italy and Spain, registering outright deflation.
Furthermore, and connected to both the financial and the monetary dimension, the
role of Target2 before and after the crisis has been dual. In operative terms, it techni-
cally eliminated the possibility of balance-of-payments crises in the single currency area,
substituting private interbank lending when peripheral countries suffered drastic capital
outflows between 2011 and 2012. In this very respect, Target2 has shown strong similar-
ities with Keynes’s International Clearing Union (Lavoie 2015). It thus contributed to
eliminating the ’country risk’ of investing in one country’s assets with the danger that a
sudden devaluation would reduce the face value of that investment. On the other hand,
and in contrast with the proposal of Keynes, it cannot impose limitations on capital
transfers between private banks and financial institutions. With the disappearance of
the ’currency risk’ and with no limits imposed on the movements of capital, speculative
cross-border financial flows could flourish. Therefore, the combination of a facilitator of
gross financial transactions and the existing free mobility of capital across jurisdictions
has enormously contributed towards increasing the financial elasticity of the Eurozone
before the crisis, as BIS data on cross-border transactions, credit to GDP ratios and asset
prices demonstrate. Once again the very configuration and institutional setting of the
European Monetary Union was not neutral in the process of building imbalances. In the
words of Minsky (1986, p.353):
As a result of these constitutional flaws, speculative finance and the growth of
market institutions that facilitate the rolling over and refinancing of positions
are destabilizing developments during prosperous times.
Lastly, a final consideration on trade liberalisation in the European Union needs
to be made. When Martin Wolf in early 2012 asked on the columns of the Financial
Times whether a country can have a balance-of-payments crisis in a currency union, the
answer he gave was a positive one, adding that it could manifest as either, or both,
a credit crisis or a ”regional economic slump”. It should be clear by now that the
Eurozone does in fact have a ”workable mechanism for dealing with the creditworthiness
crises” caused by outflows of private capital and consequent pressures on governments’
borrowing. A properly functioning common central bank, as the European Central Bank
has progressively become through time, can technically prevent both a ’credit crisis’,
through its payment system and its refinancing operations, and a sovereign debt crisis,
as long as it acts as a lender of last resort for its member states. Nonetheless, there is
some truth in the assertion that balance-of-payments crises - or current account deficits
as one ought to be calling them - are the accounting manifestation of imbalances in the
’real economy’. Chapter 4 has shown that in the pre-crisis years imports have boomed
in many peripheral countries, especially Greece and Spain, while they grew much less in
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Germany; at the same time export growth in Germany was little more sustained compared
to the periphery. Far from being a sign of deteriorating price competitiveness, current
account deficits emerged in peripheral countries, either because they overdeveloped in
certain non-tradable activities, or because domestic consumption could not keep up with
domestic production. Even though this is practically irrelevant in terms of the external
financial sustainability of those deficit countries, imports growing in excess of exports
in whatever economic area, be it a region or a country, is most of the time a sign of
economic weakness. As Anthony Thirlwall in an article written for the Financial Times
in October 1991 sought to explain: ”EMU is no cure for problems with the balance of
payments”. With that he simply meant that any economic unit in which export growth is
strong relative to import demand will generally present high rates of productivity-induced
growth and low unemployment rates. The theoretical foundation of this argument dates
back to the first Keynesian authors, but it has been better investigated by Kaldor in
his inquiries over the ”causes of growth and stagnation” of economic systems, where he
identified in the rate of export growth the explanatory factor for the rate of economic
development in a given region, through Harrod’s foreign trade multiplier. Resuming
other ’Kaldor’s growth laws’ on the relation between manufacturing output and overall
income mediated by the macroeconomic role of increasing returns, in Causes of Growth
and Stagnation in the World Economy (1984, p.67) he summarised his export-led growth
theory as follows:
International statistical comparisons have firmly established that differences
of growth rates of GDP are mainly explicable in terms of differences in the
growth rates of the manufacturing sector; countries with high rates of GDP
growth have invariably been those whose manufacturing industry has grown
at an even faster rate and whose exports of manufactures have grown at a still
faster rate. Harrod has shown (three years before the publication of Keynes’
General Theory), in his theory of the ”foreign trade multiplier”, that changes
in export demand have multiplier and accelerator effects which operate so as
to adjust, via changes in the general level of output, the level of imports to
that of exports. [...] It follows, moreover, that the growth rate of exports,
together with the income elasticity of imports, govern the growth rate of the
economy.
Although exports are crucial in determining the growth prospect of a country or a sin-
gle region, for Kaldor this does not necessarily imply that the opening of trade between
different economies is beneficial for everyone, as the Ricardian theory of ’comparative ad-
vantages’ would suggest. Classical and neoclassical theories of international trade declare
that free trade favours convergence among countries and regions, yet Kaldor (1981) ex-
plains that this might happen if traded goods are sufficiently homogeneous and substitute
(i.e. agricultural products), and their market is characterised by perfect competition and
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diminishing or even constant returns to scale. None of this assumptions obviously hold
true in the real world of oligopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale, where
traded goods are most often sophisticated and complementary industrial products. The
combination of all these characteristics, in the absence of tariff barriers and quantita-
tive restriction on trade, might well lead to the concentration of production activities in
certain areas and economic divergences between countries and regions. In this case, the
principle of ’cumulative causation’ (Kaldor 1970, p. 484) explains the unequal economic
development of different areas by illustrating how:
the region that is initially more developed industrially may gain from the
progressive opening of trade at the expense of the less developed region whose
development will be inhibited by it.
It is here that the European Union, or the European Economic Community (EEC) as
it was called at that time, enters the scene. The Treaty of Rome of 1957, establishing
the European Economic Community, had as its principal purpose the institution of a
common market among the six original founding members. Therefore, the first of the
”FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY” was codified in Article 9, under the title
”FREE MOVEMENTS OF GOODS”:
The Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all
trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States
of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent
effect.
The free-trade orientation of the EEC was the main reason behind Kaldor’s (1971b)
scepticism towards Britain joining the Common Market. He was coherently convinced
that (p.71):
Unless we manage to become the fast-growing industrial centre of the Com-
munity [...] we may be faced with the same problem of declining total demand
and employment as our development areas have had during the last twenty
years, and with no more ability to counter it by local policies, without external
assistance.
This last passage finally hints to his brilliant and crucial distinction on how the principle
of ’cumulative causation’ manifests between different regions of a single country and
between different polities. In the context of the European Economic Community or the
European Union today, the discrimination is fundamental, as it typifies the conceptual
and practical failure of an institutional arrangement in which some important decisional
competences are shared in a dysfunctional way. In particular, Kaldor criticised the process
of European economic integration for its lack of coherence among policy instruments and
the practical neutralisation of the public authorities in pursuing the economic objectives
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of full employment, price stability and a healthy balance of payments. In contrast to a
sovereign political entity (Kaldor 1970, p.488):
a region which forms part of a political community, with a common scale of
public services and a common basis of taxation, automatically gets ’aid’ when-
ever its trading relations with the rest of the country deteriorate. There is an
important built-in fiscal stabilizer which arrests the operation of the export-
multiplier: since taxes paid to the Central Government vary with the level
of local incomes and expenditure, whilst public expenditures do not (indeed
they may vary in an offsetting direction through public works, unemployment
benefit, etc.), any deterioration in the export-import balance tends to be re-
tarded (and ultimately arrested) by the change in the region’s fiscal balance
– in the relation between what it contributes to the central Exchequer and
what it receives from it.
In adhering to the Common Market31, each member state would automatically renounce
to any instrument of trade policy - tariffs or quotas - that it could use to benefit its trade
balance without the provision of any equilibrating mechanism of fiscal transfers at the
Community level. Intra-Community transfers, which constitute an essential feature of
federal as well as unitary states, where not envisaged in the Treaty of Rome, although
the Werner Report mentions the necessity of ”financial transfers” to realise equilibrium
within the Community ”in the same way as within a nation’s frontiers”. In a later
document, the so-called ”MacDougall Report” (1977), that explored the possibility for
the Community to establish a proto-federal budget, the issue of ”Inter-regional balance
of payments” should have been dealt with a ”horizontal budget equalisation mechanism”
that would have entailed annual intra-EEC financial transfers amounting to a modest 2%
of the Community GDP. A far cry from the current ”European Structural and Investment
Funds”, which amount to 454 billions of euros for the years 2014-2020: on a yearly
average they represent only 0.44% of EU GDP32. Moreover, the European Union is not
simply a free trade area with a ’Common Customs Tariff’, it is also a single market with
several strict rules on competition. As the elimination of tariffs and quotas ruled out
any selective restriction of imports, even with ’infant industry’ or ’substitutive’ purposes,
other dispositions of the Treaties do not allow member states to freely perform the kind of
policies that could help promote exports in certain strategic sectors or firms. Particularly
severe is the legislation on ’state aid’, which is regulated by Article 107 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union:
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
31Which has come to be called ’Single Market’ after the signing of the European Single Act in 1986.
32Author’s calculation using the 2015 reference value for the EU GDP.
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certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be
incompatible with the internal market.
Whereas general tax measures (e.g. R&D subsidies) and employment legislation are al-
lowed, selective interventions such as loans, subsidies and grants or preferential treatments
for certain goods and services are forbidden and generally sanctioned by the European
Commission. To summarise, the complete liberalisation of trade between EU member
states, without any institutionalised system of transfers from surplus to deficit areas -
as it would be the case between regions within any country - is likely to be conducive
to increasing divergences between countries in terms of industrial and export capacities.
The concentration of financial capital, that is already existent in the European Union,
is now being accompanied by the concentration of productive activities, organised along
a core-periphery structure where the periphery acts as a subcontractor to the assembler
core, which therefore sells the final product and captures the higher share of value added
incorporated in it.
∗ ∗ ∗
In conclusion, the monetary, financial and institutional setting of the European Mone-
tary Union has never played a neutral role, neither prior to the crisis, nor afterwards. In
fact, the process of integration has remarkably contributed to the emergence of financial
and structural imbalances among its members. Nonetheless, commercial, financial and
monetary integration among European countries have always been endorsed with the jus-
tification that it would provide economic efficiency and stability to the countries involved.
Moreover, less advanced economies, by opening up competition with other countries, by
liberalising their capital accounts and by giving up their monetary sovereignty would have
reduced the productivity and income per capita gaps with richer member states. The
emergence of current account imbalances and financial flows towards peripheral countries,
in the decade before the crisis, were seen as positive signs of convergence and of financial
markets working efficiently. In the light of the current situation, it appears as pure fan-
tasy to argue that economic, financial and monetary integration has brought convergence
among EU member states. Eurostat data on income, industrial and employment variables
are as clear as merciless. Relative to 2010, real GDP per capita in 2015 was 0.5% lower
in Spain, around 3% lower in Portugal, 5% lower in Italy and a staggering 17% lower in
Greece; whereas in Germany, in France and in The Netherlands it was higher by 6.3%,
2.4% and almost 2% respectively. In terms of industrial production, from 2010 to 2015,
Spain’s index is 6% lower, the same in Portugal by 3.3%, Italy has lost 7.7%, but Greece
has performed worst with a loss of 11.7%; on the other hand, Germany’s industrial pro-
duction is higher by 8.8%, while France and The Netherlands have respectively stagnated
and lost industrial capacity over the past five years. Furthermore, Credit Reform data
on corporate insolvencies reveal33 that, compared to 2010, the average annual number of
33Author’s calculations based on Credit Reform’s annual reports on corporate insolvencies in Europe.
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insolvencies over the past five years have increased by 40% in Spain and Portugal, by 38%
in Italy, by 11% in Greece34 and also by 14% in France; in Germany and in The Nether-
lands, insolvencies have actually diminished by 21% in the first case and by 7% in the
latter. Lastly, comparing employment rates35 between their pre-crisis values in 2007 and
2015 gives a final indication of the pattern that has been taking place in the Eurozone:
employment rates have fallen by 7.7 percentage points in Spain, by 3.4 percentage points
in Portugal, by 2.2 percentage points in Italy and by 10.9 percentage points in Greece;
they have instead increased by 6.1 percent in Germany, and remained almost constant
and fairly high in The Netherlands. These are simply indicators of an extraordinary and
potentially unsustainable process of economic divergence that has been affecting the Eu-
rozone since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. It is a dramatic situation that
would require substantial and radical reforms in the Eurozone’s policies and institutional
structures, a change in the paradigm of economic integration that is currently neither
foreseeable and perhaps nor desirable. In fact, as long as the socio-economic and political
situations remains fairly stable, the current European Union, and especially its Eurozone
core, constitutes the promised land of liberalism as well as the perfect arrangements for
the socio-economic interests that it represents. As Friedrich von Hayek clearly illustrated
in 1939 (p.267), discussing how to conceive a minimalist federal state that could overcome
the vicious twist of nationalism and socialism:
The federation will have to possess the negative power of preventing individual
states from interfering with economic activity in certain ways, although it may
not have the positive power of acting in their stead.
Finally, the reference to Minsky in the title has an intentional double meaning. Apart
from celebrating his analysis on how financial crises are built in periods of overconfident
but relative prosperity and growth, the purpose of paraphrasing his most famous work -
Stabilizing an Unstable Economy - was to suggest something more about the nature of
the European Monetary Union and its monetary and financial integration. The argument
that embraces each and every aspect of the analysis presented above is crucial: euro area
developments of the past 15 years should be understood as a systemic failure, not just
as the fault of few incautious countries or the merit of other virtuous ones. Instead, the
economic crisis has been facilitated, worsened and prolonged by the institutional configu-
ration of the European Monetary Union, together with its process of integration and the
economic philosophy that accompanied it. Nowadays, more and more economists and
international institutions accuse the Eurozone of being the ”black hole” of global eco-
nomic growth. Nevertheless, the time for repentance might have expired, the long-lasting
economic crisis is carrying the European Union down to Hell, as the Commendatore’s
statue with Don Giovanni in Mozart’s opera. Integration, even if it is the result of policy,
is disintegrating.
34With reference to Greece, the computation leaves out 2015 as an outlier.
35From 20 to 65 years, Eurostat data.
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